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Riyadh’s Strategic Motivations

One year after the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, relations between Riyadh and Damascus have undergone a dramatic reversal. The transformation has been driven by overlapping geopolitical shifts, economic ambitions, and Saudi Arabia’s determination to shape a new regional order that privileges Arab leadership over Iranian influence and channels cooperation with Turkey to constrain any outsized regional ambitions.

For over a decade, Saudi Arabia was one of Assad’s fiercest adversaries, supporting opposition forces and viewing Damascus as a conduit for Iranian expansionism. Assad’s abrupt collapse in December 2024 – toppled by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, led by Ahmed al-Sharaa – upended that paradigm. The kingdom quickly moved to engage the new leadership, calculating that early outreach could prevent Syria’s descent into renewed chaos or Iranian reentrenchment.

At the core of Riyadh’s post-Assad strategy lie three imperatives: security containment, geopolitical balancing, and economic opportunity. First, Saudi Arabia seeks to preempt the resurgence of transnational jihadism and disrupt the narcotics economy – particularly the Captagon trade – that has corroded Syrian institutions and flooded Gulf markets. A stable, cooperative Damascus is seen as essential to shielding Saudi borders and domestic stability.

Second, Riyadh seeks to reassert Arab primacy in the Levant by weakening Iranian networks while keeping Turkish ambitions in check. In Syria – the Levant’s center of gravity – Saudi financial leverage and Turkish military weight make cooperation necessary, even as their complementary roles sharpen Riyadh’s wariness of Ankara’s regional aspirations. By exploiting Turkey’s dependence on Saudi and broader Gulf capital, Riyadh can work with Ankara when interests align while still constraining its bid for dominance.

Third, Syria offers economic opportunity. Syria’s reconstruction, which the World Bank estimates will cost at least $216 billion, offers a vast arena for Gulf investment. Saudi official statements and bilateral agreements point toward the use of sovereign capital and private enterprise to rehabilitate infrastructure, energy grids, and transportation corridors, with the apparent aim of gradually integrating Syria into a Gulf-linked regional economic ecosystem centered on Saudi capital. Development, in this calculus, becomes an instrument of influence.

Saudi Arabia and Syria are discussing data cables linking the kingdom to Europe as part of a regional artificial intelligence and digital hub initiative, and the Saudi Telecom Company submitted a proposal for the project. Saudi renewable energy leader ACWA Power is also among Saudi companies poised to invest in Syria. In parallel, an International Monetary Fund team has already been in Damascus to support efforts to strengthen the capacity of Syria’s central bank, ensuring it can perform its essential functions and serve as a stabilizing anchor for the national economy.

Politically, Sharaa’s emphasis on nationalism and state restoration over ideological militancy resonates with Gulf sensibilities. His pragmatic willingness to distance Syria from Iran and Islamist movements has given Riyadh a rare opportunity to cultivate a partner that, while fragile, shares the Saudi preference for stability through state authority rather than revolutionary ideology.

With this in mind, Sharaa appears to have concluded that the surest route to Western goodwill runs through deepening alignment with Saudi Arabia, one of Washington’s primary Arab partners. Taken together, these moves signal Damascus’ recognition that Saudi Arabia – not Iran or Russia – is now the indispensable gateway to postwar normalization and economic reintegration. This calculation reflects a broader strategic shift, namely that Syria’s long-term sovereignty and economic recovery now depend less on ideological alignments and more on embedding the country within a Saudi-led, Western-endorsed framework.

In essence, Saudi Arabia views Syria’s transition not simply as regime change but as a geopolitical reset, a chance to entrench Gulf leadership across the northern Arab tier and to demonstrate that Arab reconstruction, not Iranian patronage or Turkish leverage, will determine the region’s future.

Milestones in a Rapid Rapprochement

The speed of normalization since late 2024 underscores Riyadh’s strategic urgency. The reopening of the Saudi Embassy in Damascus in September 2024 symbolized Syria’s reentry into the Arab system. Sharaa’s reciprocal visit to Riyadh in February 2025, his first foreign trip, sealed the personal rapport underpinning the political thaw.

Diplomatic efforts unfolded rapidly. A January summit in Riyadh gathered foreign ministers from the Gulf Cooperation Council states, Syria, the United States, and the European Union – signaling consensus on Syria’s reintegration and underscoring Saudi Arabia’s emergence as the principal convener of postwar diplomacy.

The pace accelerated further in March, when a Saudi-mediated border demarcation agreement between Syria and Lebanon, overseen by Saudi Defense Minister Khalid bin Salman, established mechanisms to curb militancy and cross-border smuggling, issues central to Riyadh’s security agenda.

Economic engagement quickly followed the political thaw. After the administration of President Donald J. Trump lifted select sanctions in mid-May – marking a successful lobbying effort by the Saudi crown prince – Saudi Arabia, together with Qatar, settled Syria’s $15 million arrears to the World Bank and later they jointly pledged $89 million to help maintain vital public services and cover state salaries. The Syrian-Saudi Investment Forum in Damascus in July concluded with a $6.4 billion Saudi investment pledge and the signing of a slew of agreements covering infrastructure, banking, energy, and real estate, alongside feasibility studies for a Syrian stock exchange and new power-generation projects. The two countries also concluded a bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement and established a Saudi-Syrian Business Council.

Building on this momentum, Sharaa doubled down on the strategy he apparently believed would secure Western backing, visibly tying Syria’s recovery narrative to Saudi capital, regional leadership, and reformist branding. Addressing the Future Investment Initiative in Riyadh in late October, Sharaa underscored Saudi Arabia’s “key role” in rebuilding postwar Syria while courting global investors. He cast Syria as an emerging trade corridor and noted that it had already attracted more than $28 billion in pledged foreign investment. In mid-November, the Saudi tanker Petalidi delivered the first crude-oil grant shipment to help stabilize refinery operations and bolster Syria’s wider economic recovery.

For Washington, this alignment fits neatly within its broader posture of “strategic minimalism,” supporting a Gulf-led stabilization effort that limits Iran’s influence, contains Russia’s footprint, and avoids the costs of direct U.S. engagement. Russia’s muted presence in this phase of Syria’s transition – shaped by bandwidth constraints from the war in Ukraine and an implicit recognition that Gulf financing will dictate Syria’s future political economy – further underlines the shifting balance of power.

Politically, Saudi Arabia has sought to recast Syria as a stabilizing pillar rather than a flashpoint. It has condemned Israeli airstrikes on Syrian territory and championed respect for sovereignty in United Nations and Arab League forums, situating Damascus within a Gulf-led security narrative. Riyadh has approached the integration of former HTS members into local governance pragmatically, focusing on stability and effective administration rather than rigid ideological scrutiny. It remains to be seen whether the December 13 killing of two U.S. military personnel and one civilian interpreter, at a site near Palmyra in central Syria, will upend some of the assumptions for the integration of HTS by Riyadh, Damascus, and Washington. The incident may also test the viability of Washington’s preference for engagement in Syria through strategic minimalism.

Riyadh’s proactive posture may also reflect lessons from its past hesitations – particularly in Yemen and Iraq – where delayed engagement arguably contributed to Iran entrenching itself deeply before Saudi Arabia acted. Its early, front-loaded engagement in Syria is thus best understood as a preemptive strategy to shape conditions before rival actors can fill the vacuum.

The Expanding U.S.-Saudi-Syrian Triangle

All these developments suggest the Syria file is now embedded within a broader U.S.-Saudi strategic compact. Congress’ repeal of the 2019 Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act under the National Defense Authorization Act removes the broadest sanctions constraining engagement with Syria. In place of automatic snapbacks, Washington has installed a four-year conditional oversight framework tied to security and governance benchmarks. For Riyadh, the move lowers legal exposure and shifts investment decisions decisively toward managing Syria’s political and security risks rather than sanctions risk.

