A Bumpy Couple of Decades

It has been a turbulent period for Qatari-Emirati relations. Post-Arab Spring, the states were on opposite sides of the defining debate that underpinned Arab politics: whether to accommodate or suppress Islamist movements. More than merely disagreeing philosophically, each side actively supported its own genre of proxy partner around the region. From Libya to Syria to Egypt, and more recently the Horn of Africa, Qatari and Emirati proxies frequently found themselves ranged against one another in a shadow competition for regional influence.

This divergence became acute when the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Egypt launched a boycott of Qatar in June 2017. The boycott severed land, sea, and air links, expelled Qatari nationals, and sought to economically strangle the small peninsular state. The measures disrupted everything from food supply chains to family connections across borders. When the boycott was lifted in January 2021 through the Al-Ula Declaration, it was difficult to see how Qatari leaders could readily forgive and forget.

Signals From DIMDEX

The context of the Barzan-EDGE announcement is itself instructive in this regard, however. DIMDEX 2026 featured a notably large Emirati presence, with EDGE Group occupying one of the exhibition’s more prominent pavilions. Beyond mere attendance, the UAE committed as a tier one sponsor – a significant financial and symbolic investment in a Qatari showcase. The signing ceremony was accorded prime billing on the first day: a choreographed moment, paid for, invested in, and honored by both parties. Such gestures carry weight in Gulf politics, where symbolism and protocol serve as a parallel language of statecraft. Whether this reflects genuine strategic alignment or carefully managed optics remains an open question, but the investment of prestige by both parties suggests at minimum a shared interest in demonstrating reconciliation.

The Logic of Collaboration

Beyond the symbolism, there are sound rationales for Qatari-Emirati defense cooperation. Given EDGE’s broader portfolio and more mature technological base, the Emirati firm would likely serve as the primary provider of technology and expertise, with Barzan contributing limited market access, perhaps facilities, and capital. For Qatar, such an arrangement offers an accelerated path to defense industrial capability – where indigenous development might take a decade or more, partnership with a more established regional player compresses timelines considerably. This represents a marriage of convenience, certainly, but also a pragmatic recognition that smaller states seeking world-class defense capabilities benefit from pooling resources rather than duplicating efforts in isolation.

The deeper significance of this joint venture may lie in what it suggests about evolving attitudes toward intra-Gulf competition. For decades, the Gulf states have pursued parallel development strategies characterized more by rivalry than coordination. Each has sought to build national champions across sectors from aviation to finance to defense, often duplicating investments and competing for the same markets, talent, and prestige.

This competitive dynamic has produced impressive individual achievements but at considerable collective cost. That the UAE successfully launched a mission to Mars years before a train link to any other Gulf capital speaks to the domestic focus at the expense of meaningful regional integration.

Smaller Gulf states, such as Qatar, Kuwait, and the UAE, can afford competitive inefficiency for decades yet. Hydrocarbon revenue, sovereign wealth, and relatively small populations provide ample buffers against the costs of duplication. The question is whether affordability is the same as wisdom. As these states pursue economic diversification and knowledge economies less dependent on resource extraction, the logic of competition becomes less compelling and the benefits of coordination more apparent. Defense industries, with their high fixed costs and long development cycles, are precisely the sector where the case for collaboration is strongest.

Trust, Time, and Tentative Steps

None of this is to suggest that the Barzan-EDGE joint venture represents a fundamental transformation of Gulf politics or that the wounds of the boycott have healed. Trust, once broken, rebuilds slowly. Qatari policymakers would be imprudent to assume that the interests that drove the boycott have disappeared entirely, and Emirati leaders presumably remain wary of a neighbor whose regional alignments and media influence they sought so dramatically to curtail.

What the joint venture does suggest is that both sides see value in building institutional frameworks that create shared interests. Defense industrial partnerships, once established, generate their own constituencies and path dependencies. Joint development programs create stakeholders on both sides invested in the relationship’s continuation. In this sense, the Barzan-EDGE venture may be less an expression of existing trust than an instrument for building it – a calculated bet that shared projects can forge connections that diplomatic rhetoric alone cannot.

Whether this bet pays off will depend on factors beyond the control of either defense conglomerate: the evolution of regional alignments, the management of future disagreements, and the depth of commitment on both sides to making the partnership succeed when political winds shift. The Gulf has witnessed rapprochements before that proved superficial when tested by competing interests.

For now, the joint venture stands as a notable marker on an uncertain path. In a region where trust is scarce and history casts long shadows, such investment is itself significant – even if the full measure of reconciliation remains to be seen.

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2021: A Bad Year for Gulf-Lebanese Relations

In 2021, Lebanon’s relations with the Gulf states spiraled. Hezbollah maintained its grip on Lebanese politics both through its mafia-like enforcement of order and its long-standing relationship with then-President Michel Aoun and his Christian party, the Free Patriotic Movement. This monopoly cast a large shadow over Lebanese politics and decision making, particularly as it pertained to Lebanon’s relationship with its neighbors.

