The STC’s December gamble, at least on the surface, made a lot of sense. The Presidential Leadership Council, the eight-member body that represents what passes for Yemen’s internationally recognized government, was in disarray and riven with infighting. The economic situation in the South was a disaster and looked to be growing worse. Plus, the STC seemed to have the acquiescence if not the active encouragement of the UAE. The STC was formed in 2017 with the explicit goal of forming an independent Southern state in Yemen. By late November and early December 2025, all it needed was a spark, which it got when a local commander in Hadramout deployed troops around an oil field in an attempt to secure more revenue. The STC responded with a military offensive, quickly taking much of the oil-rich governorate of Hadramout as well as Mahra, Yemen’s easternmost governorate on the border with Oman. Within days the STC had control of much of Southern Yemen, and it looked as if all that was missing was an official declaration of independence.

On December 26, Rashad al-Alimi, the head of the Presidential Leadership Council, called on Saudi Arabia to intervene militarily in Yemen to reverse the STC’s military gains. For many, Alimi’s request echoed the one made a decade earlier by then Yemeni President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi, who called on Saudi Arabia and the UAE to use military force in Yemen to expel the Houthis from Sanaa. That intervention exacerbated a conflict in Yemen that still hasn’t ended.

Despite that history, however, Saudi Arabia quickly signaled that it was willing to intervene militarily in Yemen, even against ostensible allies. This is likely because, as analyst Maysaa Shuja al-Deen pointed out, the STC offensive upended the “implicit power-sharing arrangement” that had held for much of the past several years. “UAE backed forces dominate coastal areas and islands and maintain strong influence in Aden, while Saudi-backed forces control land borders and oil facilities.”

The day after Alimi’s request, Saudi Minister of Defense Khalid bin Salman posted a statement on X calling for the STC to withdraw. When that didn’t work, Saudi Arabia carried out an airstrike on an Emirati shipment of arms and vehicles that was destined for the STC, though the UAE denied the shipment included weapons. Worried about the implications of a Saudi-Emirati conflict in Yemen, the UAE announced that it was withdrawing all of its remaining forces from Yemen, which effectively left the STC exposed without air cover. After that, Saudi Arabia and its allies on the ground made quick work of the STC, carrying out a few airstrikes and forcing the units that had advanced with such optimism a month earlier to retreat. In some cases, STC fighters were forced to flee the area in buses after their military vehicles were destroyed.

On January 2, Aidarous al-Zubaidi, the head of the STC and a member of the Presidential Leadership Council, attempted to save face by announcing what he termed a “constitutional declaration,” basically laying out a two-year transitional period for an independent Southern state. Saudi Arabia responded by summoning several members of the STC, who also sit on the Presidential Leadership Council, in an apparent attempt to divide the movement from within.

What comes next in Yemen is likely to be messy and chaotic. Already there has been looting in Hadramout and Mahra as well as calls for reform and transition within the STC. Whether it survives in its current form or is able to implement its two-year constitutional transition toward independence are both open questions as is what role the UAE will play in Yemen moving forward. Will it continue to support the STC to the degree it did before, or will it look to diversify and increase support to other proxies, such as Tariq Saleh, who are not tied to dreams of Southern independence? One thing is certain, the withdrawal of UAE troops from Yemen does not mean the end of the UAE in Yemen.

Beyond the immediate implications for the STC, however, are broader ones for Yemen. After nearly 15 years of protest, revolution, chaos, uncertainty, and war, the country seems more divided than ever. The STC, despite its vision of an independent Southern state, never had the type of popular support across the South that could make that dream a reality. Instead, it is and was largely a regional movement, with much of its leadership and backing coming from Dhala and Lahj, which are close to Aden but far from Hadramout, where the STC was pushing to take over. Meanwhile, Hadramis prize their own regional identity, and even a few independent Hadrami state flags have popped up on X recently. The same could be said about Mahra and Socotra, both of which have distinct languages, although neither has the economic resources of Hadramout. Local allegiances over a national identity, a handful of competing militias none of which are strong enough to compel others to bend to their will, and meddling outside powers, taken together, constitute a recipe for continued conflict.

