In mid-November 2025, Task Force 150, under Saudi rotating command at the time, seized more than two tons of crystal methamphetamine with an estimated street value of $130 million from a stateless dhow. This major counternarcotics success was part of a series of high-value interdictions in recent months. Only weeks later, Task Force 152, led by Qatar since September 2025, conducted the inaugural Joint Patrol-01, deploying both crewed patrol vessels and unmanned surface vehicles for coordinated surveillance in Gulf waters. While autonomous-system patrols are not new to the Combined Maritime Forces, this operation was a step forward in manned-unmanned teaming.

Once peripheral contributors, several GCC countries are now taking on leadership roles, translating national naval modernization programs into operational experience and regional strategic influence. This emerging activism, however, is uneven, with the GCC divided between states seeking command roles and quieter members whose participation remains limited or risk averse.

Charting a New Course

Historically, geopolitical considerations and threat perceptions pushed the GCC states to deprioritize the maritime domain. Aside from episodic shocks, notably the Tanker War in the 1980s, Gulf security concerns remained overwhelmingly land and air centric. Priorities were shaped by the risk of cross-border incursions, Iran’s expanding missile arsenal, and persistent terrorist threats, while maritime security appeared to be a distant concern.

Equally consequential was the long-standing reliance on external security guarantors with superior naval capabilities. The British presence until the early 1970s and, subsequently, the U.S. Navy’s entrenched posture in the Gulf beginning in the 1980s provided a de facto delegation of maritime security responsibilities. This enabled GCC states to focus resources on air defense and land forces, while maritime routes remained under Western protection.

Around the mid-2010s, however, perceptions of U.S. retrenchment and ambitions for greater strategic autonomy prompted Gulf states to shift their maritime approach, and they embarked on a sustained naval buildup, seeking stronger operational capabilities. As these programs matured and delivered increasingly sophisticated platforms, Gulf navies began to translate assets into action, adopting a more visible presence at sea.

A Divided Bloc

Rising Protagonists

Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and, more recently, Qatar have each commanded task forces in recent years, part of a growing sense of maritime responsibility and ownership in safeguarding vital shipping routes.

They have prioritized Task Force 150, responsible for maritime security from the Arabian Sea to the western Indian Ocean, and Task Force 152, focused on protecting waters west of the Strait of Hormuz. These choices reflect clear strategic priorities: first, disrupting the logistical enablers of regional destabilization and, second, securing waters near national shores.

Launched to counter maritime terrorism, Task Force 150 now focuses primarily on interdicting weapons and, increasingly, narcotics trafficking. The Arabian Sea remains a major conduit for illicit flows between western Asia, the Horn of Africa, and the Arabian Peninsula. While weapons and dual-use components remain a significant concern for the U.S.-led naval coalition, the Combined Maritime Forces have increasingly emphasized narcotics interdictions, a shift appearing to reflect an emerging pattern. This informal distribution of labor may also be the result of recent foreign initiatives, including the September 2025 Saudi-British conference on strengthening the Yemeni coast guard, which prioritized combating piracy and weapons smuggling. Drug trafficking poses a dual threat to the domestic security of Gulf states. It provides a critical revenue stream for nonstate armed actors, including the Houthis, while also fueling addiction and associated public health costs. Since assuming command of Task Force 150 in August 2025, the Saudi-led task force has overseen 13 interdictions with more than $1.36 billion in seized narcotics – “the most successful period of narcotics seizures in CMF history,” according to Task Force 150’s commander, Fahad Aljoiad. The pace of seizures underscores the task force’s enhanced operational tempo and intelligence integration under Saudi leadership.

Given the scale of the patrol area, effective interdiction demands tightly coordinated multinational operations. Operation Al Masmak, for instance, involved Saudi coordination with Pakistani, French, Spanish, and U.S. naval assets, reinforcing Riyadh’s credentials for leadership in regional maritime security.

Notably, recent interdictions were executed by Pakistani and French navy vessels rather than Saudi forces. In Combined Maritime Forces practice, command countries regularly coordinate from the Bahrain-based headquarters without deploying ships to station. Saudi Arabia’s decision to withhold key assets likely reflects caution in dealing with the volatile security context surrounding Yemen.

Task Force 152 has attracted the most consistent GCC participation. Since 2009, Gulf states have held its command almost continuously, with only three interruptions, periods that coincided with spikes in Iran-related tensions. Kuwait is the most active contributor, assuming nine commands, followed by Saudi Arabia with four, Bahrain with three, and the United Arab Emirates with two. Qatar, traditionally cautious, assumed its first command in September 2025, signaling a gradual recalibration of its approach to coalition engagement after suffering Iranian and Israeli airstrikes over the summer.

While Riyadh’s leadership aligns with its ambition to assert strategic direction in its neighborhood, smaller GCC states view command roles within the Combined Maritime Forces as a critical avenue to exercise maritime agency. For Kuwait, Bahrain, and now Qatar, Task Force 152 provides a platform to shape security practices in waters often overshadowed by Saudi and Iranian influence.

The multilateral nature of the Combined Maritime Forces lowers political and operational risks for these smaller states. It mitigates regional power asymmetries, strengthens interoperability, and enhances operational readiness within a structured environment. Task Force 152 serves both as a mechanism for safeguarding Gulf waters and as a platform for building naval capabilities and visibility.

Yet, Combined Maritime Forces-led exercises expose the limits of Gulf navies to project power independently. While they can carry out lower- and mid-intensity missions, such as search-and-rescue and countersmuggling, they remain reliant on Western partners for higher-end maritime activities, including antisubmarine warfare, mine countermeasures, and advance unmanned integration. For example, for the Doha-led Joint Patrol-01, two of the three principal surface combatants were Western vessels. Leadership roles do not yet equate to full-spectrum maritime autonomy.

Still, these joint drills have strategic value. They enhance interoperability, expand tactical proficiency, and create habits of cooperation. Over time, they are likely to strengthen the maritime posture of smaller Gulf states and signal a gradual shift toward greater burden sharing.

Quieter Members

This growing Gulf activism is far from uniform. Some GCC states, such as Oman, adopt a deliberately low-profile approach, while the UAE has paused maritime engagement, at least publicly, despite earlier contributions.

Oman has navigated a volatile region by diversifying security partnerships while maintaining strict nonalignment. Neutrality and quiet diplomacy underpin Muscat’s foreign policy and are reflected in its maritime posture. The sultanate’s geography at the mouth of the Gulf, combined with its dense web of geopolitical relationships, compels Muscat to maintain functional ties with all actors holding stakes in the Strait of Hormuz. Sharing the Gulf’s only maritime entryway with Iran, Muscat has cultivated stable relations with Tehran, through regular port calls, military dialogues, and joint drills. At the same time, Oman hosts a British logistics facility in Duqm and grants the U.S. Navy access to its ports while also engaging with non-Western security players, including China and Russia.

Despite joining the Combined Maritime Forces in 2018, Oman’s participation has remained deliberately limited. Muscat is valued as a key interlocutor, but operational contributions have focused on coordination and logistical support rather than high-profile deployments.  Assuming a task force command would risk undermining the neutrality central to Oman’s regional diplomacy.

The UAE, once a reliable contributor, announced its withdrawal from the coalition in May 2023, citing an “ongoing evaluation of security cooperation.” Yet the coalition continues to list the UAE among its members, suggesting a strategic pause rather than a full exit. The decline in operational engagement, combined with retained membership, preserves Abu Dhabi’s option to reenegage if conditions become more favorable while signaling autonomy from U.S.-led frameworks.

For a country seeking flexibility and diversified partnerships, operating under a Saudi-led structure may also be unappealing, especially as the UAE is doubling down on options offering greater freedom of maneuver, such as bilateral and minilateral partnerships. This move likely reflects pragmatic calculations about diversifying from the U.S. protection umbrella and decoupling some security choices from Riyadh’s orbit.