George Kordahi, who served as Lebanon’s minister of information at the time, made disparaging comments about the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen, calling it “futile and pointless” and said that the Houthis were “defending themselves against an external aggression.” This came six months after then Lebanese Foreign Minister Charbel Wehbe used derogatory terms to describe the Saudis. Many Gulf Cooperation Council countries were convinced that Lebanon was pursuing a pro-Iran foreign policy that was intended to undermine the Gulf’s agenda.

Meanwhile, media accounts reported that Hezbollah was smuggling disassembled weapons into Yemen and conducting training for Yemen’s Houthi fighters. There have even been unconfirmed reports that Hezbollah’s leadership may have influenced Houthi financial and military operation decisions.

Moreover, in April 2021, Saudi authorities discovered a shipment of 5.3 million smuggled Captagon pills in pomegranate crates at the Jeddah airport. The Gulf states viewed Hezbollah’s sway in Lebanon, involvement in Yemen, and effort to corrupt Gulf society through the sale of drugs as a war being waged against them.

Lebanon’s Economic Crisis

In response, Saudi Arabia in October 2021 expelled Lebanon’s ambassador, banned all Lebanese imports, and recalled its ambassador to Lebanon. In solidarity, Bahrain, Kuwait, and the UAE recalled their ambassadors as well. (These Gulf ambassadors have since returned to Beirut). Then, in early 2022, Saad Hariri, Lebanon’s former prime minister and leader of the Sunni community in Lebanon, announced that he would suspend all his political activities in advance of that year’s parliamentary elections. The announcement was linked to tensions between the Saudi royal family and Hariri. Even the Emiratis, who agreed to host Hariri, emphasized to him that he would be allowed to conduct his business affairs in the UAE on the condition that he suspend his political activities.

As Lebanon’s relationship with the Gulf was deteriorating, it suffered the effects of one tragedy after another. In 2019, Lebanon endured a severe economic collapse, as its gross domestic product fell by nearly 40% in real terms, its currency lost 98% of its value, and depositors were not allowed to access their funds held at local banks. In August 2020, during the height of coronavirus pandemic restrictions, an estimated 2,750 tons of unsafely stored ammonium nitrate exploded at Beirut’s port causing the largest nonnuclear blast in modern history, resulting in hundreds of deaths, thousands of injuries, and billions of dollars in damage.

Rather than bringing relief from such tragedies, Iran’s support to Hezbollah has only added to the suffering of the Lebanese people, including the largely pro-Hezbollah Shia population in the south. Hezbollah used its sway to block for more than two years the election of a president that it viewed unfriendly to the group’s agenda, leading to political gridlock and paralysis. It was not until Israel’s attacks in 2024 in southern Lebanon, weakening Hezbollah, that the group realized it could no longer stand in the way of electing the president. And with Joseph Aoun’s election as president in January, the gridlock ended.

What Does Lebanon Need To Do?

In June 2023, the International Monetary Fund issued a report with economic reform recommendations to stabilize the Lebanese economy. The reforms included enhanced governance transparency, a strengthened anticorruption framework, improved performance among state owned enterprises, debt restructuring, a unified exchange rate, and protection for small depositors. It is generally accepted within Lebanon and among international observers that the country’s political elite are deliberately blocking much-needed reforms to protect their financial interests.

Between 1963 and 2022, Gulf states gave Lebanon an estimated $9 billion in grants, excluding loans and investments. But they have stressed that that era is over. Gulf capitals have linked any new financial packages to reforms, such as combatting corruption and restoring confidence in the banking system as proposed by the IMF, and, crucially, disarming Hezbollah. Saudi commentator Ali Shihabi said that Saudi Arabia “does not want to invest in a black hole.”

Like other Gulf states, Saudi Arabia generally frames its position on Hezbollah’s disarmament in terms of support for state control of weapons and in the context of adherence to relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions (which include provisions on disarmament). How a relatively weak Lebanese central government, with armed forces outgunned for decades by Hezbollah, would accomplish such disarmament without prompting significant internal instability remains unclear. However, as the Lebanese government and the international community continue to make progress on the question of Hezbollah’s weapons, it is widely expected that the mafia state created by the militia will no longer be able to survive, and the much needed and long-awaited economic reforms called for by the Gulf states and others will finally be enacted.

In August, U.S. Special Envoy for Syria – and U.S. Ambassador to Turkey – Thomas Barrack announced a plan to disarm Hezbollah by the end of 2025. It outlines an economic strategy for Lebanon that combines regional investment with security reforms. This plan also includes Saudi Arabia and Qatar investing in an economic zone in southern Lebanon to create job opportunities for former Hezbollah members who agree to lay down their weapons. Media accounts indicate that the plan for disarming Hezbollah will rely on persistent Israeli military pressure on the group, which could prolong the depopulation of some border villages and lead to a more militarized southern Lebanon.