Within that newly permissive – but still conditional – framework, for Riyadh, this partnership confers immense strategic dividends. It amplifies Saudi Arabia’s diplomatic weight, aligns its regional ambitions with Washington’s minimalist engagement model, and cements its image as the indispensable Arab interlocutor between Damascus and the West. For Syria, it offers political rehabilitation and economic lifelines.

Persistent Fault Lines and Risks

Yet beneath the momentum lie vulnerabilities that could unravel the project. Domestically, Syria remains deeply fragmented. Violence has erupted intermittently in Suwayda, and while the March bloodshed in coastal Alawite areas has not repeated, underlying sectarian divisions and tensions remain pronounced. Recent parliamentary appointments hint at inclusivity, but social reconciliation remains nascent at best. The political step that builds on inclusivity, the prospect of some level of representative governance, remains only a contested, notional concept. These domestic fractures, if unaddressed, could compound external pressures and erode the foundations of Riyadh’s stabilization strategy.

Externally, Syria sits at the intersection of rival power projections. Relying on the goodwill it amassed in helping HTS develop and eventually overthrow the Assad regime, Turkey continues to occupy northern territories with troops and through proxy militias, pursuing a problematic buffer-zone agenda that is likely to eventually cause friction with Damascus. By some accounts, remnants of Iranian proxies continue to operate in Syria. Israel’s repeated airstrikes on Shia militias and Hezbollah’s logistical corridors and weapons depots perpetuate volatility. Geir Pedersen, warned in August before his resignation as U.N. special envoy for Syria that the country’s “transition remains on the knife-edge.”

Economically, accelerating sanctions relief is critical, but formal repeal of the Caesar Act does not eliminate all hurdles. Even after formal removal, major investors are likely to wait months before committing substantial capital, given lingering challenges, including Syria’s fragile political governance, persistent security problems, weak infrastructure, and volatile currency.

Smuggling and narcotics trafficking could undercut progress. Saudi efforts to strengthen border enforcement through trilateral coordination with Syria and Iraq remain embryonic and easily disrupted by political shifts or corruption.

The Kurdish question compounds these strains. The U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces still control much of the northeast, including the country’s oil production and agriculture, and the process for integrating these forces into the national army has stalled. Ankara’s hostility toward Kurdish autonomy and Damascus’ reluctance to share power make compromise elusive. A senior SDF commander, Sipan Hemo, recently warned of renewed conflict if negotiations fail, underscoring the volatility of this fault line – his hard line a reminder that tough rhetoric is a part of the negotiations process. Any escalation could derail reconstruction and test Riyadh’s diplomatic agility.

Saudi Postconflict Statecraft

Saudi Arabia’s embrace of the Sharaa government and orchestration of Syria’s regional and international reintegration represent a defining experiment in postconflict statecraft. Using financial leverage, diplomatic pragmatism, and coordination with the United States, Riyadh aims to forge a Gulf-led regional order that prioritizes Arab sovereignty and stability over ideological or proxy-driven agendas. If the strategy succeeds, it will further cement Saudi Arabia’s position as a key regional power.

Success could reshape Syria’s trajectory and the broader Middle Eastern security architecture, positioning Gulf states as both financiers and guarantors of order. Yet domestic fragmentation, residual militancy, competing foreign interests, and uncertain Western politics threaten to derail the project. For now, the Saudi-U.S. partnership stands as a symbol of strategic interdependence, with Riyadh providing capital and regional legitimacy, while Washington offers diplomatic and security backing. Whether this experiment proves a model for Gulf-led stabilization and reconstruction or a cautionary tale of the limits of external engineering will shape the region’s political landscape for years to come.

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This monumental breakthrough in diplomatic developments between the two countries was jumpstarted by Sharaa and Trump’s initial meeting May 14 in Riyadh, under the watchful eye of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who arranged that meeting. U.S. Special Envoy for Syria – and U.S. Ambassador to Turkey – Thomas Barrack has been meeting periodically with Sharaa and paving the way for this Washington visit over the past five months.

Joining the Fight Against ISIS and Opening a U.S. Air Base

The expected agreement for Syria to join the Global Coalition Against ISIS will formally align Sharaa’s government with the Trump administration on counterterrorism and with some 85 other countries and international organizations. While the Syrian Democratic Forces in northeastern Syria have been the indispensable U.S. partner in the long fight against the Islamic State group in Syria, Sharaa’s and his commanders’ jihadi roots – and their previous, sometimes violent feuding with ISIS – are thought to equip them well to engage in the counter-ISIS effort as well, in areas where ISIS has sought refuge outside SDF control. It is unlikely, despite any U.S. government preference, that in the upcoming phase, the Syrian government will assume control of the thousands of ISIS fighters detained by the SDF in makeshift prisons in the northeast or take responsibility for their thousands of family members housed in several sprawling camps assumed to be breeding grounds for further extremism. However, this agreement should serve as a useful building block for strengthening the bilateral relationship. The preparatory effort between the two sides for the counter-ISIS agreement likely also helped pave the way for the air base agreement.

The initial reporting on the air base has described it as designed to position the United States to monitor an anticipated security agreement Syria has been negotiating with Israel over the past several months. While media accounts report the two sides are close to agreement, sources in the region questioned that assessment, despite active U.S. mediation and Sharaa’s statements at the United Nations General Assembly in September expressing support for such an agreement. The ongoing Israeli incursions, with hundreds of reported attacks, have begun to embitter the Syrian leadership and led to a degree of harsher rhetoric by Sharaa as he gauges public anger. While the United States has made clear it would like to see Syria eventually sign on to the Abraham Accords, there seems to be an understanding that conditions are not yet ripe for Syria to normalize relations with Israel.

Will the Sanctions Be Unbroken?

Other elements under discussion by U.S. and Syrian officials are also not expected to be ready for formal agreement during the visit, although they will likely form part of the discussion. A top priority for the Syrian side is the formal, permanent lifting of U.S. sanctions on Syria. While Trump announced the initial steps to lifting the layers of sanctions on Syria in late June, the stringent Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act can only be waived in six-month increments until Congress formally repeals the legislation. Syrian businessmen and officials complained to AGSI that the temporary waivers are not sufficient to convince banks and potential investors in the region and more broadly that it’s safe to reengage with the Syrian financial system. Sharaa is expected to urge Trump to continue pressing hard on Congress to take permanent action. The Senate has voted to repeal the legislation but some House members have delayed, citing deadly rounds of sectarian violence in the spring and summer as cause for concern.

Kurds, Diplomats, and Other Issues

Also up for discussion but unlikely to see definitive resolution is the issue of integrating the Kurdish-led SDF into the national military forces Sharaa’s government has been constituting since it took power in December 2024. While the two sides reached a bare-bones framework agreement for integration in March, implementation that respects the central government’s insistence on sovereignty and the SDF’s demand for retaining centralized command of its forces has proved elusive. Syrian officials have expressed frustration with SDF stalling and the SDF has countered with accusations that it is being rushed, while Barrack has expressed understanding for each side’s position and reiterated confidence that they can work things out. There is concern in the region that if integration does not occur by year’s end, Turkey may act on its concerns about the SDF and renew military attacks on these forces to compel them to integrate or scatter.

One issue that hangs in the balance is that of the United States reopening its embassy in Syria. Trump could make this move with straightforward executive action. The United States closed its embassy in 2012 and severed diplomatic relations. In May, Barrack took the charged but informal action of reopening the U.S. ambassador’s residence, but the United States has not reopened its embassy or returned U.S. diplomats. While this action could be included as part of the deliverables for the visit, it has not been publicly telegraphed.