Adaptation and Assertiveness

The Gulf’s increased naval engagement reflects both adaptation and growing assertiveness amid a volatile maritime environment shaped by regional tensions, renewed piracy, and intensifying great power rivalry. However, deeper burden sharing with U.S. military operations remains limited, as GCC governments weigh the risks of closer alignment with Washington, as low participation in Operation Prosperity Guardian underscored.

Efforts to diversify security partnerships, including regular Saudi-Chinese naval drills, highlight this caution. While the recent GCC-level Union Exercise signals interest in revamping naval integration, the Combined Maritime Forces remain the most effective platform for practical cooperation, albeit one constrained by each state’s pursuit of strategic flexibility.

Ultimately, Gulf activism within the Combined Maritime Forces points to a more engaged maritime diplomacy. The Gulf states are blending ambition with pragmatic multilateralism, positioning them as increasingly influential, though still cautious, actors in the evolving maritime security landscape.

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A Bumpy Couple of Decades

It has been a turbulent period for Qatari-Emirati relations. Post-Arab Spring, the states were on opposite sides of the defining debate that underpinned Arab politics: whether to accommodate or suppress Islamist movements. More than merely disagreeing philosophically, each side actively supported its own genre of proxy partner around the region. From Libya to Syria to Egypt, and more recently the Horn of Africa, Qatari and Emirati proxies frequently found themselves ranged against one another in a shadow competition for regional influence.

This divergence became acute when the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Egypt launched a boycott of Qatar in June 2017. The boycott severed land, sea, and air links, expelled Qatari nationals, and sought to economically strangle the small peninsular state. The measures disrupted everything from food supply chains to family connections across borders. When the boycott was lifted in January 2021 through the Al-Ula Declaration, it was difficult to see how Qatari leaders could readily forgive and forget.

Signals From DIMDEX

The context of the Barzan-EDGE announcement is itself instructive in this regard, however. DIMDEX 2026 featured a notably large Emirati presence, with EDGE Group occupying one of the exhibition’s more prominent pavilions. Beyond mere attendance, the UAE committed as a tier one sponsor – a significant financial and symbolic investment in a Qatari showcase. The signing ceremony was accorded prime billing on the first day: a choreographed moment, paid for, invested in, and honored by both parties. Such gestures carry weight in Gulf politics, where symbolism and protocol serve as a parallel language of statecraft. Whether this reflects genuine strategic alignment or carefully managed optics remains an open question, but the investment of prestige by both parties suggests at minimum a shared interest in demonstrating reconciliation.

The Logic of Collaboration

Beyond the symbolism, there are sound rationales for Qatari-Emirati defense cooperation. Given EDGE’s broader portfolio and more mature technological base, the Emirati firm would likely serve as the primary provider of technology and expertise, with Barzan contributing limited market access, perhaps facilities, and capital. For Qatar, such an arrangement offers an accelerated path to defense industrial capability – where indigenous development might take a decade or more, partnership with a more established regional player compresses timelines considerably. This represents a marriage of convenience, certainly, but also a pragmatic recognition that smaller states seeking world-class defense capabilities benefit from pooling resources rather than duplicating efforts in isolation.

The deeper significance of this joint venture may lie in what it suggests about evolving attitudes toward intra-Gulf competition. For decades, the Gulf states have pursued parallel development strategies characterized more by rivalry than coordination. Each has sought to build national champions across sectors from aviation to finance to defense, often duplicating investments and competing for the same markets, talent, and prestige.

This competitive dynamic has produced impressive individual achievements but at considerable collective cost. That the UAE successfully launched a mission to Mars years before a train link to any other Gulf capital speaks to the domestic focus at the expense of meaningful regional integration.

Smaller Gulf states, such as Qatar, Kuwait, and the UAE, can afford competitive inefficiency for decades yet. Hydrocarbon revenue, sovereign wealth, and relatively small populations provide ample buffers against the costs of duplication. The question is whether affordability is the same as wisdom. As these states pursue economic diversification and knowledge economies less dependent on resource extraction, the logic of competition becomes less compelling and the benefits of coordination more apparent. Defense industries, with their high fixed costs and long development cycles, are precisely the sector where the case for collaboration is strongest.

Trust, Time, and Tentative Steps

None of this is to suggest that the Barzan-EDGE joint venture represents a fundamental transformation of Gulf politics or that the wounds of the boycott have healed. Trust, once broken, rebuilds slowly. Qatari policymakers would be imprudent to assume that the interests that drove the boycott have disappeared entirely, and Emirati leaders presumably remain wary of a neighbor whose regional alignments and media influence they sought so dramatically to curtail.

What the joint venture does suggest is that both sides see value in building institutional frameworks that create shared interests. Defense industrial partnerships, once established, generate their own constituencies and path dependencies. Joint development programs create stakeholders on both sides invested in the relationship’s continuation. In this sense, the Barzan-EDGE venture may be less an expression of existing trust than an instrument for building it – a calculated bet that shared projects can forge connections that diplomatic rhetoric alone cannot.

Whether this bet pays off will depend on factors beyond the control of either defense conglomerate: the evolution of regional alignments, the management of future disagreements, and the depth of commitment on both sides to making the partnership succeed when political winds shift. The Gulf has witnessed rapprochements before that proved superficial when tested by competing interests.

For now, the joint venture stands as a notable marker on an uncertain path. In a region where trust is scarce and history casts long shadows, such investment is itself significant – even if the full measure of reconciliation remains to be seen.

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The Islamic Republic is under severe and mounting pressure, yet its collapse is neither imminent nor inevitable. The current protest wave instead reflects a progressive narrowing of the regime’s strategic options. Iran’s leadership is approaching a critical juncture: It can either pursue a Venezuelan-style accommodation with President Donald J. Trump – potentially entailing leadership change while preserving the regime’s core institutions – or remain on a trajectory of economic deterioration, recurrent mass protest, and the gradual erosion of cohesion within the security services, a process that could ultimately culminate in regime collapse. This latter path would be significantly accelerated should the United States resume military strikes against Iran’s coercive institutions.

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The STC’s December gamble, at least on the surface, made a lot of sense. The Presidential Leadership Council, the eight-member body that represents what passes for Yemen’s internationally recognized government, was in disarray and riven with infighting. The economic situation in the South was a disaster and looked to be growing worse. Plus, the STC seemed to have the acquiescence if not the active encouragement of the UAE. The STC was formed in 2017 with the explicit goal of forming an independent Southern state in Yemen. By late November and early December 2025, all it needed was a spark, which it got when a local commander in Hadramout deployed troops around an oil field in an attempt to secure more revenue. The STC responded with a military offensive, quickly taking much of the oil-rich governorate of Hadramout as well as Mahra, Yemen’s easternmost governorate on the border with Oman. Within days the STC had control of much of Southern Yemen, and it looked as if all that was missing was an official declaration of independence.

On December 26, Rashad al-Alimi, the head of the Presidential Leadership Council, called on Saudi Arabia to intervene militarily in Yemen to reverse the STC’s military gains. For many, Alimi’s request echoed the one made a decade earlier by then Yemeni President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi, who called on Saudi Arabia and the UAE to use military force in Yemen to expel the Houthis from Sanaa. That intervention exacerbated a conflict in Yemen that still hasn’t ended.

Despite that history, however, Saudi Arabia quickly signaled that it was willing to intervene militarily in Yemen, even against ostensible allies. This is likely because, as analyst Maysaa Shuja al-Deen pointed out, the STC offensive upended the “implicit power-sharing arrangement” that had held for much of the past several years. “UAE backed forces dominate coastal areas and islands and maintain strong influence in Aden, while Saudi-backed forces control land borders and oil facilities.”