Prospects for Gulf-Lebanon Ties

Given the key to any Gulf-Lebanon rapprochement is Hezbollah surrendering its weapons, the path to get there is going to be filled with landmines both figurative and literal. This does not mean that steps can’t be taken to move toward this goal. The first big hurdle was the election of Aoun and the appointment of Prime Minister Nawaf Salam. Lebanon now has a leadership that seems ready to bring the country back into the Arab and Western fold.

In March, Aoun was the first Lebanese head of state in eight years to visit Saudi Arabia, where he met Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. During the visit, the two leaders discussed taking steps to resume Lebanese exports to Saudi Arabia and have Saudi citizens once again travel to Lebanon, according to the Office of the Presidency. In the months that followed, Aoun also visited Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE to present Lebanon as “open for business.” Saudi Arabia has responded positively and, in November, announced plans to boost commercial ties to Lebanon after reports that “the Lebanese government and security forces demonstrated efficacy in curbing drug exports over recent months,” according to a senior Saudi official.

Accounting for more than 19% of GDP prior to the economic collapse in 2019, tourism has emerged as the fastest route toward restoring ties to Gulf countries and reviving the economy. “Tourism is a big catalyst, and so it’s very important that the bans get lifted,” said Laura Khazen Lahoud, Lebanon’s tourism minister. Shortly after Aoun’s visit, the UAE officially lifted its travel ban on UAE nationals visiting Lebanon, according to the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia are considering similar moves. Qatar never imposed a travel ban, so Qatari nationals have continued to travel to Lebanon.

Emirati and Gulf interests in Lebanon are likely to include investments in the energy sector and development of the gas fields in the eastern Mediterranean. The UAE may also be willing to contribute by providing equipment and training to universities and hospitals and by rehabilitating key infrastructure, particularly the Beirut port and the country’s road and bridge networks.

Remittances in Lebanon in 2025 are expected to reach $7.31 billion, with an annual growth rate of 4.5% over the next several years. Before the rupture with the Gulf, the majority of Lebanese expatriates in the Gulf were in Saudi Arabia with more than 300,000, the UAE was close behind with nearly 200,000, and Kuwait had around 42,000. From 2020-22 alone, more than 80,000 Lebanese moved to the Gulf in search of jobs. Remittances from the Gulf remain a critical component of the Lebanese economy.

Approaching the end of the year, Saudi Arabia has already made another strong gesture of support to the Lebanese government. Along with the United States and France, Saudi Arabia announced on December 18 that it will host an international conference early in 2026 in support of the Lebanese army. Aoun expressed his heartfelt gratitude and emphasized his commitment to ensuring that the money will be used in a transparent and responsible manner to help Lebanon resume its rightful place as a member of the Arab nations.

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As the protests spread nationally, the list of demands grew. Economic demands were high on the list – with the youth unemployment rate topping 35%, protesters called for more jobs as well as higher wages and lower prices and higher subsidies for basic goods. At the same time, they called for lower expenditures on the 2025 Africa Cup and 2030 World Cup. They demanded improvements in education, health care, housing, and public transit. They called for the release of detained protesters and effective measures against corruption, including the removal of corrupt political parties from the governing coalition. Interestingly, they also called for the adoption of English over French as Morocco’s second national language after Arabic, and, notably, most protest signs were in English – relatively few were in Arabic, with almost none in French. Increasing numbers of young Moroccans prefer English over French, replacing “colonial” French with the preferred language of international commerce and communications.

The protests brought to mind the Arab Spring protests of 2011, which resulted in significant political changes in Morocco. The resonance with the earlier protests was enough to spark a reaction and support, albeit modest, from fellow monarchies in the Gulf. Moroccan King Mohammed VI’s regularly scheduled address to the Parliament on October 10 signaled his refusal to accede to the most forceful demands, notably the removal of the prime minister. Still, the protests have been a reminder both that ties among fellow monarchs persist and that youth ambitions in the region have not been fully met. Typically, protests in Morocco trigger cabinet reshuffles and, at times, prime minister replacements, institutional mechanisms that insulate to some degree but also serve as a proxy for direct criticism of the monarch.

Morocco in the Gen Z Protest Wave

Morocco was the 22nd country swept up in a global wave of protests that peaked in September following well-publicized Gen Z protests in Nepal and Madagascar. Previously referred to as the “Asian spring,” worldwide Gen Z protests began earlier in Sri Lanka and Iran (following the death of Mahsa Amini) in 2022; continued in 2024 in Kenya, Bangladesh, Mozambique, and South Korea; and, in 2025, spread to Turkey, Mongolia, Nepal, Timor-Leste, Madagascar, Serbia, Indonesia, Togo, the Philippines, France, Italy, Switzerland, San Marino, the Maldives, Peru, Paraguay, and Morocco.