Other issues on which the United States could seek follow up include finding missing Americans thought to have been kidnapped by ISIS, destroying any remaining stocks of chemical weapons left behind by the regime of former President Bashar al-Assad, and addressing any lingering concerns about foreign fighters in the ranks Sharaa’s forces and any militant Palestinian group leaders still based in Syria. Barrack expressed appreciation in the spring for Syrian government action on the latter two issues. One security issue raised by officials in the region with AGSI, but unlikely to be highlighted by the U.S. side, has to do with the need for ramped up policing and strengthening of the courts to give people more of a sense of personal security. If the issue isn’t addressed, there is the danger of spikes in criminal activity and more acts of vengeance that could spiral.

It’s possible Sharaa may try to encourage U.S. engagement on investment in Syria. Some officials in the region told AGSI that the Syrian leader might suggest U.S. investment in Syria’s energy sector or other areas. While rebuilding Syria is going to be a monumental task, Sharaa is convinced that foreign investment based on profit seeking is the best way to approach reconstruction. Several officials in the region who have met with Sharaa noted being impressed with his technocratic chops and nonideological mode of expression given his jihadi background. They also said he understands that Trump’s first principles are focused on the transactional: Sharaa appreciates that approaching the subject of rebuilding Syria in this return-on-investment context is much more likely to engage the U.S. president’s attention.

Optics as the New Substance

In the end, this visit may be heavy on the optics and much lighter on substantive deliverables. Nonetheless, the visit will be of significant benefit to the Syrian leader. As the world watches and key countries – those who command aid flows, investment ventures, diplomatic clout, and potential security support – gauge how aggressively they should ramp up engagement with the new regime in Damascus, a warm reception at the White House will certainly do no harm and will likely nudge some fence-sitters to be more helpful and summon up a bit more enthusiasm. While Sharaa is the one coming to Washington, he and Trump each have completely flipped the script. Working with key regional allies, surprising skeptics with bold action, and upending stale policy assumptions and calculations with fresh approaches, they have opened a desperately needed conversation on Syria. In geopolitics in a tough neighborhood, with a destroyed country as the backdrop and a long-suffering people foregrounded, nothing is guaranteed. But, as official visits go, this one holds promise.

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It was not federalism that destabilized Syria and Iraq. It was the very opposite. For the better part of the last century, both countries were ruled by highly centralized regimes that prioritized ethnic nationalism, militarization, and authoritarianism over pluralism, accountability, and power sharing. In Iraq, the minority Sunni regime led by Saddam Hussein launched genocidal campaigns against the Kurds and violently repressed the majority Shia community. In Syria, the minority Shia Alawite regime of Bashar al-Assad and his father, Hafez, built a political system on the exclusion of the Sunni majority and denied Kurds even the most basic civil rights, including citizenship.

Centralized states in the Middle East did not bring unity or stability. They sowed division, created power vacuums, and ignited violence with repercussions far beyond their borders with profound challenges for Western countries, serving as persistent sources of instability, authoritarian repression, and systemic human rights violations. These regimes, by consolidating power among a narrow group of elites, created push factors that drove waves of emigration toward the West, straining social and political systems. At the same time, authoritarian structures and lack of inclusive governance fostered environments ripe for radicalization and terrorism, directly threatening Western security through both regional and transnational violence.

The cumulative effects of these dynamics – unrest, refugee crises, and security threats – demonstrate the deeply entrenched risks tied to such political systems. To assume that the revival or continuation of the same centralized, authoritarian model would somehow produce different results overlooks decades of evidence to the contrary.

Federalism and decentralization, though imperfect, have proved effective frameworks for governing diverse societies. The United States has sustained a federal system for over 250 years, balancing unity with regional autonomy while managing profound political and cultural divides. In the Middle East, the United Arab Emirates demonstrates how a federal structure can preserve local authority while enabling national cohesion and economic growth.

For Syria, the solution should not be called federalism or autonomy, as these politically charged terms have been used to deny the rights of minorities and are often mistakenly equated with separatism. Instead, a new term can be coined to address the concerns of the center and fulfil the local demand for self-governance as has been done in the European Union with “subsidiarity,” “devolution of power,” “regional empowerment,” and “shared governance.”

The experiences of the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria and the Kurdistan region of Iraq illustrate that even in fragmented and volatile contexts autonomous governance structures can function as stabilizing mechanisms. While these models are imperfect, they have nonetheless demonstrated resilience, pragmatism, and a tangible capacity to mitigate broader conflict risks. In fragile settings where central authority remains contested, these autonomous arrangements stand as working models that reduce instability, preserve pluralism, and offer viable alternatives to state collapse.

In northeastern Syria, the SDF and its political wing, the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, have implemented an effective, locally based model of governance that emphasizes ethnic coexistence, gender equality, and grassroots participation. This system has offered a rare example of bottom-up stability in a region otherwise ravaged by war and authoritarianism. Women have become an active and integral part of the political, security, military, and economic systems. And infrastructure has been developed to the extent that speed limits are enforced through traffic cameras, an indicator of both improved rule of law and administrative capacity. The system is not without flaws: Critics of the system in northeast Syria note that actual governance inside the northeast, despite the emphasis on decentralization in discourse and wire-diagram organization, tends to be top-down, centralized, and deficient in transparency.

Despite numerous political and economic challenges, the Kurdistan region of Iraq has maintained relative stability, contributed to regional security, and provided a level of governance and public service often absent in the rest of Iraq. The Kurdistan region has shown that decentralized governance can coexist with broader national frameworks and even thrive, given the opportunity and international support.

Conversely, centralized governance has a catastrophic history in Iraq and Syria. The Assad and Saddam Hussein regimes were not only unable to build inclusive states, they contributed to state fragmentation. Both Iraq and Syria became breeding grounds for extremist ideologies precisely because they denied meaningful space for political and cultural pluralism.

The region requires a new political architecture that acknowledges its ethnic, linguistic, and religious diversity rather than the rigid state models inherited from the colonial mapmakers of the early 20th century. Federalism or any other sort of power decentralization, shaped by the realities on the ground, may be a path toward peace, representation, and accountability.

While decentralization offers a viable framework for rebuilding multiethnic states in postconflict settings by expanding participation, reinforcing local resilience, and diluting authoritarian structures to set the foundation for more inclusive governance, these gains are not guaranteed. Without safeguards, central authorities, external powers, armed actors, and entrenched elites can swiftly undermine local progress and recentralize power. In addition, there are risks of fragmentation and internal division, as well as well as inequality, where richer, more centrally located areas do better while remote, poorer, or more marginalized regions lag. While such flaws and vulnerabilities are real, when stacked against the catastrophic weaknesses the region has witnessed in highly centralized, authoritarian rule, there is a persuasive case to be made for giving decentralization more of a role.

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Israeli military intervention in Syria began almost immediately following the late 2024 fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime, when the forces of now interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa assumed control of Damascus. In July, Israeli actions seriously escalated with the bombing of the Syrian Ministry of Defense in Damascus. Most recently, in late August, Israeli forces launched airstrikes and a ground raid on a Syrian military base at Kiswah, on the outskirts of Damascus. Six Syrian soldiers were killed. Launched by an “airborne landing,” it is reportedly the first known use of Israeli ground forces, far from Israeli-occupied territory in southern Syria. Reported motivations for the attack on Kiswah included ongoing Israeli determination to take military action in support of the Druze population in southern Syria, tactical concerns about possibly compromised Israeli intelligence capabilities in the area, and broader Israeli concerns about Turkish efforts to rebuild Syria’s military forces and exert influence in Syria. Since the fall of Assad, Israel has launched over 400 ground incursions and nearly 1,000 airstrikes in Syria.