The day after Alimi’s request, Saudi Minister of Defense Khalid bin Salman posted a statement on X calling for the STC to withdraw. When that didn’t work, Saudi Arabia carried out an airstrike on an Emirati shipment of arms and vehicles that was destined for the STC, though the UAE denied the shipment included weapons. Worried about the implications of a Saudi-Emirati conflict in Yemen, the UAE announced that it was withdrawing all of its remaining forces from Yemen, which effectively left the STC exposed without air cover. After that, Saudi Arabia and its allies on the ground made quick work of the STC, carrying out a few airstrikes and forcing the units that had advanced with such optimism a month earlier to retreat. In some cases, STC fighters were forced to flee the area in buses after their military vehicles were destroyed.

On January 2, Aidarous al-Zubaidi, the head of the STC and a member of the Presidential Leadership Council, attempted to save face by announcing what he termed a “constitutional declaration,” basically laying out a two-year transitional period for an independent Southern state. Saudi Arabia responded by summoning several members of the STC, who also sit on the Presidential Leadership Council, in an apparent attempt to divide the movement from within.

What comes next in Yemen is likely to be messy and chaotic. Already there has been looting in Hadramout and Mahra as well as calls for reform and transition within the STC. Whether it survives in its current form or is able to implement its two-year constitutional transition toward independence are both open questions as is what role the UAE will play in Yemen moving forward. Will it continue to support the STC to the degree it did before, or will it look to diversify and increase support to other proxies, such as Tariq Saleh, who are not tied to dreams of Southern independence? One thing is certain, the withdrawal of UAE troops from Yemen does not mean the end of the UAE in Yemen.

Beyond the immediate implications for the STC, however, are broader ones for Yemen. After nearly 15 years of protest, revolution, chaos, uncertainty, and war, the country seems more divided than ever. The STC, despite its vision of an independent Southern state, never had the type of popular support across the South that could make that dream a reality. Instead, it is and was largely a regional movement, with much of its leadership and backing coming from Dhala and Lahj, which are close to Aden but far from Hadramout, where the STC was pushing to take over. Meanwhile, Hadramis prize their own regional identity, and even a few independent Hadrami state flags have popped up on X recently. The same could be said about Mahra and Socotra, both of which have distinct languages, although neither has the economic resources of Hadramout. Local allegiances over a national identity, a handful of competing militias none of which are strong enough to compel others to bend to their will, and meddling outside powers, taken together, constitute a recipe for continued conflict.

The STC’s failed attempt at independence likely means that Yemen won’t split along North and South lines. There will be no return to pre-1990 borders, at least not anytime soon. Instead, Yemen appears headed for a future in which no one party will manage to achieve superiority. The country will be divided along regional lines with local warlords, backed by outside powers, seizing as much territory as they can hold and administering as they see fit. There may be a veneer of national government, but its power won’t stretch much beyond the capital. Such a country will continue to spread insecurity – from Houthi threats to Red Sea shipping and a still active al-Qaeda threat to drug smuggling and a refugee problem, Yemen’s challenge to the region is only going to grow.

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2021: A Bad Year for Gulf-Lebanese Relations

In 2021, Lebanon’s relations with the Gulf states spiraled. Hezbollah maintained its grip on Lebanese politics both through its mafia-like enforcement of order and its long-standing relationship with then-President Michel Aoun and his Christian party, the Free Patriotic Movement. This monopoly cast a large shadow over Lebanese politics and decision making, particularly as it pertained to Lebanon’s relationship with its neighbors.

George Kordahi, who served as Lebanon’s minister of information at the time, made disparaging comments about the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen, calling it “futile and pointless” and said that the Houthis were “defending themselves against an external aggression.” This came six months after then Lebanese Foreign Minister Charbel Wehbe used derogatory terms to describe the Saudis. Many Gulf Cooperation Council countries were convinced that Lebanon was pursuing a pro-Iran foreign policy that was intended to undermine the Gulf’s agenda.

Meanwhile, media accounts reported that Hezbollah was smuggling disassembled weapons into Yemen and conducting training for Yemen’s Houthi fighters. There have even been unconfirmed reports that Hezbollah’s leadership may have influenced Houthi financial and military operation decisions.

Moreover, in April 2021, Saudi authorities discovered a shipment of 5.3 million smuggled Captagon pills in pomegranate crates at the Jeddah airport. The Gulf states viewed Hezbollah’s sway in Lebanon, involvement in Yemen, and effort to corrupt Gulf society through the sale of drugs as a war being waged against them.

Lebanon’s Economic Crisis

In response, Saudi Arabia in October 2021 expelled Lebanon’s ambassador, banned all Lebanese imports, and recalled its ambassador to Lebanon. In solidarity, Bahrain, Kuwait, and the UAE recalled their ambassadors as well. (These Gulf ambassadors have since returned to Beirut). Then, in early 2022, Saad Hariri, Lebanon’s former prime minister and leader of the Sunni community in Lebanon, announced that he would suspend all his political activities in advance of that year’s parliamentary elections. The announcement was linked to tensions between the Saudi royal family and Hariri. Even the Emiratis, who agreed to host Hariri, emphasized to him that he would be allowed to conduct his business affairs in the UAE on the condition that he suspend his political activities.

As Lebanon’s relationship with the Gulf was deteriorating, it suffered the effects of one tragedy after another. In 2019, Lebanon endured a severe economic collapse, as its gross domestic product fell by nearly 40% in real terms, its currency lost 98% of its value, and depositors were not allowed to access their funds held at local banks. In August 2020, during the height of coronavirus pandemic restrictions, an estimated 2,750 tons of unsafely stored ammonium nitrate exploded at Beirut’s port causing the largest nonnuclear blast in modern history, resulting in hundreds of deaths, thousands of injuries, and billions of dollars in damage.

Rather than bringing relief from such tragedies, Iran’s support to Hezbollah has only added to the suffering of the Lebanese people, including the largely pro-Hezbollah Shia population in the south. Hezbollah used its sway to block for more than two years the election of a president that it viewed unfriendly to the group’s agenda, leading to political gridlock and paralysis. It was not until Israel’s attacks in 2024 in southern Lebanon, weakening Hezbollah, that the group realized it could no longer stand in the way of electing the president. And with Joseph Aoun’s election as president in January, the gridlock ended.

What Does Lebanon Need To Do?

In June 2023, the International Monetary Fund issued a report with economic reform recommendations to stabilize the Lebanese economy. The reforms included enhanced governance transparency, a strengthened anticorruption framework, improved performance among state owned enterprises, debt restructuring, a unified exchange rate, and protection for small depositors. It is generally accepted within Lebanon and among international observers that the country’s political elite are deliberately blocking much-needed reforms to protect their financial interests.

Between 1963 and 2022, Gulf states gave Lebanon an estimated $9 billion in grants, excluding loans and investments. But they have stressed that that era is over. Gulf capitals have linked any new financial packages to reforms, such as combatting corruption and restoring confidence in the banking system as proposed by the IMF, and, crucially, disarming Hezbollah. Saudi commentator Ali Shihabi said that Saudi Arabia “does not want to invest in a black hole.”

Like other Gulf states, Saudi Arabia generally frames its position on Hezbollah’s disarmament in terms of support for state control of weapons and in the context of adherence to relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions (which include provisions on disarmament). How a relatively weak Lebanese central government, with armed forces outgunned for decades by Hezbollah, would accomplish such disarmament without prompting significant internal instability remains unclear. However, as the Lebanese government and the international community continue to make progress on the question of Hezbollah’s weapons, it is widely expected that the mafia state created by the militia will no longer be able to survive, and the much needed and long-awaited economic reforms called for by the Gulf states and others will finally be enacted.