What ties these global youth protest movements together, other than the ubiquitous skull and crossbones flag and meme (from the Japanese manga series “One Piece”), are concerns over inequality, reductions in standards of living, corruption, democratic backsliding, and increasing authoritarianism. Another common thread has been the important roles of rappers, both in providing protest anthems and as “martyrs” when arrested. Morocco was no exception. Prominent Moroccan rappers in the movement included Don Bigg, Dizzy DROS, ElGrande Toto, and Khtek, and the movement also spawned the viral rap freestyle challenge #FreeKoulchi (Free Everyone).

While some of these protests have toppled governments – for example in Nepal and Bangladesh – others have been more reformist in nature, such as those in Turkey, Indonesia, and Morocco. Young Moroccans presented their demands to Mohammed VI in an October 2 letter that called for the removal of the prime minister, the dismissal of the government, and a plethora of reforms and new policies. A second letter by 60 prominent artists and intellectuals condemned the government’s initial lack of concessions and called for the same reforms and the release of those in detention.

Solidarity From the Gulf States

The Moroccan state’s predicament prompted a series of gestures of support by Gulf Cooperation Council countries. Saudi Prince Turki bin Mohammed bin Fahd bin Abdulaziz, minister of state and member of the Council of Ministers, personally delivered a message to Mohammed VI on October 6 on behalf of Saudi King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. On the same day, the Saudi crown prince’s plane was spotted in Marrakesh, prompting unsubstantiated media reports that Mohammed bin Salman personally participated in the Saudi show of solidarity. In addition, a high-level Saudi delegation visited the capital, Rabat, to discuss increasing cooperation in a wide range of strategic sectors, including bilateral efforts to boost employment. Anwar Gargash, advisor to the president of the United Arab Emirates, issued a statement of solidarity. Al Jazeera covered the protests but significantly softened its tone relative to its coverage of the 2011 Arab Spring protests in Morocco, amid a widely reported reorganization of its senior staff and concomitant shifts in its editorial line.

Morocco and the GCC states have a long history of supporting each other in times of need. Following a serious oil spill off Morocco’s coast in 1989 by an Iranian tanker, Saudi Arabia sent Morocco $50 million for the cleanup. When ocean winds and currents unexpectedly pushed the spilled oil offshore and out of harm’s way, the money was used to create Al Akhawayn University, which quickly became the country’s most prestigious institution of higher learning. Morocco famously sent 1,200 troops to defend Saudi Arabia in 1991 following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait despite strong populist headwinds in Morocco. GCC countries made a series of strong gestures during and after Morocco’s large Arab Spring protests, leading to the 2013 establishment of a $5 billion development fund. Morocco joined Saudi Arabia’s military action in Yemen in March 2015, and Moroccan soldiers stayed for nearly four years. When Morocco cut ties with Iran in 2018, it cited Iran’s 2011 interference in Bahrain as one of the reasons.

These gestures of solidarity have accompanied a deepening of economic and business ties. The first Morocco-GCC summit was held in 2016. And, in March, Morocco and the GCC established a joint action plan for 2030. The fifth Moroccan-GCC Investment Forum was held in early November. Increased GCC investment has been and will be critical in helping Morocco weather the current storm.

The King’s Response and a “Victory” for Youth

Mohammed VI responded to the protests in his October 10 address to the new session of Parliament. He called for job creation, improved services, and a reduction in regional inequities and directly criticized the Parliament for inefficiency, but he also – indirectly – criticized protesters for questioning “flagship” projects. These include the construction and refurbishing of seven stadiums for the World Cup, which he argued were no less important to national development and pride than other local infrastructure projects. For example, the new stadium in Casablanca is planned to be the largest in the world, with a capacity of 115,000 spectators. However, the most prominent slogan of Morocco’s protests was “Stadiums are there, but where are the hospitals?” Another was: “At least the FIFA stadium will have a first aid kit! Our hospitals don’t.”

The Moroccan government introduced both economic and political reforms following the protests. On the economic side, it announced a 16% increase in health and education spending amounting to $15 billion. These reforms are slated to create 27,000 jobs in those sectors, build new university hospitals, renovate 90 other hospitals, and expand teacher training and preschool education. On the political side, Morocco introduced bills to increase youth participation in politics, including the easing of candidate eligibility requirements and subsidies of up to 75% for young candidates’ electoral campaigns. “Gen Z 212” responded somewhat tepidly that “these measures must be accompanied by firm measures against corruption and conflicts of interest.”

Then something extraordinary happened: Morocco upset a heavily favored Argentinian team at the 2025 FIFA U-20 World Cup, the youth soccer World Cup, in Chile. Morocco defeated Spain, Brazil, South Korea, the United States, and perennial top seed France to get to the final. Argentina was the only undefeated team and had won the trophy six previous times. On October 19, the young Moroccans beat the offensively and defensively capable Argentinian team 2-0.