The late August attack on Syria unsurprisingly prompted harsh criticism by Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad Hassan al-Shibani but also key Gulf Arab states, including Saudi Arabia and Abraham Accords signatory the United Arab Emirates. Both states condemned the Israeli attack on Kiswah as a dangerous escalation and violation of Syrian sovereignty and internal affairs. The Saudi statement also expressed the kingdom’s absolute rejection of “separatist calls to divide Syria.”

Israeli Discourse is Part of the Problem

In tandem with the ongoing Israeli military actions, there have also been periodic statements by Israeli officials and analytical pieces referring to Israeli strategic interests in Syria and the broader Levant, couched in security, territorial, and support-for-minorities rationales. Israeli analysts and politicians in recent years have linked Israeli efforts to build ties with minorities in Syria and the broader region, for example, to foundational strategic doctrines for the Jewish state, such as the periphery doctrine formulated decades ago by Israel’s first prime minister, David Ben-Gurion. Such strategic links to support for minorities have also been noted in statements by current Israeli officials, such as Foreign Minister Gideon Saar. In addition to emphasizing natural alliances with minorities in the region, as a way for Israel to strategically position itself, Saar has also used the Israeli focus on minorities to insist that a sovereign, unified Syria is unrealistic. Such views have fed a rising chorus of analysis and alarm in the Gulf and broader region asserting that Israel’s strategic aim is a fragmented Syria. More recently, Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich linked his insistence that Syria should be partitioned – or “dismantled” as a state – to Israel’s war in Gaza and broader military efforts to reshape the regional security environment to the country’s benefit. The extremist right-wing Smotrich described these linked goals as not merely policies of a specific Israeli government but in terms that pointed to a strategic consensus for the people of Israel.

Less explicit but more alarming for regional leaders was recent language Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu used referencing his strong support for “Greater Israel,” a term widely understood to include parts of Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt. Smotrich and settler leaders in Israel routinely make clear they view the territory from the Nile to the Euphrates as constituting the future borders of Greater Israel. The UAE issued a statement condemning Netanyahu’s endorsement of the concept; other Gulf countries, including Saud Arabia, Oman, Qatar, and Kuwait, issued similar condemnations, while Bahrain and the Gulf Cooperation Council signed on to a group condemnation of Netanyahu’s remarks that 31 Arab and Islamic countries and organizations issued. A recent proposal by Smotrich to annex most of the Israeli-occupied West Bank, which sparked discussion among Netanyahu’s governing coalition and in the Israeli media, has contributed to this Israeli discourse that is alarming Arab capitals.

Gulf Fears of an Unchecked Regional Power

The eruption of these alarm bells in the region have fused with Gulf concerns about Gaza – the tens of thousands of civilian casualties and massive destruction and the Israeli government’s recent military offensive – as well as fears that Israel, with its recent military and intelligence successes, has become an unchecked regional power, a Goliath against a weaker region. The underlying concern is that Israel, with its recent military campaigns in Lebanon, Syria, and Iran, is poised to dominate the region in ways that could be destabilizing.

Assessing Turkey Differently

Israel and the Gulf are also moving in opposite directions in terms of relations with Turkey, a pivotal regional power. After much of a decade of tense relations, destabilizing competition, and missed economic opportunities, the Gulf has turned the page on Turkey. Following key bilateral visits in the past few years, a profound weakening of the regional Islamist project Turkey had previously supported, and the development of a long list of possibilities for mutually beneficial trade and investment opportunities, including in Syria, relations between Gulf states and Turkey have strengthened considerably and continue to develop. Regarding Turkey’s role in Syria, the consensus Gulf assessment seems to view Ankara as a stabilizing force, in current circumstances. Looking at the same set of realities, Israeli officials have made clear they view Turkey’s growing influence in and ambitions for Syria with profound concern and that Israel will take decisive action, including military efforts, to set limits on that influence. The Israelis do not seem to share Gulf states’ concern about the risks of state failure in Syria that Ankara could help ameliorate. For Israel, there is vastly more concern with the Turkish assistance than with the risk of state failure and instability in Syria.

A Security Agreement Could Change Perceptions 

A possible security agreement between Israel and Syria could change these perceptions. There have been persistent media accounts that the two sides are meeting, usually with U.S. participation, with talks described as having reached an advanced stage. The parameters of such an agreement, as described by Syrian and U.S. officials, fall far short of an Abraham Accord-level understanding that would involve full normalization of relations. Syrian officials routinely insist any agreement would be rooted in the 1974 disengagement agreement that established a United Nations buffer zone after the 1973 war. Israel annexed the Golan Heights, which it captured in the 1967 Six-Day War, in 1981.

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What is the current state of the Syrian economy? Has the new Syrian government articulated a vision for the country’s economic future that will help inform and shape reconstruction efforts? How quickly will the recent U.S. and European Union actions to lift sanctions have decisive impact to encourage foreign investment? Are Syria’s financial system and security forces ready for the challenges of a bold reconstruction effort? What are the prerequisites needed for successful and sustained national rehabilitation and reconstruction? What is the role of Syria’s neighbors, especially Turkey and the Gulf states, as well as Europe, in postconflict reconstruction? And how will the dynamic between reconstruction efforts and foreign investment unfold? What planning role should United Nations agencies, such as the United Nations Development Programme, and other international organizations play in any comprehensive reconstruction effort?  

The post Rebuilding Syria: Opportunities and Challenges of Postwar Reconstruction appeared first on AGSI.

If things don’t go well, Syria could move from a linchpin for stability in the region to a nexus for debilitating, meddling competition from the outside (and internally). At present at least four significant geostrategic efforts focused on Syria are underway, an indication of the continuing fascination with – and desire to shape – developments in Syria. Led by its accidental – and some insist unicorn – president, Syria seems to have stumbled back to the future, as it begins to regain its long-held, and more recently long-lost, status as regional locus for the attentions and designs of its neighbors and more distant great powers.

Trump Turbocharges U.S. Engagement With Syria

Most surprisingly – and with impressive results so far – the United States has abruptly reversed course since May and embraced the government of interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa with “complete confidence.” President Donald J. Trump issued an executive order June 30 formally implementing his decision to lift economic sanctions on Syria, first announced after his May meeting with Sharaa in Riyadh during his visit to the Gulf. Referencing a welter of previous executive orders and legislation, including the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, and the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003, the extremely detailed executive order and an accompanying White House Fact Sheet make clear the decisive about-face Trump is insisting on. The executive order retains accountability for crimes committed by former President Bashar al-Assad and his regime and enablers and makes clear it accords with U.S. interests, including peaceful relations with Israel, destroying Syria’s chemical weapons stocks, preventing any resurgence of the Islamic State group, and finding missing Americans.

In a July 7 follow-up announcement, the U.S. Department of State revoked the terror designation of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the group headed by Sharaa, an action telegraphed in the earlier executive order. These actions, with further implementing steps to come by U.S. government agencies, including the Treasury and Commerce departments, and by Congress, will remove critical barriers to financial transactions and access to the international banking system, investments, and contracts, thereby vitally facilitating reconstruction efforts and a range of activities previously prohibited that have strangled the Syrian economy and inflicted widespread suffering on its people for well over a decade. The European Union has recently taken similar steps to lift its sanctions.

