In mid-November 2025, Task Force 150, under Saudi rotating command at the time, seized more than two tons of crystal methamphetamine with an estimated street value of $130 million from a stateless dhow. This major counternarcotics success was part of a series of high-value interdictions in recent months. Only weeks later, Task Force 152, led by Qatar since September 2025, conducted the inaugural Joint Patrol-01, deploying both crewed patrol vessels and unmanned surface vehicles for coordinated surveillance in Gulf waters. While autonomous-system patrols are not new to the Combined Maritime Forces, this operation was a step forward in manned-unmanned teaming.

Once peripheral contributors, several GCC countries are now taking on leadership roles, translating national naval modernization programs into operational experience and regional strategic influence. This emerging activism, however, is uneven, with the GCC divided between states seeking command roles and quieter members whose participation remains limited or risk averse.

Charting a New Course

Historically, geopolitical considerations and threat perceptions pushed the GCC states to deprioritize the maritime domain. Aside from episodic shocks, notably the Tanker War in the 1980s, Gulf security concerns remained overwhelmingly land and air centric. Priorities were shaped by the risk of cross-border incursions, Iran’s expanding missile arsenal, and persistent terrorist threats, while maritime security appeared to be a distant concern.

Equally consequential was the long-standing reliance on external security guarantors with superior naval capabilities. The British presence until the early 1970s and, subsequently, the U.S. Navy’s entrenched posture in the Gulf beginning in the 1980s provided a de facto delegation of maritime security responsibilities. This enabled GCC states to focus resources on air defense and land forces, while maritime routes remained under Western protection.

Around the mid-2010s, however, perceptions of U.S. retrenchment and ambitions for greater strategic autonomy prompted Gulf states to shift their maritime approach, and they embarked on a sustained naval buildup, seeking stronger operational capabilities. As these programs matured and delivered increasingly sophisticated platforms, Gulf navies began to translate assets into action, adopting a more visible presence at sea.

A Divided Bloc

Rising Protagonists

Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and, more recently, Qatar have each commanded task forces in recent years, part of a growing sense of maritime responsibility and ownership in safeguarding vital shipping routes.

They have prioritized Task Force 150, responsible for maritime security from the Arabian Sea to the western Indian Ocean, and Task Force 152, focused on protecting waters west of the Strait of Hormuz. These choices reflect clear strategic priorities: first, disrupting the logistical enablers of regional destabilization and, second, securing waters near national shores.

Launched to counter maritime terrorism, Task Force 150 now focuses primarily on interdicting weapons and, increasingly, narcotics trafficking. The Arabian Sea remains a major conduit for illicit flows between western Asia, the Horn of Africa, and the Arabian Peninsula. While weapons and dual-use components remain a significant concern for the U.S.-led naval coalition, the Combined Maritime Forces have increasingly emphasized narcotics interdictions, a shift appearing to reflect an emerging pattern. This informal distribution of labor may also be the result of recent foreign initiatives, including the September 2025 Saudi-British conference on strengthening the Yemeni coast guard, which prioritized combating piracy and weapons smuggling. Drug trafficking poses a dual threat to the domestic security of Gulf states. It provides a critical revenue stream for nonstate armed actors, including the Houthis, while also fueling addiction and associated public health costs. Since assuming command of Task Force 150 in August 2025, the Saudi-led task force has overseen 13 interdictions with more than $1.36 billion in seized narcotics – “the most successful period of narcotics seizures in CMF history,” according to Task Force 150’s commander, Fahad Aljoiad. The pace of seizures underscores the task force’s enhanced operational tempo and intelligence integration under Saudi leadership.

Given the scale of the patrol area, effective interdiction demands tightly coordinated multinational operations. Operation Al Masmak, for instance, involved Saudi coordination with Pakistani, French, Spanish, and U.S. naval assets, reinforcing Riyadh’s credentials for leadership in regional maritime security.

Notably, recent interdictions were executed by Pakistani and French navy vessels rather than Saudi forces. In Combined Maritime Forces practice, command countries regularly coordinate from the Bahrain-based headquarters without deploying ships to station. Saudi Arabia’s decision to withhold key assets likely reflects caution in dealing with the volatile security context surrounding Yemen.

Task Force 152 has attracted the most consistent GCC participation. Since 2009, Gulf states have held its command almost continuously, with only three interruptions, periods that coincided with spikes in Iran-related tensions. Kuwait is the most active contributor, assuming nine commands, followed by Saudi Arabia with four, Bahrain with three, and the United Arab Emirates with two. Qatar, traditionally cautious, assumed its first command in September 2025, signaling a gradual recalibration of its approach to coalition engagement after suffering Iranian and Israeli airstrikes over the summer.