Suddenly, many of the same young Moroccans lamenting new stadiums joined the delirium in favor of another huge Moroccan soccer success. Morocco had been the first African or Arab team to reach the Men’s World Cup semifinals in 2022. Its women’s team was reaching new heights as well by unexpectedly qualifying for knockout stages of the 2023 World Cup, the first Arab and North African team to do so. This filled Moroccan youth with pride and is likely to serve to further dampen criticism of soccer stadium construction and refurbishment. But as the monarch and Moroccan youth seem to agree, the country’s political and economic success will depend to a significant degree on greater investment in job creation and services beyond what World Cup success will provide.

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Rare earth minerals, along with other metals, such as lithium, copper, cobalt, and nickel, are critical for the technologies driving the global transition to clean energy. They serve as core components in everything from electric vehicle batteries and wind turbines to advanced electronics and defense systems. As demand accelerates, securing reliable supply chains for critical minerals has become a top priority for countries worldwide.

In recent years, Gulf states have become increasingly focused on critical minerals as part of their economic diversification efforts, with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates playing leading roles. These states’ strategies, however, differ significantly: Saudi Arabia is building an integrated mining sector, while the UAE, Qatar, Oman, and Bahrain are adopting more selective investment approaches. These differences reflect each state’s distinct national priorities and capacities within the global critical mineral landscape.

Saudi Arabia’s Integrated Mining Sector

Mining is the “third pillar” of Saudi Arabia’s national economy under Vision 2030, playing a crucial role the kingdom’s efforts to diversify away from fossil fuels. With Saudi Arabia’s untapped mineral and mining resources valued at an estimated $2.5 trillion, the kingdom has the capacity to develop an integrated mining ecosystem by leveraging its vast domestic deposits while also using its substantial capital to expand investments in global supply chains. This ability to build a strong domestic mining base and pursue strategic opportunities abroad is what distinguishes Saudi Arabia from other Gulf states when it comes to critical minerals.

Domestically, Saudi Arabia has accelerated efforts in recent years to develop its mining sector through regulatory reforms, expanded geological surveying, and partnering with various global entities. In 2021, the kingdom passed the “Mining Investment Law” to make investment processes more efficient and investor friendly. In parallel, the Saudi Geological Survey, the country’s national geological authority, launched the “Regional Geological Survey Program” in late 2020, working with both local and foreign partners to map 230,000 square miles of the Arabian Shield to identify mineral resources and attract greater foreign participation.

These efforts have already produced tangible results. Saudi Arabia’s estimated mineral wealth rose from $1.3 trillion in 2016 to roughly $2.5 trillion in 2024, reflecting new discoveries and improved mapping techniques. Exploration activity has also expanded significantly, with investments in exploration growing from $28.4 million in 2019 to $140 million in 2024. Additionally, by 2025, foreign mining investors accounted for two thirds of the total license bidders in the country. The kingdom has further sought to capitalize on its domestic critical mineral potential through strategic partnerships with international entities, notably signing nine mineral deals, valued at $9.3 billion, in late 2024 with companies including India’s Vedanta Resources and China’s Zijin Mining Group, and, more recently, establishing a joint venture between Maaden and MP Materials to build a rare earth refinery in Saudi Arabia.

Through Manara Minerals, a joint venture between Maaden and the Public Investment Fund, Saudi Arabia has been acquiring stakes in major global mining entities. In 2023, Manara Minerals invested $2.6 billion to acquire a 10% stake in Brazil’s Vale Base Metals. In 2024, it expressed interest in investing at least $1 billion in Pakistan’s Reko Diq copper and gold project as well as up to $2 billion in First Quantum Minerals’ copper and nickel assets in Zambia, extending the kingdom’s reach across global critical mineral supply chains.

The UAE’s Global Reach

Unlike Saudi Arabia’s resource-rich landscape, the UAE has limited domestic critical mineral reserves. So, Abu Dhabi has centered its strategy on investing in critical mineral projects globally, notably in Africa. In 2023, the UAE, through International Resources Holding, invested $1.1 billion to acquire a 51% stake in Mopani Copper Mines in Zambia. Most recently, International Resources Holding acquired a 56% majority stake in Alphamin Resources for $366 million, giving it access to the Bisie tin complex in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Additionally, in 2024, International Resources Holding formed joint ventures for iron ore mining in Angola and announced that it was in advanced talks to potentially acquire mines in Burundi, Kenya, and Tanzania.

Beyond Africa, the UAE is expanding its global footprint through various large-scale partnerships, namely with the United States. In January, Abu Dhabi’s ADQ, with Orion Resource Partners, a U.S.-based global investment firm specializing in metals and materials, created a 50/50 joint venture based in Abu Dhabi with a $1.2 billion commitment to invest in mining companies in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Additionally, in October, a broader fund, Orion Critical Mineral Consortium, was established by the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, Orion Resource Partners, and ADQ with an initial funding commitment of $1.8 billion and a plan to expand to $5 billion. The consortium’s goal is to invest in existing or near-term producing assets, further underscoring the UAE’s emphasis on gaining strategic exposure to global critical mineral assets.