In August, U.S. Special Envoy for Syria – and U.S. Ambassador to Turkey – Thomas Barrack announced a plan to disarm Hezbollah by the end of 2025. It outlines an economic strategy for Lebanon that combines regional investment with security reforms. This plan also includes Saudi Arabia and Qatar investing in an economic zone in southern Lebanon to create job opportunities for former Hezbollah members who agree to lay down their weapons. Media accounts indicate that the plan for disarming Hezbollah will rely on persistent Israeli military pressure on the group, which could prolong the depopulation of some border villages and lead to a more militarized southern Lebanon.

Prospects for Gulf-Lebanon Ties

Given the key to any Gulf-Lebanon rapprochement is Hezbollah surrendering its weapons, the path to get there is going to be filled with landmines both figurative and literal. This does not mean that steps can’t be taken to move toward this goal. The first big hurdle was the election of Aoun and the appointment of Prime Minister Nawaf Salam. Lebanon now has a leadership that seems ready to bring the country back into the Arab and Western fold.

In March, Aoun was the first Lebanese head of state in eight years to visit Saudi Arabia, where he met Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. During the visit, the two leaders discussed taking steps to resume Lebanese exports to Saudi Arabia and have Saudi citizens once again travel to Lebanon, according to the Office of the Presidency. In the months that followed, Aoun also visited Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE to present Lebanon as “open for business.” Saudi Arabia has responded positively and, in November, announced plans to boost commercial ties to Lebanon after reports that “the Lebanese government and security forces demonstrated efficacy in curbing drug exports over recent months,” according to a senior Saudi official.

Accounting for more than 19% of GDP prior to the economic collapse in 2019, tourism has emerged as the fastest route toward restoring ties to Gulf countries and reviving the economy. “Tourism is a big catalyst, and so it’s very important that the bans get lifted,” said Laura Khazen Lahoud, Lebanon’s tourism minister. Shortly after Aoun’s visit, the UAE officially lifted its travel ban on UAE nationals visiting Lebanon, according to the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia are considering similar moves. Qatar never imposed a travel ban, so Qatari nationals have continued to travel to Lebanon.

Emirati and Gulf interests in Lebanon are likely to include investments in the energy sector and development of the gas fields in the eastern Mediterranean. The UAE may also be willing to contribute by providing equipment and training to universities and hospitals and by rehabilitating key infrastructure, particularly the Beirut port and the country’s road and bridge networks.

Remittances in Lebanon in 2025 are expected to reach $7.31 billion, with an annual growth rate of 4.5% over the next several years. Before the rupture with the Gulf, the majority of Lebanese expatriates in the Gulf were in Saudi Arabia with more than 300,000, the UAE was close behind with nearly 200,000, and Kuwait had around 42,000. From 2020-22 alone, more than 80,000 Lebanese moved to the Gulf in search of jobs. Remittances from the Gulf remain a critical component of the Lebanese economy.

Approaching the end of the year, Saudi Arabia has already made another strong gesture of support to the Lebanese government. Along with the United States and France, Saudi Arabia announced on December 18 that it will host an international conference early in 2026 in support of the Lebanese army. Aoun expressed his heartfelt gratitude and emphasized his commitment to ensuring that the money will be used in a transparent and responsible manner to help Lebanon resume its rightful place as a member of the Arab nations.

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Boulos has been in communication with Sudan’s military leaders since the late summer to try to end the conflict, including a direct meeting with Sudan’s army chief and de facto head of state, Lt. Gen. Abdul Fattah al-Burhan, in Switzerland in mid-August. He has not met directly with the head of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, Lt. Gen. Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo, widely known as Hemedti. In spite of media accounts reporting the Rapid Support Forces’ acceptance of the Quad plan, neither side has formally accepted it, according to Boulos. Burhan has partially walked back initially harsh language rejecting the plan as unacceptable and biased.

Pivotal Gulf Influence

The involvement of both Saudi Arabia and the UAE in the ad hoc Quad grouping points to the pivotal involvement of the Gulf states in diplomacy focused on the conflict in Sudan. The UAE is alleged to be supporting the Rapid Support Forces militarily, accusations it has consistently denied. While Saudi Arabia and Egypt have offered consistent diplomatic support for Burhan and the Sudanese Armed Forces, Egypt has denied allegations of providing the Sudanese government military support. Media and U.S. government sources have raised questions about these denials.

Russia and Iran Intervene

The evidence of outside involvement in Sudan’s war is overwhelming. Russia for a sustained period was accused of playing both sides. It provided diplomatic support to the government and signed agreements for infrastructure, postwar reconstruction, and establishing a naval base at Port Sudan. At the same time, Russia has used elements of the former Wagner Group to provide weapons to the Rapid Support Forces and logistical support for the group’s gold smuggling through regional bases it controlled in Libya, west of Sudan. Iran has also intervened in the conflict, providing arms for the Sudanese government, including drones and other military equipment that helped turn the tide for the Sudanese Armed Forces to retake Khartoum early this year, helping the government consolidate control over eastern and central Sudan.

Recent Battlefield Dynamics

The more recent battlefield dynamics point to the Rapid Support Forces’ ascendancy, with its brutal November takeover of El Fasher, in the Darfur region. The Rapid Support Forces has moved on with a severe military offensive aimed at the town of Babanusa and other gateway nodes in the sprawling Kordofan region east of Darfur. The Sudanese Armed Forces has denied recent reports the town has fallen to the Rapid Support Forces. The battlefield dynamics, particularly in the takeover of El Fasher, have been accompanied by widespread reports of Rapid Support Forces atrocities, including mass killings, sexual violence, targeting of non-Arab ethnic groups, and grisly efforts to destroy or conceal human remains. In tandem with intensifying reports of widespread famine in the months preceding the El Fasher takeover, and reiterated findings of genocidal behavior by the Rapid Support Forces, the conflict in Sudan was thrust front and center into the focus of the international community in the weeks leading up to Mohammed bin Salman’s Washington visit and help explain how Sudan became a pivotal issue, prompting Trump’s pledge to the Saudi crown prince to try to end the conflict.

Prospects for a Settlement

The critical issue to address relates to prospects for ending the war. Is there a credible opportunity to tie off this raging conflict and stick the diplomatic landing with a civilian-led transitional government as called for in the Quad plan? Several factors point to the outside possibility of success. They include the heightened U.S. involvement, supported by Trump, to facilitate mediation efforts. The Quad resolution effort also points to a degree of increasing regional alignment – often a key factor in ending civil conflicts – reflecting broader international scrutiny of the conflict and growing pressure to coordinate an ending rather than perpetuate the competition that has fed the war. The latest wave of appalling violence, cresting at El Fasher, is also pushing the conflict to the apex of global humanitarian priorities requiring mediation and resolution and sharpening the international consensus that the war’s costs are unsustainable. Those unsustainable costs are a reality that increases pressure on the sides involved in prosecuting or supporting the war to consider a cease-fire and a political solution. Analysts who have examined how wars end believe such consensus and  pressure on intervening states often serve as precursors for a credible effort to end the conflict with a settlement. Fears about regional spillover that could lead to an arc of instability linking the Sahel with the Horn of Africa and Red Sea commercial and security interests represent yet another reason to believe this conflict’s due date for settlement looms ominously as does analysis in conflict literature pointing to a “mutually hurting stalemate.” Egypt and Saudi Arabia, given their geographical proximity, view the conflict in Sudan as a national security threat.

A More Skeptical View

While the appalling humanitarian costs, devastation of infrastructure, military exhaustion on both sides, and increasing international pressure on external actors might seem to support the notion that the conflict in Sudan has ripened for forceful mediation and a political transition, the case for pessimism seems more compelling. The two sides do not seem that exhausted and exhibit significant recalcitrance – or evasive action – when confronted with the prospect of engaging in mediation to end the conflict. Sudan’s government has exhibited significant recalcitrance with its public response to the Quad plan; the Rapid Support Forces, while using more adroit rhetoric expressing support for Quad efforts and a self-imposed three-month cease-fire, has demonstrated battlefield recalcitrance and cynical use of public statements endorsing mediation, while it pushes forward with its Babanusa military offensive in the Kordofan region.