The STC’s failed attempt at independence likely means that Yemen won’t split along North and South lines. There will be no return to pre-1990 borders, at least not anytime soon. Instead, Yemen appears headed for a future in which no one party will manage to achieve superiority. The country will be divided along regional lines with local warlords, backed by outside powers, seizing as much territory as they can hold and administering as they see fit. There may be a veneer of national government, but its power won’t stretch much beyond the capital. Such a country will continue to spread insecurity – from Houthi threats to Red Sea shipping and a still active al-Qaeda threat to drug smuggling and a refugee problem, Yemen’s challenge to the region is only going to grow.

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Since 2022, Southern Yemen has been ruled by an odd amalgamation of interests through the Presidential Leadership Council, while in the North the Houthis have consolidated control over the highlands. The Presidential Leadership Council was never meant to be a long-term solution to Yemen’s many problems. Instead, it was designed to paper over a host of internal rivalries and reunify the anti-Houthi coalition as a single bloc. That hasn’t happened for two simple reasons – one internal and one external.

The Presidential Leadership Council is a Yemeni organization, but it was organized and built by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, each of which selected four members for the committee. The problem is that Saudi Arabia and the UAE don’t agree on what to do in Yemen and neither do their proxies. The head of the council, Rashad al-Alimi, who is backed by Saudi Arabia, favors reunifying the entire country, while Aidarous al-Zubaidi, one of the vice presidents on the council, wants an independent Southern state. Zubaidi is also the head of the Southern Transitional Council, which in recent days launched a major military operation in Hadramout and Mahra apparently as a first step toward seizing unilateral control of the South and, potentially, declaring independence. Southern Transitional Council forces took over military bases, check points, and oil fields, sometimes peacefully and sometimes after a short skirmish. Each time they did so, they replaced the Yemeni national flag with the Southern flag, clearly signaling their intentions.

Once again, there is both an internal and an external reason for the Southern Transitional Council’s offensive, which it has labeled “The Promising Future.” On the domestic front, the precipitating spark was a decision by Amr bin Habrish, Hadramout’s deputy governor and a commander of the Hadramout Tribal Alliance, to deploy troops around oil fields in an effort to secure more revenue. Bin Habrish, who is backed by Saudi Arabia, was quickly confronted by troops loyal to the Southern Transitional Council, who used his move as a pretext for military action. Southern Transitional Council troops, which are funded and armed by the UAE, then moved into Mahra, on the border with Oman, positioning themselves to take control over much of Southern Yemen.

At the same time, on December 5, Alimi abandoned the presidential palace in Aden and boarded a flight to Saudi Arabia. The Saudi troops that had been protecting him in Aden also withdrew, clearing the way for the Southern Transitional Council to take control of the presidential palace, the seat of political power in the South. By December 6, bin Habrish had also flown to Saudi Arabia. This meant that, on the ground in Yemen, the Southern Transitional Council held both the Southern capital of Aden as well as the South’s richest governorate – Hadramout. In parts of the South there are already demonstrations, demanding that the Southern Transitional Council declare independence.

However, as some commentators have pointed out, no matter the internal dynamics and jockeying in Yemen, it is unlikely the Southern Transitional Council would have launched an offensive aimed directly at Saudi-backed forces in Yemen without prior consultation with the UAE. It is no secret that Saudi Arabia is looking to extricate itself from Yemen, and the kingdom had been looking to make a deal with the Houthis brokered by Oman. The Southern Transitional Council takeover, at least in the short term, likely complicates those discussions.

What is unclear is whether Saudi proxy forces in Yemen will push back militarily against the Southern Transitional Council and, relatedly, whether it is prepared to declare an independent Southern state and disband the Presidential Leadership Council. Either of these possibilities could spark renewed fighting in the South, which could easily tip Yemen back into a renewed civil war.

Yemen has been broken for years. Saleh pillaged the South after the civil war in 1994, sowing some of the early seeds of state failure. Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi, who succeeded Saleh in 2012, was largely inept, making decisions like splitting the central bank, which only made a bad situation worse. The Presidential Leadership Council is paralyzed by infighting and indecision. The Southern Transitional Council is betting that if the South can be united under a single leadership – its own, of course – it can cordon the South off from the Houthis in the North, utilize oil and gas revenue, and create a stable and functioning state. That is a tall order, and it will likely be contested both internally and externally.