Qatar, Oman, and Bahrain

Qatar’s distinct critical mineral investment strategy is more conservative than that of the UAE. Through its sovereign wealth fund, the Qatar Investment Authority, Qatar’s approach is focused on gaining financial exposure by acquiring stakes in well-established critical mineral companies rather than investing directly in mines. In 2024, QIA invested $180 million in Dublin-based TechMet, and, more recently, it invested $500 million in Canada’s Ivanhoe Mines through a private placement. This targeted approach gives Qatar exposure to the critical mineral sector while avoiding the operational risks associated with running mining projects.

In Oman, mining has been designated a strategic sector under Oman Vision 2040. Oman’s investment strategy in critical minerals is grounded in domestic development but at a much smaller scale than Saudi Arabia’s, given its smaller resource base. The country advances its exploration and investment agenda through the Ministry of Energy and Minerals and state-backed Minerals Development Oman.

Oman’s ophiolite-rich mountains are believed to host a wide range of metals, including chromite, cobalt, copper, and nickel. The country was also the first in the Gulf to produce and export ferrochrome. In 2023, the Ministry of Energy and Minerals signed an agreement with United Kingdom-based Knights Bay to extract nickel, Oman’s first mining agreement with a foreign investor. In January, Minerals Development Oman exported copper concentrates from its Lasail mine for the first time and plans to start production at Al Baydha copper mine in the years ahead. More recently, the Ministry of Energy and Minerals signed three mining exploration agreements valued at $500 million and signed a memorandum of understanding with Turkey’s Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources to enhance cooperation on critical mineral exploration.

Bahrain has also been trying to enter the critical mineral space, despite its small size and limited resource base. In September, Bahrain became the first Middle Eastern country to sponsor a deep-sea mining permit after backing California-based Impossible Metals’ bid to explore part of the Pacific Ocean. Although Bahrain has not made any financial commitments, Impossible Metals CEO Oliver Gunasekara noted that Bahrain could potentially fund a refinery in the future. While Bahrain’s initiatives remain extremely limited compared to those of other Gulf states, recent moves suggest a desire not to be left behind in the global critical mineral race.

The Gulf states are increasingly active in critical minerals, hoping to capitalize on their resources and strategic investments to prepare for a post-hydrocarbon economy. However, their different approaches reflect each state’s distinct resource capacities, national priorities, and ambitions.

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Over the past two decades, Turkey has moved from dependency to self-reliance in the defense sector. Through political will, sustained investment, and public-private collaboration, Turkey has built a diversified ecosystem in which state-owned firms and agile private companies compete and cooperate under the guidance of the Presidency of Defense Industries. The results are visible: a broad portfolio of indigenous systems, expanding export markets, and a growing network of co-production agreements across Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. This industrial rise has also altered Turkey’s regional posture, turning defense cooperation into a key instrument of foreign policy.

For the Gulf states, the appeal of a partnership with Turkey lies in a convergence of strategic and industrial objectives. As the Gulf states pursue defense localization and seek to reduce dependence on the United States and Europe, Ankara offers not only cost-effective technology but a model of how to build capacity within constrained political and financial environments. The readiness of Turkish firms to share their know-how, adapt their production, and establish joint ventures aligns with the Gulf’s drive toward diversification. In this sense, through its defense-industrial trajectory, Turkey has become a partner and is providing a blueprint for Gulf localization, linking industrial pragmatism with strategic autonomy.

Among Gulf states, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia have taken the lead in shifting from procurement-heavy to production-oriented defense sectors. Both have tied localization to strategic autonomy and economic diversification, yet they differ in institutional design, speed, and outcomes.

Turkey’s Defense Industry Model

Turkey’s transformation from a dependent arms importer to an increasingly autonomous producer is rooted in both strategic necessity and institutional design. The 1974 U.S. arms embargo following the Cyprus intervention exposed the vulnerabilities of dependence on Western suppliers. Over the following decades, Ankara built a defense ecosystem through state guidance, private entrepreneurship, and export orientation.

The creation of the Presidency of Defense Industries, originally as the Defense Industry Development and Support Administration in 1985, and the consolidation of firms under the Turkish Armed Forces Foundation gave coherence and financing to this effort. Successive governments, from Turgut Ozal’s liberalization to Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s state-driven modernization, turned the sector into a pillar of national industrial policy. The Presidency of Defense Industries now operates as a central coordinator for procurement, research and development funding, and technology transfer. At the same time, firms such as ASELSAN, HAVELSAN, Roketsan, Baykar, Turkish Aerospace Industries, and numerous small and medium enterprises populate an increasingly export-oriented ecosystem.

In 2019, the United States expelled Turkey from its F-35 program after Ankara decided to purchase and deploy the Russian-made S-400 air-defense system, which Washington viewed as incompatible with NATO security standards and a risk to the F-35’s sensitive technology. This accelerated investment in indigenous systems, including the KAAN fifth-generation fighter, Bayraktar unmanned aerial vehicles, the Altay tank, and new naval platforms. These flagship projects symbolize Turkey’s ambition to achieve strategic autonomy while remaining embedded in NATO’s technological ecosystem. In 2024, Turkey’s defense and aerospace exports reached approximately $7.1 billion – a 29% increase compared to 2023 – placing the country’s defense industry among the top exporters globally.