Other factors also support the view that fighting will continue, despite the Quad and Trump administration efforts to end it. Regional alignment to end the conflict does not seem all that cohesive and appears to be masking ongoing differences in approach and perceived interests, even among Quad members. Reports at the time of the visit cited Mohammed bin Salman’s efforts with Trump aimed not only at conflict resolution but at prompting U.S. pressure on the UAE. The UAE for its part has contented itself with welcoming Trump’s efforts to end the conflict and expressing support for an immediate cease-fire while accusing Burhan and the Sudanese Armed Forces of “consistently obstructive behavior.”

Military leaders on both sides of the conflict in Sudan seem unwilling to accept that military victory is unattainable, often a key motivator in prolonging conflict. Leaders in such conflicts often prefer to gamble for victory rather than negotiate a compromise. This is true in circumstances where, as in Sudan, sustained atrocities create issues of mistrust and incentives for continuing the fighting, where one or both sides fear post-settlement reneging by the other side and retribution. Analysts of the Sudan conflict also point to now entrenched territorial divisions and rival state-building efforts in territories under each side’s control that also raise the bar quite high for reaching a settlement. Some analysts have pointed to language in the Quad plan referencing the Muslim Brotherhood and hinted or been explicit that such language, aimed at key constituent elements in Burhan’s political and military alliances, would make it difficult to persuade the Sudanese government to participate sincerely in any Quad mediation effort. Anwar Gargash, Emirati presidential diplomatic advisor, pointing toward a red line in the opposite direction, insisted that Sudan’s future “could not be dictated by the Muslim Brotherhood.” In separate comments, Gargash highlighted what the UAE views as a troubling organic link between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Muslim Brotherhood.

The scramble for resource riches (agricultural land, gold and other valuable and rare earth minerals) in Sudan also seems to be prolonging the conflict, creating incentives that are undermining prospects for a settlement. Resource wealth can fund armed groups, helping sustain long-term fighting. It also creates leadership incentives for continuing to fight. Internally, Hemedti and his family are thought to control much of the lucrative gold trade. Figures in 2021 indicated that nearly 50% of Sudanese gold – valued at more than $4 billion – was smuggled out of the country illegally, much of it controlled by the Rapid Support Forces leader and his family. External players’ picking sides in the conflict are also motivated to a significant degree by this scramble for resources, as analysts on the conflict in Sudan have made clear. External players focused on mineral wealth or rich agricultural lands also view the possibility of port access and naval bases on the Red Sea as a critical way to exercise maritime, commercial, and security influence and control access to a critical gateway to Africa. Conditions of war facilitate this effort to plunder the country for resources and influence, creating perverse disincentives for ending a conflict, according to conflict analysts.

As the Quad mediation efforts ramp up, under newly energized U.S. leadership, it will become clearer whether there is cause for optimism that a settlement of Sudan’s bloody civil war – or even an extended humanitarian cease-fire – is possible at this stage. A review of the dynamics on the ground among the warring parties and among external players vying for influence and resources in the country, when considered in light of key lessons drawn in relevant conflict literature, points to the huge challenges ahead for getting a temporary cease-fire in place and extending it into a longer-term, peaceful transition. There is a persuasive case to be made that the war is likely to grind on.

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Vision 2030’s Nuclear Pivot

Saudi Arabia’s civilian nuclear program remains, fundamentally, the technological cornerstone of Vision 2030, a grand strategy to pivot from oil dependency to atomic leverage. For Mohammed bin Salman, this has always been a deliberate bid for technological sovereignty, transcending mere energy policy. While the public-facing justification – that a country with vast solar potential needs nuclear power for desalination and grid stability – holds technical merit, the underlying strategic reality is clear: Riyadh views nuclear capability as a prerequisite for great power status and a critical hedge in a volatile neighborhood.

The leverage Saudi Arabia wielded in Washington was the explicit threat of a geopolitical pivot: Had the United States not provided the pathway to a civilian nuclear program, including some form of enrichment rights, Riyadh was fully prepared to finalize deals with Beijing or Moscow – competitors who had long signaled their willingness to build reactors without the stringent nonproliferation strings that the United States traditionally insists upon.

The Negotiated Enrichment Compromise

The talks were initially defined by the central impasse over the enrichment red line. Washington’s nonproliferation policy had long been guided by the “gold standard” established in the 2009 U.S.-UAE 123 Agreement, which explicitly forbids domestic enrichment and reprocessing. Nonetheless, Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, upon which all such agreements are based, does not explicitly require this “gold standard” waiving enrichment and reprocessing technology by a country receiving U.S. civilian nuclear assistance and technology.

The core fear in Washington is the creation of a “threshold state”: a country possessing the technical infrastructure to rapidly weaponize fissile material. However, the negotiated framework suggests that the United States is prepared to relinquish the rigid “gold standard” requirement of forsaking enrichment in exchange for cementing the alliance for the coming generation. The breakthrough was achieved via a highly specific, controlled compromise. While Riyadh received U.S. commitment to the necessary technological assistance and U.S. backing for a civilian nuclear program, the “full fuel cycle” was not granted outright. Instead, the framework described by diplomatic sources utilizes a hybrid model:

1. U.S.-Controlled Fuel Repatriation: The United States agreed to supply the enriched uranium fuel, and, crucially, all spent fuel will be repatriated by the United States or a designated international partner, preventing the reprocessing capability that is the critical step toward weaponization.
2. Advanced Research and Development and Training: The United States will provide significant assistance in nuclear research and development and training, fulfilling Mohammed bin Salman’s demand for technological sovereignty and building the indigenous human capital required for a future “threshold state” – but one that is initially and heavily reliant on the United States for maintenance and fuel supply.
3. Enhanced IAEA Protocol: Saudi Arabia agreed to adopt the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Additional Protocol, mandating far more intrusive inspections and transparency measures than the kingdom previously adhered to – an apparent concession to mollify congressional hard-liners.

Israel’s Conditional Acceptance

The U.S.-Saudi package was ultimately structured as a comprehensive deal, inextricably tethered to a formal, NATO-style defense pact and U.S. approval for the transfer of advanced weaponry, potentially including F-35 fighter jet sales, as explored in the lead-up to these negotiations.

For Israel, the initial prospect of a nuclear-capable Saudi Arabia armed with fifth-generation aircraft was viewed as a direct assault on the long-standing U.S. commitment to Israel’s qualitative military edge. Diplomatic sources confirm that first, Israel’s silent veto was active until the final hours. Second, there is a high probability the compromise was brokered through a massive, undisclosed qualitative military edge enhancement package committed to by the United States for Israel, and third Israel’s acceptance of the deal was conditional on the highly intrusive inspection regime established by the Additional Protocol and the United States’ ironclad guarantee regarding fuel repatriation. This move effectively decoupled the immediate threat of a Saudi bomb from the qualitative military edge issue, trading future risk for immediate, tangible security guarantees for Israel.

Iran’s Shadow Calculus Intensifies

The most profound ripple effect of the deal is the immediate intensification of Iran’s “shadow war” calculus. This refers to Tehran’s reliance on asymmetric proxies and covert destabilization to offset Saudi Arabia’s new conventional advantage. The White House secured a deal cemented by a defense pact and conventional superiority, signaling U.S. resolve to guarantee the kingdom’s security and deter regional aggression. The U.S.-backed program is thus not merely civilian; it is a formalized deterrent, serving as the technological pillar of the new defense pact – a tangible, U.S.-stamped signal to Tehran that Saudi Arabia’s conventional and technological modernization has Washington’s full backing.