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Houthi leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi set the tone in televised remarks in mid-September. In perhaps his harshest attack yet on Saudi Arabia he accused Riyadh of serving Israeli interests and warned of consequences if the kingdom deepened its role in Red Sea security. His speech followed the September 16 Yemen Maritime Security Partnership conference, co-hosted by Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom, with representatives from more than 35 countries. The initiative was presented as a technical capacity building program for Yemen’s coast guard, framed around lawful efforts to counter smuggling, piracy, and human trafficking. Saudi officials pointed to decades of support, citing $55.6 million in historical coast guard assistance and a new $4 million pledge. For Abdul Malik al-Houthi, these were not neutral numbers. He argued that any banner raised to protect navigation now means protecting Israeli shipping and told Riyadh to avoid entanglement. His rhetoric ended with a vow that Saudi efforts would fail to secure Israeli vessels.

Kinetic and cyber signals reinforced the message. Pro-Houthi groups claimed to have penetrated Saudi logistics networks and tracked more than 60 oil tankers, hinting at destructive attacks if Riyadh persisted in backing anti-Houthi forces. Over the same period, maritime authorities logged two incidents in the northern Red Sea. One vessel 40 nautical miles southwest of Yanbu reported a splash from an unknown projectile and a loud bang. Another incident 178 nautical miles northwest of Hodeidah combined a water impact with severe electronic interference. There were no mass casualties, was no escalation to cities, but the incidents were significant enough to place the western energy and trade corridor within psychological warfare reach of the Houthis.

The political track moved at the same time. Riyadh hosted mediation meetings that brought members of the Presidential Leadership Council together with the Saudi and Emirati ambassadors. The result was a carefully staged show of unity. Smiling leaders after two days of talks and a subsequent council meeting September 18 reaffirmed the partnership, collective leadership, and adherence to the legal framework that governs the council. The council agreed to review decisions that conflict with its founding resolution within 90 days and examine appointments by Aidarous al-Zubaidi, vice president of the Presidential Leadership Council. A legal team will work with the Military and Security Committee to address force management issues. This is precisely the kind of statecraft that the Houthis read as consolidation against them. Yemen analysts have consistently encouraged Abu Dhabi and Riyadh to tighten coordination on the Yemen file. The September mediation meetings demonstrated a cohesive Saudi-Emirati strategy, which is necessary for any durable stability. But from the Houthis’ vantage point, it is also another sign of encirclement that will agitate their leadership and harden their information campaign.

The security picture that most unsettles the Houthis is the convergence of Red Sea control and the resurgence of anti-Houthi formations backed by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The National Resistance Forces now operate as an active and effective presence along Yemen’s western coast and near the Bab el-Mandeb strait, with a well-documented record of stopping Iranian arms shipments. Tariq Saleh, who leads the National Resistance Forces, also serves as vice president of the Presidential Leadership Council and has been a prominent adversary of the Houthis since the 2017 rupture with the group, which ended with the Houthis killing his uncle, late President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Saudi-funded units, including the National Shield Forces, have deployed across desert and border corridors to secure overland routes and disrupt Houthi smuggling and infiltration. UAE-backed formations, including the Counterterrorism Service and the Southern Giants Brigades, have intercepted shipments of Chinese dual-use equipment destined for Houthi networks. From the Houthis’ perspective, Riyadh’s engagement with maritime forces and the wider anti-Houthi camp form the backbone of a strategy that squeezes supply chains at sea while rebuilding a rival security architecture on land.

The Houthis’ public interpretation of the government forces’ military maneuvers exaggerated the coherence of a deeply fragmented coalition. Nevertheless, they promoted this narrative, fully aware of its distortions, because it served their public messaging. However, the main driver of their harassment remains economic pressure. Israeli strikes have targeted transportation and energy hubs tied to the Houthis and have disrupted external lifelines, including flights. U.S. terrorism designations and sanctions have narrowed financial channels. Trade flows, fuel access, and currency movements are constrained. Under these conditions the cheapest form of leverage for the Houthis is to raise the cost of Saudi calm without crossing the threshold that would trigger a decisive international response. Drones striking refineries would court war. Cyber intrusions, electromagnetic interference at sea, and unclaimed projectiles that splash near hulls are sufficient to lift insurance rates and capture the attention of Riyadh. They are also deniable enough to manage escalation. Electronic warfare and maritime harassment promise pressure without courting overly harsh or collective responses. It is coercive diplomacy by attrition.