At the political level, the United States is also taking decisive action. Newly appointed Special Envoy to Syria (double-hatted as U.S. Ambassador to Turkey) Thomas Barrack met with Sharaa in Damascus May 24 and raised the American flag over the U.S. ambassador’s residence, a quasi-official act that seems to telegraph the full normalization of diplomatic relations in the not-too-distant future. Signaling how U.S. involvement in Syria could spur joint investment with Gulf countries and Turkey, Barrack and Sharaa signed a $7 billion energy deal between Syria and a Qatari-U.S.-Turkish consortium that will generate 5,000 megawatts.

Barrack followed up with a July 9 Damascus visit that helped facilitate in-person negotiations between Sharaa and General Mazloum Abdi, Kurdish commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces, U.S. partner in the fight against ISIS in northeastern Syria. It was another indication of the diplomatic muscle the United States is providing to support Syria’s transition while also looking after its own interest in seeking a viable off-ramp for the SDF that will help facilitate the eventual withdrawal of the approximately 1,000 U.S. troops deployed in Syria. Despite that support, those talks are proving difficult: The SDF is showing reluctance to accelerate any move to integrate its forces into the Syrian national army or concede on any of its expansive demands for a federal approach to northeast Syria that would leave the SDF as a cohesive force and significantly empowered to run local affairs over a resource-rich area covering nearly one-third of Syria. Barrack walked a fine line, criticizing the SDF for insisting on expansive demands tied to federalism and moving too slowly but also making the point that integrating the SDF would need to occur in small steps.

Israel, With U.S. Help, Also Looks to Engage

Pointing to a separate but related avenue of statecraft, Barrack noted in early July that Israel and representatives of the Sharaa government were meeting in U.S.-brokered talks to address border conflict. Sharaa earlier described those talks as “indirect.” Since the fall of Assad in late 2024, Israel has launched hundreds of airstrikes in southern Syria all the way up to the outskirts of Damascus, deployed ground forces to occupy a United Nations-demarcated buffer zone between Syrian territory and the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, and made threats of further action, often in support of Syrian minorities, such as the Druze. It also bombed several sites scoped for Turkish military bases near Homs and Hama, north of Damascus, an indication of the heightened geostrategic jousting between these two powerful neighbors over influence in Syria and the Levant. Since Trump’s reorienting of U.S. policy toward Syria, Israel has softened its harsh rhetoric, eased its militarized approach to Syria, and begun to speak of the possibility of normalizing relations with Damascus, while insisting any consideration of returning the Golan was off the table.

For their part, Syrian officials have emphasized something significantly less ambitious than normalization, such as using a nonaggression pact of some kind, focused on reactivating the 1974 Disengagement Agreement, to ease tension. While Trump and other senior U.S. officials have referenced the possibility of Syria joining the Abraham Accords, a recent statement by Barrack expressed support for the current talks as a good step while noting momentum for normalization would only happen slowly, as mutual confidence developed, like “unwrapping an onion.” Anonymous Syrian officials, while clearly supportive of a nonaggression accord with Israel, have made clear the issue of the Golan Heights would not be conceded to facilitate normalization with Israel, while observers point to a lack of public support in Syria for normalization as a risk or disincentive for the Sharaa government. Even as Israel has shifted from a military to a diplomatic approach, it remains intently focused on its northern neighbor, as it considers border security, the future of the Golan, and Israel’s evolving role in the Levant.

Gulf Arab Countries Pursuing Robust Economic Statecraft With Damascus

Gulf Arab countries remain keenly focused on Syria and have been courted assiduously by Sharaa and other senior officials. Sharaa visited Abu Dhabi July 7, his second official visit to the UAE, meeting with President Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan. Presidential diplomatic advisor Anwar Gargash said the meeting affirmed “the UAE’s commitment to Syria’s success in this pivotal stage.” In a related development, prominent Emirati businessman Khalaf Al Habtoor has announced a large delegation of businessmen and potential investors will head to Damascus in the coming days, and he has spoken enthusiastically about investment prospects in Syria, citing opportunities across Habtoor Group’s key sectors: hospitality, automotive, real estate, education, insurance, and publishing. Other business analysts cite further opportunities in key sectors such as agriculture, reconstruction, contracting, and energy. On the logistics front, Dubai-based DP World has signed an $800 million memorandum of understanding to develop the Mediterranean port of Tartus. That agreement follows the cancellation of a previous agreement to develop the port signed with Russia in January. Emirates Airlines recently announced the July 16 introduction of service to Damascus. The Habtoor delegation visit, DP World Tartus contract, and Emirates Airlines move all reflect a broader Emirati strategy to merge economic activity with geopolitical influence in Syria, a stratagem other Gulf countries and neighbors, including Turkey, are adopting with accelerating enthusiasm, as stifling economic sanctions come off and the Sharaa government gets a U.S. government seal of approval.

Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan visited Damascus May 31 with a large economic and business delegation. The two sides discussed business and investment opportunities in infrastructure, telecommunications, and agriculture, noted Prince Faisal. He also mentioned that Riyadh and Doha had agreed to jointly fund a significant pay increase for Syria’s poorly paid public sector employees. On the European side, France and the United Kingdom are both taking diplomatic action and making or supporting economic statecraft moves. The U.K. restored diplomatic ties after a visit by Foreign Secretary David Lammy in early July and unveiled a $128 million assistance package. And French shipping and logistics group CMA CGM announcing a 30-year concession and $260 million investment agreement focused on modernizing and expanding the port of Latakia, also on the Mediterranean.

First and Last, Turkey Poised to Support and Benefit From Solo and Joint Efforts

Since Assad fell, Turkey has strengthened already robust security cooperation, evident in late stages of the civil war with some 20,000 Turkish troops in Syria and dozens of informal military bases. Turkey also accepted some 3.2 million Syrian refugees. Sharaa has made more visits to Turkey than to any other foreign country (three), meeting each time with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Senior Turkish officials have swarmed Damascus as well, beginning with intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalin who arrived December 12, 2024, a mere four days after the fall of Assad. Reports of advanced talks on a defense pact as well as the scoping of several air and land bases in Syria and efforts to delineate maritime boundaries make clear the range and intensity of efforts on security cooperation. On the commercial side, a top Turkish business delegation met with Sharaa and other senior officials in Damascus July 11 to discuss investment, reconstruction, and other opportunities for economic cooperation. Turkey, through a range of chambers of commerce, labor, and private sector channels, is developing plans for joint ventures in Syria with key Gulf countries, including Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Turkish Airlines resumed flights to Damascus in January.

With the severe weakening of Iran in the past year (including its collapse of influence in Syria) and the capping for now of regional normalization initiatives with Israel because of the Gaza war, Syria has unexpectedly moved to center stage in regional dynamics. It is the product of Syria’s strategic geography, powerful neighbors, potential for investment and instability, and the pragmatically sanded-away rougher edges of Sunni extremism in its leadership that have seized the attention of the statecraft movers and shakers. This development has been juiced dramatically by Trump’s unexpected and influential about-face on U.S. Syria policy. In the coming weeks and months, the hard work begins in earnest for Syria, as its talented but thin leadership seeks to keep all these lines of effort on track and humming in reinforcing, parallel lanes. The U.S. role is going to be pivotal. Given these various expansive agendas, with the potential for creating regional and internal frictions and fissures if mishandled, it’s going to take good fortune and good coordination for all these efforts to function as addition and multiplication rather than subtraction and division.

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While the Gulf states share broad strategic goals – curbing Iranian influence, managing the refugee crisis, and preventing a jihadist resurgence – their approaches to the new Syrian administration diverge sharply in ideology, method, and pace. These differences reflect not only distinct national priorities but also deeper fractures in Gulf foreign policy shaped by years of regional rivalry and shifting alliances.