On the other hand, initial reactions from Tehran suggest the deterrent effect may be short lived. Iranian officials have condemned the deal as a “Western capitulation” and direct threat to regional stability, asserting that even a leashed Saudi program will accelerate their own proliferation efforts. Regional analysts stress that the deal has not necessarily prevented a regional arms race but rather shifted its terms. Tehran, seeing the United States break the “gold standard,” now possesses enhanced rhetorical justification and geopolitical urgency to accelerate its sprint to a bomb. Mohammed bin Salman’s statement that if Iran gets a bomb, Saudi Arabia will follow, is now a much more imminent and credible threat, creating a cascade risk that still looms over other regional powers, including Egypt and Turkey.

The Price of Influence

The agreement was the strategic compromise widely anticipated. The United States traded its rigid nonproliferation purity for influence, accepting a leashed Saudi nuclear ambition as the price of preventing a “rogue” one – or worse, a Chinese-built one. This U.S.-backed program is “civilian” in name, but its true value is strategic. It functions, first, as a geopolitical anchor: a multibillion-dollar, multidecade U.S. technological and security presence on Saudi soil, locking Riyadh into a U.S. technological and security orbit for the next generation. It provided Mohammed bin Salman with the necessary win to claim technological sovereignty and build the human capital he demanded, all while ensuring the most dangerous proliferation component – the fuel cycle – remains under a tight U.S. leash. This evolution marks the fruition of the strategic groundwork laid out in recent U.S.-Saudi arms deliberations, solidifying Riyadh’s pivot within Washington’s orbit. The agreement also nests well strategically, on Washington’s side, with the administration’s strong tilt toward nuclear energy, evident in executive orders President Donald J. Trump signed in May, a U.S. energy tilt that many analysts believe will critically depend on the kind of ample, responsible financing Saudi Arabia represents on the nuclear energy technology export horizon.

The administration’s decision reflects the current global geopolitical reality: Washington can no longer simply enforce a “gold standard” in a region where trust is measured in warheads and strategic partnerships not just legally binding agreements. The U.S.-Saudi deal is a reluctant acknowledgment of this new reality, sacrificing perfect world nonproliferation dogma not required by U.S. law or policy to preserve a critical strategic alliance and maintain technological preeminence in the face of escalating competition from Moscow and Beijing.

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Over the past two decades, Turkey has moved from dependency to self-reliance in the defense sector. Through political will, sustained investment, and public-private collaboration, Turkey has built a diversified ecosystem in which state-owned firms and agile private companies compete and cooperate under the guidance of the Presidency of Defense Industries. The results are visible: a broad portfolio of indigenous systems, expanding export markets, and a growing network of co-production agreements across Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. This industrial rise has also altered Turkey’s regional posture, turning defense cooperation into a key instrument of foreign policy.

For the Gulf states, the appeal of a partnership with Turkey lies in a convergence of strategic and industrial objectives. As the Gulf states pursue defense localization and seek to reduce dependence on the United States and Europe, Ankara offers not only cost-effective technology but a model of how to build capacity within constrained political and financial environments. The readiness of Turkish firms to share their know-how, adapt their production, and establish joint ventures aligns with the Gulf’s drive toward diversification. In this sense, through its defense-industrial trajectory, Turkey has become a partner and is providing a blueprint for Gulf localization, linking industrial pragmatism with strategic autonomy.

Among Gulf states, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia have taken the lead in shifting from procurement-heavy to production-oriented defense sectors. Both have tied localization to strategic autonomy and economic diversification, yet they differ in institutional design, speed, and outcomes.

Turkey’s Defense Industry Model

Turkey’s transformation from a dependent arms importer to an increasingly autonomous producer is rooted in both strategic necessity and institutional design. The 1974 U.S. arms embargo following the Cyprus intervention exposed the vulnerabilities of dependence on Western suppliers. Over the following decades, Ankara built a defense ecosystem through state guidance, private entrepreneurship, and export orientation.

The creation of the Presidency of Defense Industries, originally as the Defense Industry Development and Support Administration in 1985, and the consolidation of firms under the Turkish Armed Forces Foundation gave coherence and financing to this effort. Successive governments, from Turgut Ozal’s liberalization to Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s state-driven modernization, turned the sector into a pillar of national industrial policy. The Presidency of Defense Industries now operates as a central coordinator for procurement, research and development funding, and technology transfer. At the same time, firms such as ASELSAN, HAVELSAN, Roketsan, Baykar, Turkish Aerospace Industries, and numerous small and medium enterprises populate an increasingly export-oriented ecosystem.

In 2019, the United States expelled Turkey from its F-35 program after Ankara decided to purchase and deploy the Russian-made S-400 air-defense system, which Washington viewed as incompatible with NATO security standards and a risk to the F-35’s sensitive technology. This accelerated investment in indigenous systems, including the KAAN fifth-generation fighter, Bayraktar unmanned aerial vehicles, the Altay tank, and new naval platforms. These flagship projects symbolize Turkey’s ambition to achieve strategic autonomy while remaining embedded in NATO’s technological ecosystem. In 2024, Turkey’s defense and aerospace exports reached approximately $7.1 billion – a 29% increase compared to 2023 – placing the country’s defense industry among the top exporters globally.

Unlike Western suppliers, which are bound by rigid export frameworks, Turkey emphasizes flexibility and partnership. Its co-production offers, offset agreements, and willingness to localize production resonate with partners seeking capability transfer rather than dependency.

Yet Turkey’s rapid ascent in defense production also carries structural and strategic vulnerabilities. The sector’s dependence on public financing and political patronage raises concerns about transparency, accountability, and long-term sustainability. Export growth relies heavily on markets exposed to conflict volatility or Western export restrictions, such as the Gulf, North Africa, and Central Asia. Moreover, localization often masks enduring dependencies on imported components, software, and critical technologies, leaving key projects – like the KAAN fighter or Altay tank –susceptible to supply-chain disruptions. Finally, the increasing militarization of industrial policy risks conflating national prestige with commercial viability, creating incentives for overexpansion and reduced oversight.

The UAE Case: From Importer to Innovator

The UAE’s defense sector over the last two decades has demonstrated notable success in moving from dependency on foreign arms to developing a technologically advanced domestic industry. In the early 2000s, the UAE was still making large-scale acquisitions from Western suppliers, including high-end platforms such as the United States’ F-16 jet and France’s Leclerc tanks. These purchases, driven by security concerns over Iran, reflected an import-based model typical of Gulf defense procurement.

Faced with regional volatility during the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings, Abu Dhabi began to view defense industrialization as both a means of ensuring military self-reliance and as a pillar of economic diversification. UAE Vision 2021 and National Defense Strategy 2023 emphasized technological sovereignty and innovation, laying the foundations for an integrated defense ecosystem. The decisive turning point came in 2019 with the creation of EDGE Group, a state-owned conglomerate that brought together more than 25 entities under one umbrella. With revenue of roughly $5 billion in its first year, EDGE became the centerpiece of a wider national framework that includes the UAE’s Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) Strategy, Operation 300bn, and the Tawazun Council, which manages offsets and enforces local content requirements of up to 60%.

By the early 2020s, the UAE had shifted from buying weapons platforms to mastering the technologies behind them – data, software, artificial intelligence, and integration systems. This transition was accelerated by the Houthi drone attack on Abu Dhabi in 2022 and by lessons from Ukraine and Gaza, which underscored the need to invest in AI-driven unmanned and counter-UAV systems. Subsidiaries such as ADASI (autonomous systems), HALCON (precision-guided munitions), and SIGN4L (electronic warfare) positioned EDGE at the forefront of the future battlefield, while acquisitions of Estonia’s Milrem Robotics and Switzerland’s Anavia embedded advanced design capabilities into Emirati research and development.