The Houthis’ bargaining demand is not subtle. They want Saudi Arabia to sign and implement the United Nations roadmap with clauses that commit Riyadh to fund 6 to 12 months of public sector salaries in Houthi-controlled areas, including in the security and defense sectors, and to seed a reconstruction fund.

Saudi Arabia’s restrained response stems from deeper structural factors. The kingdom tried sustained military pressure for eight years without approaching an achievable military and political end state. The anti-Houthi coalition remains fragmented, with divergent chains of command and competing sources of external support. Western partners who could change the balance quickly do not want a new Yemen war. Riyadh is, therefore, seeking to avoid a large military campaign and is instead investing in layered defenses, maritime domain awareness, and partner capacity that hardens critical nodes while at the same time pushing the Presidential Leadership Council to function. This strategy was visible in September. Saudi money flowed to the United Nations-recognized government, and the Presidential Leadership Council staged its reset. Senior Saudi and Yemeni commanders inspected forces in Medi, Hairan, Haradh, Abs, and a naval unit operating in nearby islands. None of this ends the war. All of it attempts to counter Houthi pressure while making the Red Sea a more contested space.

Hezbollah’s leader, Naim Qassem, a key Houthi ally, seeks to immunize Lebanon from this regional spiral by urging Saudi Arabia to open a new chapter with the Lebanese “resistance” and stressing that its weapons target Israel rather than the kingdom. The Houthis use the same vocabulary to argue the opposite. Their claim is that Saudi Arabia is already inside Israel’s war.

In September, Houthi security and intelligence sources alleged that Israel, working through Saudi channels, funneled money to recruit “mercenaries” to hijack what they described as national Yemeni events and stir unrest. In fact, the Houthis went further, publishing through their official news agency a study claiming Israeli strategists view Riyadh as the grand prize of normalization and that Saudi entry into the Abraham Accords would reconfigure the region’s security architecture. It hypothesized preconditions including a Gaza cease-fire, U.S. security and civil nuclear guarantees for Saudi Arabia, and calibrated detente with Iran, framing these as evidence of emerging Saudi, U.S., and Israeli coordination with far-reaching implications.

To feed their collusion narrative, Houthi channels amplified a claim that Saudi Arabia’s national shipping company, Bahri, was moving U.S. weapons to Israel via the vessel Bahri Yanbu. Bahri issued a categorical denial, calling the reports baseless, affirming it has never carried cargo to Israel, and stressing full compliance with Saudi policy on Palestine and all maritime laws. The allegation appears to originate from Italian media reports claiming that Italian dockworkers blocked a Saudi ship carrying weapons destined for Israel, a shipment that Bahri has categorically denied.

This is how the myth seems to slide toward something real, even if only apparently so. Israeli strikes in Sanaa created visible damage to Houthi leadership, security, and propaganda nodes. Saudi budget support to Aden, Saudi and Emirati mediation with the Presidential Leadership Council, and the coast guard partnership project are all public. If Houthi harassment pushes Riyadh to adopt faster intelligence fusion with any actor who can suppress launch sites and defeat drones, then practical cooperation could follow. It does not require a treaty or a grand alliance. It would only require shared intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, deconfliction cells, and a willingness to move data and tactics that shrink the time between detection and effect. Israel has those tools on the shelf. Saudi Arabia will have to assess whether, in the scope of its broader strategic interests, it would make sense to use any tool that protects the southern border with Yemen, sea lanes, and oil infrastructure and whether the risks could be controlled at a manageable political cost.