Unlike Western suppliers, which are bound by rigid export frameworks, Turkey emphasizes flexibility and partnership. Its co-production offers, offset agreements, and willingness to localize production resonate with partners seeking capability transfer rather than dependency.

Yet Turkey’s rapid ascent in defense production also carries structural and strategic vulnerabilities. The sector’s dependence on public financing and political patronage raises concerns about transparency, accountability, and long-term sustainability. Export growth relies heavily on markets exposed to conflict volatility or Western export restrictions, such as the Gulf, North Africa, and Central Asia. Moreover, localization often masks enduring dependencies on imported components, software, and critical technologies, leaving key projects – like the KAAN fighter or Altay tank –susceptible to supply-chain disruptions. Finally, the increasing militarization of industrial policy risks conflating national prestige with commercial viability, creating incentives for overexpansion and reduced oversight.

The UAE Case: From Importer to Innovator

The UAE’s defense sector over the last two decades has demonstrated notable success in moving from dependency on foreign arms to developing a technologically advanced domestic industry. In the early 2000s, the UAE was still making large-scale acquisitions from Western suppliers, including high-end platforms such as the United States’ F-16 jet and France’s Leclerc tanks. These purchases, driven by security concerns over Iran, reflected an import-based model typical of Gulf defense procurement.

Faced with regional volatility during the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings, Abu Dhabi began to view defense industrialization as both a means of ensuring military self-reliance and as a pillar of economic diversification. UAE Vision 2021 and National Defense Strategy 2023 emphasized technological sovereignty and innovation, laying the foundations for an integrated defense ecosystem. The decisive turning point came in 2019 with the creation of EDGE Group, a state-owned conglomerate that brought together more than 25 entities under one umbrella. With revenue of roughly $5 billion in its first year, EDGE became the centerpiece of a wider national framework that includes the UAE’s Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) Strategy, Operation 300bn, and the Tawazun Council, which manages offsets and enforces local content requirements of up to 60%.

By the early 2020s, the UAE had shifted from buying weapons platforms to mastering the technologies behind them – data, software, artificial intelligence, and integration systems. This transition was accelerated by the Houthi drone attack on Abu Dhabi in 2022 and by lessons from Ukraine and Gaza, which underscored the need to invest in AI-driven unmanned and counter-UAV systems. Subsidiaries such as ADASI (autonomous systems), HALCON (precision-guided munitions), and SIGN4L (electronic warfare) positioned EDGE at the forefront of the future battlefield, while acquisitions of Estonia’s Milrem Robotics and Switzerland’s Anavia embedded advanced design capabilities into Emirati research and development.

EDGE’s rise has been both commercial and strategic. In 2024, the company generated $4.9 billion in contracts, including $2.1 billion in exports – a threefold increase from the previous year. Its $2.45 billion FALAJ-3 missile boat contract with Kuwait in June was the region’s largest shipbuilding export deal. And manufacturers such as NIMR and Calidus have been showcasing modular platforms, including the Wahash 8×8 APC and B-250 aircraft, integrating Turkish and European components. The UAE has also built one of the most advanced counter-drone architectures in the Global South, featuring AI-enabled systems, such as the SkyKnight missile and REACT electronic systems.

This momentum has elevated Abu Dhabi into the ranks of emerging defense exporters. According to SIPRI data, the UAE accounted for 5.3% of the Middle East and North Africa’s arms exports from 2020-24. This is a notable achievement for a country long viewed mainly as an importer, in an arms export market dominated by Israel and Turkey. And EDGE has expanded its presence across Asia, Latin America, and Africa, accounting for roughly one-third of the UAE’s defense exports.

Saudi Arabia: Defense Industrialization as Strategic Bargain

Saudi Arabia’s defense industrialization has become a main component of Vision 2030, designed to convert military spending into a driver of diversification and sovereignty. Riyadh has pledged to localize 50% of defense procurement by 2030, creating two institutional pillars: the General Authority for Military Industries as regulator and enabler and Saudi Arabian Military Industries as the primary production and integration arm.

Defense remains a fiscal heavyweight, with the 2025 budget allocating $72.5 billion – about 21% of total spending – to the sector. Under the General Authority for Military Industries’ Industrial Participation Policy, any contract estimated over 150 million Saudi riyals ($40 million) must dedicate up to 60% of its value to local firms, helping raise localization from 4% in 2018 to nearly 20% in 2024. Yet the pace has slowed, reflecting structural limits in skilled labor, research and development absorption, and reliance on imported subsystems. Frustration within the royal leadership has grown as local content targets have fallen short of expectations, with several senior reshuffles in mid-2025 exposing tension between vision and delivery.