EDGE’s rise has been both commercial and strategic. In 2024, the company generated $4.9 billion in contracts, including $2.1 billion in exports – a threefold increase from the previous year. Its $2.45 billion FALAJ-3 missile boat contract with Kuwait in June was the region’s largest shipbuilding export deal. And manufacturers such as NIMR and Calidus have been showcasing modular platforms, including the Wahash 8×8 APC and B-250 aircraft, integrating Turkish and European components. The UAE has also built one of the most advanced counter-drone architectures in the Global South, featuring AI-enabled systems, such as the SkyKnight missile and REACT electronic systems.

This momentum has elevated Abu Dhabi into the ranks of emerging defense exporters. According to SIPRI data, the UAE accounted for 5.3% of the Middle East and North Africa’s arms exports from 2020-24. This is a notable achievement for a country long viewed mainly as an importer, in an arms export market dominated by Israel and Turkey. And EDGE has expanded its presence across Asia, Latin America, and Africa, accounting for roughly one-third of the UAE’s defense exports.

Saudi Arabia: Defense Industrialization as Strategic Bargain

Saudi Arabia’s defense industrialization has become a main component of Vision 2030, designed to convert military spending into a driver of diversification and sovereignty. Riyadh has pledged to localize 50% of defense procurement by 2030, creating two institutional pillars: the General Authority for Military Industries as regulator and enabler and Saudi Arabian Military Industries as the primary production and integration arm.

Defense remains a fiscal heavyweight, with the 2025 budget allocating $72.5 billion – about 21% of total spending – to the sector. Under the General Authority for Military Industries’ Industrial Participation Policy, any contract estimated over 150 million Saudi riyals ($40 million) must dedicate up to 60% of its value to local firms, helping raise localization from 4% in 2018 to nearly 20% in 2024. Yet the pace has slowed, reflecting structural limits in skilled labor, research and development absorption, and reliance on imported subsystems. Frustration within the royal leadership has grown as local content targets have fallen short of expectations, with several senior reshuffles in mid-2025 exposing tension between vision and delivery.

Concrete progress is visible in select areas, including maintenance, repair, and overhaul, armored vehicles, AI-enabled command systems, and THAAD launcher components. However, most projects still rely on external technology and are heavily shaped by partnerships with U.S., European, and Asian suppliers, including BAE Systems, Arabian Industries, Hanwha, and Thales.

Ultimately, Saudi localization operates more as a strategic bargaining tool than a quest for full self-reliance. By embedding foreign prime contractors within its industrial networks and offset rules, Riyadh converts dependency into negotiation leverage, asserting political and economic control while signaling credibility to investors and allies. Inspired in part by the UAE’s EDGE model, the kingdom’s localization drive aims not to achieve autonomy but to maintain strategic room to maneuver – a recalibration of power that strengthens Saudi Arabia’s hand in a more multipolar defense order.

Turkey-GCC Joint Ventures and Emerging Defense Synergies

Over the past five years, Turkey and its Gulf partners have transformed competition into cooperation. What began as a cautious political rapprochement has matured into defense-industrial diplomacy linking technology, trade, and security.

The deepening defense-industrial engagement between Turkey and the Gulf has become one of the clearest expressions of the region’s shift from arms importation to co-production. Over the past three years, Ankara has established structured partnerships with the UAE’s EDGE Group and Saudi Arabia’s SAMI, bringing Turkish engineering capacity to help meet the Gulf’s localization and diversification goals.

Early cooperation between Turkey and the UAE focused on technology integration across air and unmanned systems. EDGE and Baykar partnered to integrate Emirati sensors and targeting payloads into the Bayraktar UAV family, while Calidus Aerospace and ASELSAN collaborated on the design of advanced cockpit displays for the B-250 light attack aircraft. EDGE and TAI also signed a memorandum of understanding to incorporate Emirati payloads into intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms and the KAAN fighter, combining Emirati strengths in avionics with Turkish production expertise. These programs – supported by EDGE’s global acquisitions in defense tech – created new synergies in AI, mission control, and precision-guided weapons.

At IDEF 2025, cooperation entered a new phase with the launch of KEY4, a joint venture between EDGE and Turkey’s Pavo Group, headquartered in Abu Dhabi. KEY4 is a platform for joint research, development, and export-oriented production in AI, cybersecurity, cryptography, electronic warfare, and smart surveillance. The initiative complements the broader partnership between EDGE and SAHA Istanbul, which connects over 1,000 Turkish defense firms through the MALATH coordination framework established to streamline bilateral supply chains and co-production programs.

In parallel, Saudi-Turkish defense cooperation has gained steady momentum. In July 2023, SAMI and Baykar signed a landmark agreement for the local production of Bayraktar Akinci UAVs in Turkey’s largest-ever defense export contract. As part of the deal, up to 70% of each UAV will be produced in the kingdom, with the National Company for Mechanical Systems, ASELSAN, and Roketsan handling systems integration, electro-optics, and guidance kits. Through the partnership, Riyadh aims to accelerate the absorption of technology and expand local assembly beyond basic maintenance tasks.

In July 2025, SAMI signed technology-transfer agreements with Nurol Makina, FNSS, and ASELSAN to localize production of 4×4, 6×6, and 8×8 armored vehicles and turrets. Manufacturing will take place at the SAMI Land Industrial Complex, an AI-enabled facility scheduled to open in late 2025. Meanwhile, discussions have continued over Saudi Arabia’s participation in the KAAN fifth-generation fighter jet program, following multiple visits between Defense Minister Khalid bin Salman and Haluk Gorgun, head of the Presidency of Defense Industries.

Together, these initiatives illustrate a shared calculus: Turkey provides combat-tested systems, modular design, and adaptable licensing, while the Gulf contributes capital, infrastructure, and long-term market demand. The result is a pragmatic form of industrial interdependence – one that replaces procurement with partnership as the core mechanism of defense relations.

This cooperation also carries growing strategic weight. Following Israel’s September Doha attack, Turkey and GCC states intensified consultations on regional defense integration, reflecting a broader understanding that industrial cooperation has become as strategic as it is technological. Together, these dynamics embody what Turkish analysts describe as a “New Horizons” approach: engaging the Global South to expand autonomy while maintaining a functional relationship with the West. For Gulf states, collaboration with Turkey provides rapid access to affordable technology and operational expertise. For Ankara, it offers new markets, political influence, and validation of its industrial model.

Challenges nonetheless persist. Technology-transfer sensitivities, intellectual-property disputes, and uneven production capacities could slow progress, while political volatility on both sides may test the resilience of cooperation. Yet the underlying exchange – localization for the Gulf and strategic autonomy for Turkey – continues to bind the two sides. As Turkey evolves from client to competitor in the global defense market, its partnership with Gulf states will determine whether this industrial convergence becomes a durable pillar of the emerging Middle Eastern security order or remains a pragmatic alignment shaped by shifting crises.

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While both parties signed a Joint Declaration on the Completion of Negotiations on Civil Nuclear Energy Cooperation, this document further underscores what has yet to be agreed upon: the issue of domestic enrichment and the transfer of sensitive technology and know-how. After years of negotiations, it had looked like Mohammed bin Salman’s visit might have culminated in a 123 agreement, the legally required framework under the United States’ 1954 Atomic Energy Act for the transfer of nuclear materials, technology, and knowledge.

In an interview, U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wright indicated that the cooperation being discussed is “not about enrichment. It’s not about anything related to weapons.” However, importantly, uranium enrichment does not equate to nuclear proliferation: While nuclear enrichment and reprocessing are the two pathways for acquiring the bomb, all parties to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, including Saudi Arabia, have the right to pursue such capabilities for civilian purposes under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. Second, Wright’s statements indicate that the enrichment question for Saudi Arabia has yet to be settled. Therefore, while the joint declaration cements U.S. interest in nuclear cooperation with the Saudis, the road ahead remains long. For the time being, the joint declaration acts as a placeholder, leaving the door open for further negotiations, which could culminate in a 123 agreement that satisfies both parties.