The Houthis appear to be following a North Korean playbook, using recurring cycles of provocation to extract political and economic concessions. Just as Pyongyang conducts missile tests and issues military threats to gain leverage over South Korea, Japan, and the United States, the Houthis are turning their territories south of Saudi Arabia and the Red Sea into their stage. When they seek funds or influence, they escalate harassment and information operations targeting Saudi-linked energy and global logistics networks. In return, Riyadh is likely to respond by reinforcing defenses, supporting coalition partners, and expanding discreet security ties. This ongoing cycle of tit-for-tat actions, without a holistic or lasting resolution, is likely to persist. Each round produces temporary pauses and partial concessions, while the Houthis claim symbolic victories that sustain the pattern and strengthen their narrative.

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The Houthis have at least three possible options moving forward. They could cease all attacks, basically adhering to previous pledges they have made. They could continue to strike Israel, claiming either that the deal doesn’t apply to them or, alternatively, that Israel is continuing to carry out attacks on Palestinians. Or, perhaps the most likely course of action, the Houthis could use the deal in Gaza as an opportunity to regroup while looking to continue the fight in the future.

Option #1: End the Attacks

The Houthis could easily use the Gaza peace deal, as tenuous as it is, as an excuse to de-escalate and end their strikes on commercial shipping and Israeli targets. After all, the Houthis and their allies have taken a beating over the past year.

In Gaza, Hamas is a shell of its former self. Lebanese Hezbollah is fractured, fragmented, and under new leadership after Israel’s assassination of Hassan Nassarallah in late 2024. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, one of the Houthis’ biggest backers, was decimated during Israel’s 12-day war with Iran in June. And the Houthis, themselves, absorbed over 1,100 U.S. strikes in March and April, which may have had more of an impact than was initially assumed. More recently, Israeli strikes have killed top Houthi leaders, including the military chief of staff, Mohammed al-Ghamari, which the Houthis covered up for two months, signaling at least some internal concerns.

The Gaza peace deal, in other words, may have come at exactly the right time for the Houthis, providing them with a face-saving off-ramp. The problem with this approach, however, is that peace doesn’t deliver what the Houthis need or want.

The Houthis are not currently positioned to survive long term in Yemen. To position themselves as the long-term ruling authority in the north, the Houthis need an economic base. This is one of the main reasons the Houthis have been so focused on Marib in recent years, throwing men and money at various offensives meant to take the governorate and its oil and gas fields. At the most basic level, the Houthis want what someone else holds. The only way to get it is to take it by force. An end to the fighting would mean the Houthis are left with only the territory they currently control, none of which holds the economic resources the group will need to survive into the next decade.

Of more immediate concern is the growing domestic dissent in Houthi-controlled territory. On October 25, seasoned Yemen observer Mohammed al-Basha posted a video of Yemeni businessmen in Sanaa angrily confronting Houthi officials about overly restrictive rules and regulations. Combine the Houthis’ poor record on governance with an economic crisis and the continued fallout from Israeli strikes, and the domestic situation looks increasingly unstable.

Traditionally, the Houthis have muted public dissent by circling the wagons against an external foe – the Yemeni government from 2004-10, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates from 2015-23, and the United States and Israel since 2023 – but that becomes nearly impossible if the Houthis aren’t involved in active conflict.

Option #2: Continue the Attacks 

The second option the Houthis have is to continue as they have for much of the past two years, carrying out attacks on shipping in the Red Sea and targets in Israel, saying essentially that the group isn’t a party to the peace deal. Alternatively, but with the same end, the Houthis could say that as Israel hasn’t fully withdrawn from Gaza neither can the Houthis fully end their attacks.

Continuing the strikes would obviously allow the Houthis to pursue both of their domestic goals – taking more territory and squashing dissent – but it is far from clear whether the Houthis are actually in a position to continue the fight at scale. Operation Rough Rider, the two-month U.S. air campaign against the Houthis, may have done more to damage Houthi weapons stockpiles than originally assumed. Combine that with a number of recently interdicted weapons shipments and the Houthis, however much they want to continue the fight, may not be in a position to do so.

This may have contributed to the Houthis’ lack of activity during Israel’s 12-day war against Iran as well as the drop-off in Houthi attacks on commercial shipping in late 2024 and 2025. There have been some spectacular strikes – the sinking of MV Magic Seas and the Eternity C, for example – but the overall number of strikes has declined. The Houthis may be in a position to fire sporadic missile and drone strikes at Israel, but these have had little impact.