Concrete progress is visible in select areas, including maintenance, repair, and overhaul, armored vehicles, AI-enabled command systems, and THAAD launcher components. However, most projects still rely on external technology and are heavily shaped by partnerships with U.S., European, and Asian suppliers, including BAE Systems, Arabian Industries, Hanwha, and Thales.

Ultimately, Saudi localization operates more as a strategic bargaining tool than a quest for full self-reliance. By embedding foreign prime contractors within its industrial networks and offset rules, Riyadh converts dependency into negotiation leverage, asserting political and economic control while signaling credibility to investors and allies. Inspired in part by the UAE’s EDGE model, the kingdom’s localization drive aims not to achieve autonomy but to maintain strategic room to maneuver – a recalibration of power that strengthens Saudi Arabia’s hand in a more multipolar defense order.

Turkey-GCC Joint Ventures and Emerging Defense Synergies

Over the past five years, Turkey and its Gulf partners have transformed competition into cooperation. What began as a cautious political rapprochement has matured into defense-industrial diplomacy linking technology, trade, and security.

The deepening defense-industrial engagement between Turkey and the Gulf has become one of the clearest expressions of the region’s shift from arms importation to co-production. Over the past three years, Ankara has established structured partnerships with the UAE’s EDGE Group and Saudi Arabia’s SAMI, bringing Turkish engineering capacity to help meet the Gulf’s localization and diversification goals.

Early cooperation between Turkey and the UAE focused on technology integration across air and unmanned systems. EDGE and Baykar partnered to integrate Emirati sensors and targeting payloads into the Bayraktar UAV family, while Calidus Aerospace and ASELSAN collaborated on the design of advanced cockpit displays for the B-250 light attack aircraft. EDGE and TAI also signed a memorandum of understanding to incorporate Emirati payloads into intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms and the KAAN fighter, combining Emirati strengths in avionics with Turkish production expertise. These programs – supported by EDGE’s global acquisitions in defense tech – created new synergies in AI, mission control, and precision-guided weapons.

At IDEF 2025, cooperation entered a new phase with the launch of KEY4, a joint venture between EDGE and Turkey’s Pavo Group, headquartered in Abu Dhabi. KEY4 is a platform for joint research, development, and export-oriented production in AI, cybersecurity, cryptography, electronic warfare, and smart surveillance. The initiative complements the broader partnership between EDGE and SAHA Istanbul, which connects over 1,000 Turkish defense firms through the MALATH coordination framework established to streamline bilateral supply chains and co-production programs.

In parallel, Saudi-Turkish defense cooperation has gained steady momentum. In July 2023, SAMI and Baykar signed a landmark agreement for the local production of Bayraktar Akinci UAVs in Turkey’s largest-ever defense export contract. As part of the deal, up to 70% of each UAV will be produced in the kingdom, with the National Company for Mechanical Systems, ASELSAN, and Roketsan handling systems integration, electro-optics, and guidance kits. Through the partnership, Riyadh aims to accelerate the absorption of technology and expand local assembly beyond basic maintenance tasks.

In July 2025, SAMI signed technology-transfer agreements with Nurol Makina, FNSS, and ASELSAN to localize production of 4×4, 6×6, and 8×8 armored vehicles and turrets. Manufacturing will take place at the SAMI Land Industrial Complex, an AI-enabled facility scheduled to open in late 2025. Meanwhile, discussions have continued over Saudi Arabia’s participation in the KAAN fifth-generation fighter jet program, following multiple visits between Defense Minister Khalid bin Salman and Haluk Gorgun, head of the Presidency of Defense Industries.

Together, these initiatives illustrate a shared calculus: Turkey provides combat-tested systems, modular design, and adaptable licensing, while the Gulf contributes capital, infrastructure, and long-term market demand. The result is a pragmatic form of industrial interdependence – one that replaces procurement with partnership as the core mechanism of defense relations.

This cooperation also carries growing strategic weight. Following Israel’s September Doha attack, Turkey and GCC states intensified consultations on regional defense integration, reflecting a broader understanding that industrial cooperation has become as strategic as it is technological. Together, these dynamics embody what Turkish analysts describe as a “New Horizons” approach: engaging the Global South to expand autonomy while maintaining a functional relationship with the West. For Gulf states, collaboration with Turkey provides rapid access to affordable technology and operational expertise. For Ankara, it offers new markets, political influence, and validation of its industrial model.

Challenges nonetheless persist. Technology-transfer sensitivities, intellectual-property disputes, and uneven production capacities could slow progress, while political volatility on both sides may test the resilience of cooperation. Yet the underlying exchange – localization for the Gulf and strategic autonomy for Turkey – continues to bind the two sides. As Turkey evolves from client to competitor in the global defense market, its partnership with Gulf states will determine whether this industrial convergence becomes a durable pillar of the emerging Middle Eastern security order or remains a pragmatic alignment shaped by shifting crises.

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