Saudi Arabia’s Nuclear Reasoning

Under Vision 2030, the kingdom aims to diversify its energy mix, develop domestic industries, and reduce its dependence on foreign expertise. Nuclear energy fits in that strategy, as it would free up more oil for exportation, helping to finance megaprojects in the country. At the same time, it would provide a stable, nonfossil fuel source to meet domestic electricity demands. Further, the skills acquired in the hydrocarbon sector, already mastered in the kingdom, could also be transferred to the nuclear industry in some respects. Therefore, provided that the Saudis find a supplier that would share sensitive technology and know-how, and allow them to enrich uranium domestically, Saudi Arabia could theoretically develop new types of services in the nuclear industry. The kingdom’s uranium ore reserves (an estimated 90,000 metric tons), while insufficient for exportation, would suffice for domestic use, ultimately enabling the Saudis to develop a fully indigenous and independent nuclear fuel cycle. Such autonomy could down the line enable Riyadh to hedge capabilities as part of an overall defense strategy.

Saudi Arabia is unlikely to let go of this capability for a variety of reasons revolving around pride, national interest, and sovereignty. Given its inherent right to enrich under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and its substantial uranium deposits, Riyadh sees no reason to constrain itself by forgoing enrichment and signing a more restrictive, “gold standard” 123 agreement, like the one agreed to by the United Arab Emirates, especially when other U.S. partners, such as South Korea, were not required to do so. (Although South Korea notionally retained the right to domestic enrichment, with U.S. permission, the United States withheld consent for more than 20 years, only agreeing to it during Trump’s recent visit. While the U.S.-UAE 123 agreement is believed to be the “gold-standard” of nonproliferation, the kingdom seems to understand it as a voluntary exception that must not become the rule in the region. Already, Saudi Arabia, like Egypt, has suggested that Arab states have been subjected to double standards by the nonproliferation community, which relied on strategic ambiguity to tacitly allow for a nuclear Israel and permitted an Iranian enrichment program under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action nuclear deal. Meanwhile, Arab states have been expected to forgo enrichment and subject themselves to the IAEA Additional Protocol, a voluntary safeguard agreement that provides the agency with a broader array of access and information.

While the conclusion of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (a mandatory safeguards agreement for all nonnuclear weapons states party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty) with the IAEA is required by the 123 agreement, there is no explicit mention of the Additional Protocol in the U.S. agreement. The UAE is the only state to have signed and ratified the Additional Protocol under its 123 agreement. Any 123 agreement must meet nine nonproliferation requirements, namely the need to “obtain approval before enriching or reprocessing transferred nuclear material.” Typically, once signed, the 123 agreement is submitted to Congress, which has 90 days to review it. To block such an agreement, a joint resolution of disapproval would have to be adopted with a “supermajority,” ensuring that the presidential veto doesn’t override it, which has been historically difficult to achieve.

Finally, even though no 123 agreement came out of Mohammed bin Salman’s trip, Saudi leaders understand that if they want nuclear cooperation with Washington, their best option is to secure it while Trump is in power, given the intricate ties between the Saudi royal family and the president’s circle. Trump has also made it a priority since the beginning of his second term to revitalize the U.S. nuclear industry, as Russia and China account for the majority of planned nuclear reactors internationally. A multibillion-dollar nuclear partnership with Saudi Arabia could revitalize companies such as Westinghouse and Bechtel while avoiding Chinese involvement in the Saudi nuclear program. Removing the question of Saudi Arabia normalizing ties with Israel from the nuclear equation, and avoiding restrictive language that could alienate Riyadh, like “gold standard,” during Mohammed bin Salman’s trip underscores the U.S. administration’s interest in bringing an agreement to life.

Both sides have therefore incentives to keep the door open for negotiations, and many possibilities lie ahead, including:

1. An iron-clad defense treaty and a gold standard compromise: Although Saudi Arabia has been elevated to the status of non-NATO ally, it is hard to imagine the kingdom under a U.S. nuclear umbrella. However, it seems to be the only case in which the kingdom might agree to forgo enrichment capabilities. Such a security agreement, ratified by Congress, would diminish the kingdom’s need to hedge through domestic enrichment. That said, Saudi Arabia’s trust in U.S. security guarantees remains tainted by Washington’s lack of response to the 2019 attacks on Saudi oil facilities in Abqaiq and Khurais. In addition, enrichment is not merely part of a hedging strategy; it symbolizes the kingdom’s sovereignty and self-sufficiency. Thus, even under such a treaty, Riyadh could still demand domestic enrichment rights.
2. An ambiguous 123 agreement: Given the manner in which the joint declaration has been framed, the most plausible scenario would be one in which the 123 agreement signed would neither authorize nor explicitly ban Saudi enrichment. It would leave the door open for future negotiations while allowing both parties to move forward with the construction of nuclear power plants. That way, as trust incrementally builds, Saudi considerations could be framed under a review mechanism, establishing a temporary moratorium on enrichment that would be revisited every couple of years.

   While the agreement would probably ban reprocessing and the storage of spent fuel, the Saudis would still gain significant technical experience and develop workforce capabilities. A parallel can be drawn with South Korea, which recently secured U.S. support to revisit its right to enrich and reprocess uranium under its 123 agreement.

   However, if Saudi Arabia is provided with anything less than a “gold standard,” the UAE has the right to renegotiate the terms of its deal under the “most-favored nation” clause of the U.S.-UAE 123 agreement. Although it is unlikely for Abu Dhabi to demand equal enrichment rights because it has neither the ambition nor the capability to maintain a domestic nuclear fuel cycle, it could use it as leverage to try to push through its long-awaited F-35 purchase or in other negotiations with the United States.

   This agreement would ensure Saudi Arabia does not develop a nuclear program with a more permissive supplier, such as China, and provide sufficient ambiguity to avoid having Iran use it as an argument during its future negotiations with the United States on its nuclear program.

3. Saudi Arabia is granted its enrichment wish: The United States could end up authorizing the Saudis to enrich uranium to avoid Chinese-Saudi nuclear cooperation. Beijing is already collaborating with Riyadh on uranium extraction from seawater and a yellowcake extraction facility. With China’s help, Saudi Arabia is also believed to be building a ballistic missile facility. China, historically more flexible on the issue than the United States, could allow for enrichment and transfer of know-how, enabling a fully indigenous Saudi nuclear fuel cycle.

   Granting Saudi Arabia its enrichment demand could present the opportunity to cap both Iran’s and Saudi Arabia’s enrichment levels at 3.67% (the level of enrichment previously granted to Iran under the JCPOA) and enforce the ratification of the Additional Protocol, allowing the IAEA deeper oversight of their respective activities. Iran has signaled its willingness to restart negotiations with the United States, and Saudi Arabia has long asked for equal capabilities as its neighbor. Despite turbulence in the region, the relationship between these historical rivals has remained stable since the China-brokered rapprochement in 2023. There could be a window to bridge the divide and push for a regional nuclear consortium.

4. No Agreement: It is also plausible that the joint declaration was signed to save face and serves more as a diplomatic placeholder than a pathway toward deeper cooperation. After almost a decade of negotiations, perhaps both parties have come to the realization that their interests in the area do not align. This way, both sides walk away claiming partial success: The United States for maintaining nonproliferation principles and Saudi Arabia for refusing to submit itself to double standards.

While neither side has indicated a timeline for signing the 123 agreement, they both seem to have approached the issue with pragmatism through a joint declaration focusing on converging factors, including the transfer of technologies, rather than on divisive topics, namely enrichment.

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