Option #3: Pause the Attacks

If both option one and two are unworkable for different reasons, that leaves option three: pause attacks while the Houthis regroup. This seems the Houthis’ most likely course of action. The Houthis would like nothing more than to continue fighting, as they believe their goals can only be achieved through conflict, but, like most parties involved in the war, they need to regroup.

The Houthis need more weapons from Iran and to reorganize the group’s military after Israeli strikes and some defections. There are already signs that the Houthis are, at least temporarily, stepping back. This past week, as Mohammed al-Basha pointed out, was the first time in 107 weeks the Houthis did not hold a pro-Gaza rally. Nor did Houthi leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi give his typical weekly speech.

This also fits a pattern that the Houthis developed during their initial wars against the Yemeni government, rounds of fighting interspersed with tenuous cease-fires that allowed them the space and time to regroup. In this case, the Houthis are likely to wait until either the domestic pressure grows so great that they feel like they have to restart the war or until they have built back their weapons stockpiles to the point that they can restart the war. Either way, the war isn’t over for the Houthis.

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Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council, which serves as the collective leadership of the United Nations-recognized government, has reached its most critical point since its formation in April 2022. The council, created under Saudi and Emirati sponsorship to unify Yemen’s diverse anti-Houthi factions, is now deeply divided over power sharing, decision making, and control of resources. Riyadh is holding talks among the members of the council aimed at resolving these disputes. But, at the same time, they could trigger a political rupture and alter Yemen’s fragile transitional process. President Rashad al-Alimi is expected to meet with Aidarous al-Zubaidi, vice president of the Presidential Leadership Council and leader of the Southern Transitional Council, in what could be a decisive first step toward determining whether the Presidential Leadership Council can remain intact. While not all members are currently in Riyadh, several are en route, while others are waiting to see the outcome of the initial discussions before committing to attend.

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Like many other conflicts around the world, Yemen has rarely been a priority for global decision makers. It has often been treated as an internal problem with limited external focus on the needs of the Yemeni population itself. Since the conflict broke out in 2014, the United Nations has been involved in negotiations, and agreements have been reached between the main warring parties. Nonetheless, a sustainable political settlement has remained elusive, highlighting the limitations of the U.N.’s peace track in Yemen.

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Perhaps nowhere is this more the case than in Yemen, where the Houthis, who control much of the northern part of the country, remain Iran’s most potent partner. Over the past two years, since the Houthis began targeting commercial shipping in the Red Sea in late 2023, the United States has run through its list of options – from defensive patrols and shooting down Houthi missiles and drones to targeted strikes and a two-month bombing campaign – with limited success.

Israel, which has been targeted multiple times by Houthi ballistic missiles, faces a similar challenge in Yemen. It lacks the intelligence penetration of the Houthi movement that it used to such devastating effect against Iran’s nuclear scientists in June and in the coordinated pager attack aimed at Hezbollah in late 2024. Nor are the Houthis next door to Israel, where it can easily deploy its military as it has against Hamas over the past two years. So Israel, like the United States, has carried out a series of airstrikes, some coordinated and some not, in an effort to degrade, deter, and ultimately defeat the group.

A sustained bombing campaign may work over time, but it would likely require the addition of ground troops, either local or international, which would significantly increase both cost and risk, neither of which the United States is willing to consider at the moment. Instead, a more prudent approach may be to exploit four existing Houthi vulnerabilities – weapons shipments, communications, domestic dissent, and finances – all which have been exacerbated by the current period of readjustment.

Weapons Shipments

The first and most obvious vulnerability is Iranian weapons shipments. The Houthis are able to produce some of their own weapons, but when it comes to high-end and long-range weapons that they use to target commercial shipping and Israel, they are almost entirely dependent on Iran. In recent weeks, as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has struggled to recover from Israel’s June attacks, there has been an uptick in interdictions. In July, National Resistance Forces in Yemen under the command of Tariq Saleh seized 750 tons of weapons meant for the Houthis. More recently, officials in Aden seized material from China that suggests the Houthis are attempting to address this vulnerability by establishing domestic “drone and missile manufacturing capability.”