Syria has become a testing ground for these intra-Gulf dynamics, with each actor advancing its own model of state building, ideological alignment, and regional order. At the same time, the United States remains a critical player. Washington’s efforts to empower regional partners, mediate between competing ambitions, and reassert influence through economic diplomacy have introduced both new openings and fresh constraints.

Saudi Arabia’s Strategic Shift: From Opposition to Reengagement

Riyadh’s approach to Syria has undergone a dramatic transformation – from regime change advocate to pragmatic power broker. Once a leading sponsor of the Syrian opposition, Saudi Arabia initially viewed the 2011 uprising as a chance to end Assad’s Iran-aligned rule, channeling support to armed groups and pushing for Damascus’ isolation. By 2015, however, Riyadh began to recalibrate, and, by 2023, it had normalized relations with Assad’s regime. This reversal laid the groundwork for a more strategic reengagement once Assad fell.

The defeat of Assad and the emergence of a Hayat Tahrir al-Sham-led transitional government prompted Saudi Arabia to reengage Syria with renewed urgency. Framing itself as a stabilizing force, Riyadh’s current strategy is anchored in several overlapping priorities: safeguarding Syrian territorial integrity, limiting Turkish and Qatari influence, halting Iranian entrenchment, curbing Islamist radicalization, facilitating refugee returns, and ending the Captagon drug trade. These priorities reflect not only Saudi Arabia’s national security concerns but also its ambition to shape a new regional order centered on state-led reconstruction and geopolitical containment.

In January, Saudi Arabia hosted a summit in Riyadh, bringing together foreign ministers and international representatives to discuss Syria’s reconstruction and transitional stability. The summit emphasized humanitarian efforts, political reforms, and regional security as priorities for Syria’s recovery. Importantly, the gathering signaled Riyadh’s intent to lead the Arab world’s engagement with postconflict Syria on its own terms. Beyond diplomacy, Saudi Arabia has been actively involved in humanitarian aid to Syria. On the economic front, in May, Saudi Arabia and Qatar settled Syria’s $15.5 billion World Bank debt – Riyadh’s first financial commitment on behalf of the transitional government – paving the way for the World Bank to resume support and operations.

Though Saudi Arabia has pledged to contribute to a proposed $6.5 billion international aid package for Syria, it has yet to commit substantial reconstruction funding – presumably awaiting assurance that its core strategic conditions, including the exclusion of Iranian-backed militias and progress toward a secular, inclusive government, are met. This cautious posture reflects both Riyadh’s desire to retain leverage and its awareness of U.S. hesitations about long-term involvement in Syrian reconstruction.

A key pillar of Riyadh’s new approach to Syria is its evolving partnership with Turkey. What began as cautious de-escalation has matured into a tactical alliance driven by shared strategic interests. Riyadh and Ankara are united in their determination to curb Iranian influence in post-Assad Syria and to address their own security concerns. Joint Saudi-Turkish lobbying was instrumental in persuading Washington – reportedly despite Israeli objections – to grant limited sanctions relief for transitional authorities and affiliated projects. This behind-the-scenes diplomacy underscores Riyadh’s ability to navigate U.S. redlines while pursuing its own vision for regional stabilization.

UAE: The Calculated Realist

Among the three leading Gulf Arab states, the UAE has taken the most cautious and ideologically driven approach toward the new Syrian administration. This stance reflects the UAE’s long-standing suspicion of Islamist political movements – a concern that has deeply shaped its regional diplomacy since the 2011 Arab uprisings. Abu Dhabi views the Syrian transition not only through geopolitical calculations but also as an ideological battleground.

This cautious posture was evident during Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s visit to the UAE in mid-April, his second official trip to a Gulf capital after Saudi Arabia. Although Emirati leaders welcomed him, their public messaging remained measured. Nevertheless, concrete steps followed. President Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan announced plans to restore commercial air travel with Syria, and the UAE-linked Eighth Brigade in southern Syria’s Daraa province declared it would disband and integrate into the national army. These moves signal a pragmatic willingness to support Syria’s stabilization, while maintaining direct influence on the ground.

Since 2011, Abu Dhabi has positioned itself as a counterrevolutionary force, seeking to contain Islamist factions it views as a threat. Mohammed bin Zayed consistently argues that all Islamist groups – from mainstream parties to militant offshoots – share the goal of establishing theocratic rule under the guise of a caliphate. This worldview informs policies aimed at marginalizing Islamist actors and promoting a secular regional order. In Syria, this translates into efforts to bolster technocratic governance, support military integration, and prevent HTS from dominating the political landscape.

The UAE has formally designated the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization and, early in the year, added 19 affiliated individuals and entities to its domestic terror list – an unmistakable signal that it will resist any empowerment of Muslim Brotherhood-linked groups in Syria. Despite improving ties with Turkey, the Muslim Brotherhood’s main regional sponsor, Abu Dhabi, remains wary of Ankara’s influence, viewing it as a potential source of instability. While the rivalry with Turkey has softened somewhat, it persists fundamentally over the legitimacy of political Islam in the region. The same can be said for relations between the UAE and Qatar.

Beyond direct diplomacy, the UAE has pursued a discreet security role, reportedly hosting backchannel talks between Syria and Israel focused on intelligence cooperation. This highlights Abu Dhabi’s ambition to act as a stabilizing intermediary, bridging Arab and Israeli interests in a post-Assad Levant. The UAE is deepening economic ties with Syria as well. In May, Dubai-based DP World signed an $800 million preliminary deal with Damascus to develop and operate a terminal at the Port of Tartus – the first such agreement since U.S. sanctions began to ease. This port deal, alongside Syria’s decision to shift currency printing operations from Russia to the UAE and Germany, is part of Abu Dhabi’s strategic investment in Syria’s commercial infrastructure as a tool of influence, even as it avoids headline-grabbing reconstruction pledges.

Humanitarian and reconstruction efforts also play a key role in the UAE’s approach. Between 2011 and 2023, it provided over $1.1 billion in aid to Syria and Syrian refugees. The creation of the UAE Aid Agency in late 2024, combined with Mohammed bin Zayed’s expressed “keenness to support” Syria’s reconstruction, underscores a sustained effort to shape Syria’s postwar trajectory. For Abu Dhabi, supporting reconstruction is not just about rebuilding infrastructure but about ensuring that legitimate state institutions – not Islamist groups – become the primary providers of security and services.

By positioning itself as a pragmatic partner in Syria’s recovery, the UAE aims to contain threats, counter regional rivals, and shape outcomes from within. This blend of cautious pragmatism and ideological conviction reflects Abu Dhabi’s distinctive brand of realpolitik in the Levant.

Qatar: From Regime Opponent to Early Partner of Post-Assad Syria

Qatar was once the Assad regime’s most vocal and active adversary among the Gulf states. Early in the conflict, it poured funds into opposition groups and even advocated for Arab military intervention. As recently as 2022, Qatar backed efforts to unite disparate opposition groups, maintained a hard-line policy of nonrecognition of the Assad regime, and refused to restore diplomatic ties. At the May 2023 Arab League summit –  Assad’s first since Syria’s suspension – Qatar’s emir walked out before Assad’s speech.

Yet following Assad’s ouster in December 2024, Doha moved rapidly to reposition itself as an early and influential partner to Syria’s new authorities. Qatar was the first Gulf country to engage with the HTS-led coalition that deposed the regime, announcing on December 11 that it would reopen its embassy in Damascus, with operations resuming just six days later.

Qatar’s minister of state for foreign affairs, Mohammed Al-Khulaifi, was the first high-ranking official from the Gulf to visit Syria, ending a more than 13-year rift between the two countries. That visit was followed by Emir Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani’s landmark visit in January, the first head of state to meet with the new leadership in Damascus.