While Riyadh’s leadership aligns with its ambition to assert strategic direction in its neighborhood, smaller GCC states view command roles within the Combined Maritime Forces as a critical avenue to exercise maritime agency. For Kuwait, Bahrain, and now Qatar, Task Force 152 provides a platform to shape security practices in waters often overshadowed by Saudi and Iranian influence.

The multilateral nature of the Combined Maritime Forces lowers political and operational risks for these smaller states. It mitigates regional power asymmetries, strengthens interoperability, and enhances operational readiness within a structured environment. Task Force 152 serves both as a mechanism for safeguarding Gulf waters and as a platform for building naval capabilities and visibility.

Yet, Combined Maritime Forces-led exercises expose the limits of Gulf navies to project power independently. While they can carry out lower- and mid-intensity missions, such as search-and-rescue and countersmuggling, they remain reliant on Western partners for higher-end maritime activities, including antisubmarine warfare, mine countermeasures, and advance unmanned integration. For example, for the Doha-led Joint Patrol-01, two of the three principal surface combatants were Western vessels. Leadership roles do not yet equate to full-spectrum maritime autonomy.

Still, these joint drills have strategic value. They enhance interoperability, expand tactical proficiency, and create habits of cooperation. Over time, they are likely to strengthen the maritime posture of smaller Gulf states and signal a gradual shift toward greater burden sharing.

Quieter Members

This growing Gulf activism is far from uniform. Some GCC states, such as Oman, adopt a deliberately low-profile approach, while the UAE has paused maritime engagement, at least publicly, despite earlier contributions.

Oman has navigated a volatile region by diversifying security partnerships while maintaining strict nonalignment. Neutrality and quiet diplomacy underpin Muscat’s foreign policy and are reflected in its maritime posture. The sultanate’s geography at the mouth of the Gulf, combined with its dense web of geopolitical relationships, compels Muscat to maintain functional ties with all actors holding stakes in the Strait of Hormuz. Sharing the Gulf’s only maritime entryway with Iran, Muscat has cultivated stable relations with Tehran, through regular port calls, military dialogues, and joint drills. At the same time, Oman hosts a British logistics facility in Duqm and grants the U.S. Navy access to its ports while also engaging with non-Western security players, including China and Russia.

Despite joining the Combined Maritime Forces in 2018, Oman’s participation has remained deliberately limited. Muscat is valued as a key interlocutor, but operational contributions have focused on coordination and logistical support rather than high-profile deployments.  Assuming a task force command would risk undermining the neutrality central to Oman’s regional diplomacy.

The UAE, once a reliable contributor, announced its withdrawal from the coalition in May 2023, citing an “ongoing evaluation of security cooperation.” Yet the coalition continues to list the UAE among its members, suggesting a strategic pause rather than a full exit. The decline in operational engagement, combined with retained membership, preserves Abu Dhabi’s option to reenegage if conditions become more favorable while signaling autonomy from U.S.-led frameworks.

For a country seeking flexibility and diversified partnerships, operating under a Saudi-led structure may also be unappealing, especially as the UAE is doubling down on options offering greater freedom of maneuver, such as bilateral and minilateral partnerships. This move likely reflects pragmatic calculations about diversifying from the U.S. protection umbrella and decoupling some security choices from Riyadh’s orbit.

Adaptation and Assertiveness

The Gulf’s increased naval engagement reflects both adaptation and growing assertiveness amid a volatile maritime environment shaped by regional tensions, renewed piracy, and intensifying great power rivalry. However, deeper burden sharing with U.S. military operations remains limited, as GCC governments weigh the risks of closer alignment with Washington, as low participation in Operation Prosperity Guardian underscored.

Efforts to diversify security partnerships, including regular Saudi-Chinese naval drills, highlight this caution. While the recent GCC-level Union Exercise signals interest in revamping naval integration, the Combined Maritime Forces remain the most effective platform for practical cooperation, albeit one constrained by each state’s pursuit of strategic flexibility.

Ultimately, Gulf activism within the Combined Maritime Forces points to a more engaged maritime diplomacy. The Gulf states are blending ambition with pragmatic multilateralism, positioning them as increasingly influential, though still cautious, actors in the evolving maritime security landscape.

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The event will feature a fireside chat moderated by AGSI President Ambassador Douglas A. Silliman.

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A Bumpy Couple of Decades

It has been a turbulent period for Qatari-Emirati relations. Post-Arab Spring, the states were on opposite sides of the defining debate that underpinned Arab politics: whether to accommodate or suppress Islamist movements. More than merely disagreeing philosophically, each side actively supported its own genre of proxy partner around the region. From Libya to Syria to Egypt, and more recently the Horn of Africa, Qatari and Emirati proxies frequently found themselves ranged against one another in a shadow competition for regional influence.