Iran smuggles weapons to the Houthis through three primary routes: via boats in the Red Sea that land in Houthi-controlled territory, overland through non-Houthi parts of Yemen, and over the Omani-Yemeni border and then cross country to Houthi territory. Each of these routes can be constricted through either increased diplomatic pressure in the case of Oman, more U.S. and allied patrols in the Red Sea, and greater assistance to forces operating under the auspices of the United Nations-recognized government of Yemen.

Communications

The Houthis’ second vulnerability is control of the narrative and communications, which is why they have been so opposed to Starlink satellite internet in Yemen, calling it a “threat to national security and sovereignty.” The threat Starlink actually presents is that it breaks the Houthis’ monopoly on the internet. As seasoned Yemen observer Mohammed al-Basha of Basha Report noted, the Houthis use their control of the internet to control access, censor dissent, and spy on citizens. Increasing Starlink access in Yemen will weaken the Houthis’ grip on power.

Domestic Dissent

This impacts the Houthis’ third vulnerability – domestic dissent. The Houthis are genuinely bad at governance. The group provides little in the way of government salaries, has alienated large segments of Yemeni society, collects excessive taxes, and does not tolerate criticism. The United States, of course, cannot manufacture domestic dissent in Yemen, but what it can do is limit outside support coming to the Houthis and increase options for domestic Houthi opponents internally. Both increasing maritime patrols to interdict weapons shipments and encouraging Starlink in Yemen will have the second order effect of increasing and amplifying domestic dissent within Houthi-controlled regions at a time in which the group is feeling more vulnerable than ever.

Finances

Finally, and perhaps most important, the Houthis have a money problem. The Houthis know exactly how vulnerable they are on this front. Without money the group can’t survive. In July 2024, when the central bank in Aden attempted to cut Houthi banks off from the international financial system, Houthi leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi went on the offensive, threatening Saudi Arabia with more attacks if the bank in Aden didn’t back down. Saudi Arabia pressured the bank and the decision was reversed. But that was last year, before the United States conducted two months of airstrikes against Houthi targets in Operation Rough Rider. This year, with a weakened Iran, diminished Houthi weapon reserves, and a renewed U.S. sanctions regime that has labeled the Houthis a foreign terrorist organization, the time is ripe to implement the central bank’s plan to remove Houthi banks from the international financial system. This would likely require U.S. assurances to Saudi Arabia and perhaps the presence of missile defense battery systems, but that would still be less expensive than a sustained bombing campaign.

The Houthis can’t survive without money and weapons. Strangling the group’s supply of both, while challenging its narrative and helping to create the conditions for domestic dissent will severely weaken the group. By attacking the Houthis’ support system, the United States can use indirect means to accomplish what it couldn’t through direct military intervention.

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The Houthis fired a handful of missiles at Israel on June 14 and 15, and, then, on June 21, they pledged to attack the United States if it entered the conflict against Iran. Within hours the United States had struck three nuclear sites. The Houthi response: a statement condemning the attacks.

The lack of a direct Houthi response has confused scholars and analysts alike. After all, the Houthis responded quickly to Israel’s move into Gaza in October 2023, launching a lengthy campaign targeting commercial shipping in the Red Sea. This year, from March to May, the Houthis withstood 52 days of sustained U.S. bombing in Operation Rough Rider only to emerge from the cease-fire and continue firing missiles at Israel. As important as the Palestinian cause is to the Houthis, it is largely an ideological and rhetorical issue; Iranian support – particularly smuggled ballistic missile components – is what sustains the group and allows it to present a threat to commercial shipping and Israel. All of this begs a simple question: Why were the Houthis missing in action from the conflict?

There are seemingly three possible explanations: The Houthis may be currently unable to carry out strikes; they may be unwilling to carry out strikes; or they may be waiting to carry out strikes. Houthi desires have remained constant. The group, with its slogan: “Death to America, Death to Israel, Curses upon the Jews, Victory for Islam,” still wants to attack the United States and Israel. But in spite of that, and for reasons that aren’t clear to outside observers, the group did not enter the fight in any meaningful way.