In conjunction with these visits, Doha pledged to maintain the humanitarian aid air bridge to Syria for as long as needed and provide significant reconstruction assistance. It is funding operations at Damascus International Airport and supporting a temporary increase in public-sector wages – up to $29 million per month for an initial three-month period.

In March, as part of a deal with Jordan and the United Nations Development Program, Qatar began supplying Syria with natural gas, producing 400 megawatts of power daily. Qatar is also collaborating with Turkey to dispatch floating power plants to Syria following the easing of U.S. sanctions to alleviate the country’s severe electricity shortages. Talks are underway between Doha and Damascus to modernize Syria’s telecommunications sector. In addition, Qatar is reportedly training small police units to stabilize urban areas.

This strategic shift reflects Doha’s pragmatic recalibration from ideological opposition to active engagement, leveraging its close ties with Turkey and international institutions to solidify influence in Syria’s fragile recovery. For Qatar, early involvement is not only about rebuilding infrastructure but about securing a long-term role in shaping Syria’s postconflict political and economic architecture, particularly through support of Islamist-aligned actors and HTS-linked technocrats, a stance that occasionally diverges from U.S. priorities but complements Ankara’s regional ambitions.

Qatar’s transformation from a leading Assad opponent to an early postconflict partner reflects the wider Gulf trend of pragmatic repositioning – a shift from ideological rigidity to strategic engagement aimed at shaping Syria’s new order.

U.S. Leverage and Regional Rivalries

The announcement in late May of a $7 billion energy deal between Syria and a Qatari-Turkish-U.S. consortium – facilitated by the newly appointed U.S. envoy to Syria, Thomas Barrack – marked a striking development in the geopolitics of postconflict reconstruction. The deal, which aims to rehabilitate Syria’s devastated power sector, coincides with Barrack’s symbolic hoisting of the U.S. flag over the ambassador’s residence in Damascus and his call for a nonaggression pact between Syria and Israel. These gestures signal more than just transactional diplomacy; they suggest a U.S.-backed attempt to reweave the region’s fractured political fabric through economic interdependence and de-escalation.

Moreover, the U.S. role, while publicly presented as enabling stabilization, also reflects a desire to contain Iranian and Russian influence without the burdens of a large-scale U.S. footprint. The energy deal, framed as a lever for reconstruction, doubles as a soft-power instrument for shaping Syria’s internal balance and regional alignments.

Competing Gulf Visions in a Fractured Syria

The fall of the Assad regime has not only reopened Syria to regional reintegration but also exposed the fragmented ambitions of Gulf powers seeking to shape its future. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar are each advancing distinct – and at times conflicting – visions for Syria’s reconstruction, governance, and regional alignment.

While united in their desire to counter Iranian influence and prevent jihadist resurgence, they diverge sharply in ideology, pace, and preferred partners, turning Syria into a theater for broader Gulf rivalries. For Riyadh, Syria is a proving ground for a new brand of state-centric pragmatism. For Abu Dhabi, it is a frontline in the ideological struggle against political Islam. For Doha, it offers a chance to reassert influence through early engagement and alignment with Islamist-tied actors.

Against this backdrop, the United States is recalibrating its Syria policy. By backing regional actors and prioritizing economic diplomacy – rather than committing to large-scale reconstruction or a direct military presence – the Trump administration is testing a lighter-touch model of influence. Its support for a Qatari-Turkish-U.S. energy consortium, coupled with renewed diplomatic engagement, signals a shift toward burden sharing and regional ownership. But this approach may leave Washington with diminished leverage should regional partners prioritize conflicting agendas.

Ultimately, post-Assad Syria is becoming less a unified project of stabilization than a contested space of experimentation – for Gulf rivalries, U.S. strategy, and the reshaping of the regional order. How these overlapping ambitions play out will determine Syria’s trajectory and could help determine the durability of the fragile alignments now taking shape in the region.

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In tandem, Secretary of State Marco Rubio issued a 180-day national security waiver for the infelicitously named Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act sanctions, which, since the act was implemented in early 2020, had choked Syria’s economy with a suffocating layer of secondary sanctions aimed at preventing any international reconstruction efforts or investment in the country. The act was originally passed by Congress in 2019 and extended for another five years in late 2024, after the fall of the Assad regime. It will eventually require formal legislative action to repeal its far-reaching strictures, which without the Rubio waiver would continue to ward off critically needed investment and financial transactions to rebuild a country estimated to have absorbed up to $400 billion in physical damage. In a separate statement explaining his waiver action, Rubio underscored he was taking the action in furtherance of Trump’s effort to provide the Syrian government “with the chance to promote peace and stability” in Syria and with its neighbors. He also made clear that the president expected prompt action from Syria on important U.S. policy priorities. These are understood to include cooperation on counterterrorism, expelling foreign fighters, and agreeing to ties with Israel.

These sanctions actions, while decisive and likely to reassure the region and international community that U.S. sanctions relief for Syria is serious, are the first steps in what is likely to be a strenuous effort required to unwind the decades-long layering of sanctions imposed on Syria since it was first designated a state sponsor of terrorism in 1979. Key layers of sanctions were added in 2001, 2003-04 (The Syria Accountability Act), 2006, and 2011 and were topped off with the Caesar Act, now waived in most of its provisions but not repealed. The waiver by Rubio can be extended in six-month increments with further certification actions to Congress. Meanwhile, the European Union, which began to cautiously unwind its sanctions on Syria several months earlier, announced May 20 it was comprehensively lifting its remaining sanctions on Syria.

U.S. Skeptics and Israeli Reservations Dismissed

These bold steps for  sanctions relief seem to short-circuit talk around White House and Republican Party circles, following Trump’s Gulf visit, about skeptics who opposed lifting sanctions on Syria over suspicions about the extremist jihadi tendencies of the government of President Ahmed al-Sharaa. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu also reportedly asked Trump not to lift the sanctions when he visited Washington in April. The Israeli military’s dozens of military actions, including air raids, cross border activity, and support for Syrian minorities, such as the Druze, in southern Syria, have made clear Israel’s deep suspicions of the Sharaa government. Trump clarified shortly after departing Abu Dhabi, the final destination of his Gulf trip, that he “did not ask” Israel about his decision on Syria sanctions relief. In the coming stages for rebuilding Syria and strengthening its government to pursue security, internal stability, and counterterrorism, it remains to be seen if Israel will choose to play the role of spoiler.

Big Winners: Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Qatar

If Israel was a loser in the battle for Trump’s support on Syria, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Qatar are big winners. The United Arab Emirates also staked out a nuanced but supportive position that encouraged Trump’s moves on Syria. While Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan had weighed in on the issue prior to the president’s Gulf trip, the influence of Saudi Arabia, specifically Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, seemed particularly decisive in light of the optics of the Gulf visit. Trump’s decision would seem to burnish Riyadh’s status as pivotal regional power broker and the crown prince’s credentials as critical wielder of influence able to lead an informal coalition of countries pushing for sanctions relief in the wake of the momentous changes in Syria.

Reconstruction: Gulf Countries, Turkey, Private Sector Will Be Key Players

After years of glacial slowness in developments on Syria, the pace has accelerated dramatically. This surge of sanctions relief is likely to open the door for substantial reconstruction efforts and investment in Syria. How much will pour in and how fast remain to be seen. The deepest pockets for financing the billions of dollars required for reconstruction are of course located in the Gulf. Qatar stands at the front of the line, having already indicated strong interest in injecting significant funds to help Syria. With Saudi Arabia and the UAE, it has the financial resources to vitally support the multibillion-dollar reconstruction effort that will be required for Syria. The UAE also has significant logistical capabilities and infrastructure development expertise it can bring to bear if it chooses to play that role.