Explanation #1: Unable to Carry Out Strikes   

The explanation that the Houthis were unable to carry out strikes during the conflict argues that the U.S. bombing campaign in Operation Rough Rider was much more successful than the United States realized. Shortly after the conclusion of the campaign, an assessment from the U.S. intelligence community argued that the Houthis had suffered “some degradation” but would likely be able to reconstitute. Perhaps that assessment was wrong, and the nearly two months of sustained aerial bombardment did more damage to Houthi weapons depots and storage facilities than was apparent from the outside. During the operation, the United States carried out more than 1,100 strikes. Combine that with more than a year of Houthi strikes on commercial shipping and Israel, and it is possible that Houthi missile stores are much lower than assumed. The Houthis produce some of the materials domestically. Some, such as drones, they buy off the shelf. But for ballistic missile components, the Houthis are dependent on Iran to smuggle material into the country. If those stores were low, and they haven’t been replenished, it is possible that, while the Houthis might have wanted to join the fight, they simply didn’t have the munitions they need to attack the United States and Israel.

Explanation #2: Unwilling to Carry Out Strikes

The explanation that the Houthis were unwilling to carry out strikes argues that the Houthis saw how deeply Israel had penetrated Iran and how successful its initial campaign was – killing top Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commanders and nuclear scientists – that they fear for the group’s survival. As Elisabeth Kendall, a Yemen expert, told The Wall Street Journal about the Houthis: “They’ll probably be thinking that we should lie fairly low at the moment. We start maneuvering around, we give ourselves away, we reveal our locations.”

This idea was driven home on June 14 when Israel came close to assassinating Muhammad al-Ghamari, the Houthi’s military chief of staff, in a targeted strike. Details are still vague, but, according to sources in Yemen, it appears Ghamari was badly injured in the attack but survived, at least initially.

There are, however, a couple of holes in this theory. First, Israel has spent decades infiltrating Iran and laying the intelligence groundwork for its successful first few days. By comparison, the Houthis have been a much more recent and distant threat for Israel until the last couple of years, which would suggest a much more limited degree of penetration. Also, while Israel has only been attacking Iran for a couple of weeks, it has been conducting strikes against the Houthis for more than a year: If it had so successfully penetrated the group, it likely would have already utilized that intelligence. Second, and perhaps most important, the Houthis know how dependent they are upon Iran for their own survival. The Houthis need Iranian support and missile technology to be a regional player, and they are a group with regional ambitions.

Explanation #3: Waiting to Carry Out Strikes

The explanation that the Houthis were waiting to carry out strikes is seemingly the most plausible. The Houthis likely didn’t feel the freedom to freelance a response against Israel. Instead, they were looking to coordinate with Iran. But Israel’s successful decapitation strikes in the initial days of the campaign, and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s retreat to a bunker (reportedly requiring communication through a trusted aide), made coordination much more difficult than it was in the past. In this scenario, the Houthis still had the munitions and the will to strike at the United States and Israel, they simply wanted to ensure that any strikes were in keeping with Iran’s retaliation strategy. The options ranged from a coordinated attempt to close the Red Sea and Strait of Hormuz to coordinated missile strikes on Israel to exhaust or overwhelm interceptors to a more asymmetric response of terrorist attacks.

This explanation – that the Houthis wanted to wait and coordinate their response with Iran – seems to fit the known facts best. Whereas the first explanation, that the Houthis were unable to carry out strikes, requires that the U.S. assessment of Operation Rough Rider was wildly off the mark, and the second explanation, that the Houthis were afraid, seems to cut against years of evidence that show the Houthis are willing to take on stronger adversaries.

Perhaps most important will be what comes next. On June 24, the Houthis said that the Israeli-Iranian cease-fire did not apply to the group. If the Houthis have sufficient munitions, it is likely that Iran will continue to leverage the group to press against Israel and the United States, which could give the Iranian regime time to reconstitute and reconsider its strategy given Iran’s poor performance in the short war and the weakening of its proxy network.

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Is there still space for a sustainable peace process in Yemen, and, if so, what form it might take? With Yemen’s deepening economic collapse – the fragmentation of monetary institutions, rising inflation, and consequences from the U.S. terrorist designation of the Houthis – and as aid channels tighten, what options are there for economic stabilization in the absence of a comprehensive political agreement? 

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