But Gulf countries have their own priorities these days. Many are engaged in massive – and costly – internal development projects, such as Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030, and in long-term energy and economic diversification plans. At the same time, oil prices are mired in the mid-$60 per barrel trading range, significantly below some of these countries’ fiscal breakeven price to avoid annual budget deficits. Some Gulf countries are also likely to assess whether a bold embrace of reconstruction and assistance for Syria helps ensure a further weakening of the jihadi Islamist zeal that motivated its leaders for years or merely buys it time to reassert itself down the road. The Saudis, having already hosted two meetings on Syria heavily focused on reconstruction – the first in January in Riyadh and a second in Washington, with the International Monetary Fund, in April – seem ready to take on a leadership role on this front.

Turkey seems similarly postured for a strong leadership role, with the focus, given its more limited resources, on implementation rather than financing of reconstruction. Turkish construction, transportation, and manufacturing companies are well postured to do significant work – and profit handsomely – in Syria as it rebuilds its devastated cities and infrastructure. The profit aspect also points perhaps to the incentive for joint Turkish ventures with Gulf countries, capable of providing significant chunks of the financing and investment required for such efforts but also focused on return on investment. Private companies, with legacy investment in Syria shuttered under the weight of international sanctions, such as GulfSands Petroleum, with its valuable operating stake in two oil fields in northeast Syria, will also have a role to play in the country’s reconstruction.

International Community and Syrian Diaspora’s Key Roles

On the international organization front, the United Nations will seek to carve out a useful role in helping coordinate some of this effort. The World Bank has indicated an interest in reengaging in Syria, with an initial focus on access to electricity, while the IMF has appointed its first mission chief to Syria in 14 years and will also likely play a critical role in advising the new Syrian government. The Syrian diaspora is also likely to play a pivotal role in channeling investment – supported with professional expertise – back into Syria and focusing it in useful and personal ways that reflect knowledge of specific communities and needs. Europe, with its Syrian refugee challenges, humanitarian interests, and commercial capabilities will also play a key role in these reconstruction efforts.

For now, the region and the broader international community – and the legions of planners, investors, advisors, and construction and manufacturing companies, among others – are trying to catch up with the latest decisions lifting sanctions and paving the way for the rebuilding of Syria. There is also a great sorting out and significant planning that will be required for the reconstruction of Syria, since most of the detailed reflection done to date for rebuilding Syria occurred before the Assad regime collapsed and understandably failed to include the collapse of the regime or the lifting of sanctions or has only just begun to think through the implications for reconstruction in the late-breaking assumptions required. As the process gets underway, the region and broader international community, in their different ways, are likely to insist on imperatives such as the return and reintegration of refugees and a surge in humanitarian aid to help a Syrian population mired in food insecurity and poverty, confronting destroyed health and education facilities. The international community is likely as well to insist on persistent government efforts for an inclusive political process that can culminate in a new constitution and a credible political transition. Neither the region nor the broader international community will take on this exceedingly heavy lift in the absence of such a process and the assurances that come with it. These are daunting challenges, but they also represent the huge opportunities only freshly available for Syria – and Syrians – to benefit from. While threats and extremely difficult challenges lie ahead, which could upend security and threaten Syria’s prospects, it is notable how far the country has hurtled forward in six months. For all its blemishes, that change inspires a measure of hope for Syria that has not been felt for decades.

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Trump’s announcement marks a dramatic shift in U.S. foreign policy. This will have ramifications for the European oil majors, including Shell, TotalEnergies, and OMV of Austria, that were the main operators in Syria’s upstream oil and gas sector. Syria’s oil production just before the civil war broke out in 2011 stood at around 385,000 barrels per day of crude oil, with exports estimated at 109,000 b/d. Total’s joint venture with the General Petroleum Corporation in the Deir Ezzor Petroleum Company produced 27,000 b/d before operations were suspended in 2011, after the European Union tightened sanctions. Similarly, Shell held stakes in the 100,000 b/d Al-Furat Petroleum Company through its joint venture with China’s CNPC.

But the prospects of these firms rushing back in are slim. Large swaths of the country are still outside the control of the transitional government. Syria’s Kurds, represented by the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces, control key oil-producing regions in the northeast and have enjoyed a level of autonomy they will not easily relinquish. Negotiations between the interim government in Damascus and the SDF led to a barebones framework agreement in March that could open the way for eventually integrating SDF forces into the Syrian state army, though most of the details remain to be hammered out.

Security is also a pressing concern. Many oil and gas fields, especially in eastern Syria, were damaged or seized during the conflict, with some infrastructure targeted by Islamic State group fighters and other militant groups. The $1.2 billion Elba project, a joint venture between Canada’s Suncor and the General Petroleum Corporation, was brought online shortly before the war began, only to suffer severe damage. Whether firms like Suncor or Croatia’s INA, which operated the Hayan block producing gas and condensates, are willing to reinvest is not guaranteed.

Meanwhile, Chinese energy firms may be poised to fill the void. CNPC, Sinochem, and Sinopec all had operations in Syria before the war and are used to operating in high-risk environments as they enjoy state backing. A recent visit by Chinese delegations to Damascus for talks with Energy Minister Mohammed al-Bashir suggests Beijing is already exploring expanded roles in postwar recovery.

Gulfsands Petroleum, a United Kingdom-listed company, is the lone Western player actively advocating for reentry. The firm seeks to resume development in Block 26, located near Al Hasakah in northeast Syria, in which it holds a 50% stake. Earlier in May, Gulfsands CEO John Bell led a delegation to Damascus for talks with the Ministry of Energy before heading to Washington to make his case to senior U.S. government representatives. He wrote on his LinkedIn page, mere days before Trump’s decisive action on Syria sanctions: “Gulfsands believes the energy industry and Syria’s indigenous oil & gas resources can play a huge role in the country’s future, providing vital energy for the Syrian people and a means to generate important foreign currency revenues for the Syrian Treasury. These benefits cannot be realised with current sanction restrictions in place.”

In addition to upstream prospects, the potential for Syria to become a downstream hub is being discussed. The 140,000 b/d Banias refinery, currently operating at half capacity, will need to be rehabilitated to reduce Syria’s dependence on refined products. Imports currently come mainly from Russia, but the lifting of sanctions could allow Syria to diversify suppliers and reduce transportation and transaction costs.

Regional players, such as Jordan and Qatar, could also support Syria’s recovery. Jordanian ports, including Aqaba, are reportedly in talks to offer storage and trucking services to facilitate the flow of fuel and crude into Syria. Qatar has expressed interest in supplying natural gas via Jordan’s pipeline network, which could ease power generation costs and reduce blackouts. Turkey hopes that Syria could eventually serve as a transit corridor for Qatari or east Mediterranean gas flows through Syria to Turkey and on to Europe.

Still, there are significant financing gaps. International donors remain skeptical, and private investors will need strong legal assurances that there will be no lingering exposure to international sanctions. The current government in Damascus must build credibility and establish a functioning regulatory framework if it hopes to secure the billions of dollars in capital requirements.

Even with oil and gas revenue eventually returning, the road to recovery will be long. It will involve repairing war-torn cities, restoring public services, and reintegrating millions of displaced citizens. The potential is there – Syria has significant natural resources, a strategic location, and a skilled diaspora – but unlocking it will require careful coordination among government, industry, and international partners. Trump’s headline-grabbing declaration may have opened the first door. But whether the key players – in Washington, Brussels, Damascus, Ankara, and, also, Beijing – can take the necessary steps to peel away layers of sanctions, rebuild and modernize a damaged oil infrastructure, and get Syria’s oil production flowing at prewar levels remains to be seen.

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