This divergence became acute when the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Egypt launched a boycott of Qatar in June 2017. The boycott severed land, sea, and air links, expelled Qatari nationals, and sought to economically strangle the small peninsular state. The measures disrupted everything from food supply chains to family connections across borders. When the boycott was lifted in January 2021 through the Al-Ula Declaration, it was difficult to see how Qatari leaders could readily forgive and forget.

Signals From DIMDEX

The context of the Barzan-EDGE announcement is itself instructive in this regard, however. DIMDEX 2026 featured a notably large Emirati presence, with EDGE Group occupying one of the exhibition’s more prominent pavilions. Beyond mere attendance, the UAE committed as a tier one sponsor – a significant financial and symbolic investment in a Qatari showcase. The signing ceremony was accorded prime billing on the first day: a choreographed moment, paid for, invested in, and honored by both parties. Such gestures carry weight in Gulf politics, where symbolism and protocol serve as a parallel language of statecraft. Whether this reflects genuine strategic alignment or carefully managed optics remains an open question, but the investment of prestige by both parties suggests at minimum a shared interest in demonstrating reconciliation.

The Logic of Collaboration

Beyond the symbolism, there are sound rationales for Qatari-Emirati defense cooperation. Given EDGE’s broader portfolio and more mature technological base, the Emirati firm would likely serve as the primary provider of technology and expertise, with Barzan contributing limited market access, perhaps facilities, and capital. For Qatar, such an arrangement offers an accelerated path to defense industrial capability – where indigenous development might take a decade or more, partnership with a more established regional player compresses timelines considerably. This represents a marriage of convenience, certainly, but also a pragmatic recognition that smaller states seeking world-class defense capabilities benefit from pooling resources rather than duplicating efforts in isolation.

The deeper significance of this joint venture may lie in what it suggests about evolving attitudes toward intra-Gulf competition. For decades, the Gulf states have pursued parallel development strategies characterized more by rivalry than coordination. Each has sought to build national champions across sectors from aviation to finance to defense, often duplicating investments and competing for the same markets, talent, and prestige.

This competitive dynamic has produced impressive individual achievements but at considerable collective cost. That the UAE successfully launched a mission to Mars years before a train link to any other Gulf capital speaks to the domestic focus at the expense of meaningful regional integration.

Smaller Gulf states, such as Qatar, Kuwait, and the UAE, can afford competitive inefficiency for decades yet. Hydrocarbon revenue, sovereign wealth, and relatively small populations provide ample buffers against the costs of duplication. The question is whether affordability is the same as wisdom. As these states pursue economic diversification and knowledge economies less dependent on resource extraction, the logic of competition becomes less compelling and the benefits of coordination more apparent. Defense industries, with their high fixed costs and long development cycles, are precisely the sector where the case for collaboration is strongest.

Trust, Time, and Tentative Steps

None of this is to suggest that the Barzan-EDGE joint venture represents a fundamental transformation of Gulf politics or that the wounds of the boycott have healed. Trust, once broken, rebuilds slowly. Qatari policymakers would be imprudent to assume that the interests that drove the boycott have disappeared entirely, and Emirati leaders presumably remain wary of a neighbor whose regional alignments and media influence they sought so dramatically to curtail.

What the joint venture does suggest is that both sides see value in building institutional frameworks that create shared interests. Defense industrial partnerships, once established, generate their own constituencies and path dependencies. Joint development programs create stakeholders on both sides invested in the relationship’s continuation. In this sense, the Barzan-EDGE venture may be less an expression of existing trust than an instrument for building it – a calculated bet that shared projects can forge connections that diplomatic rhetoric alone cannot.

Whether this bet pays off will depend on factors beyond the control of either defense conglomerate: the evolution of regional alignments, the management of future disagreements, and the depth of commitment on both sides to making the partnership succeed when political winds shift. The Gulf has witnessed rapprochements before that proved superficial when tested by competing interests.

For now, the joint venture stands as a notable marker on an uncertain path. In a region where trust is scarce and history casts long shadows, such investment is itself significant – even if the full measure of reconciliation remains to be seen.

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Leaders in the Gulf states largely escaped the whiplash treatment meted out by the administration to allies and adversaries alike. However, this sweet spot, cemented by the commercial and investment partnerships that characterized the first year of Trump’s second term, is offset by the precarity of being on the frontline of increasing U.S.-Iran volatility. Both the June 2025 12-day war between Israel and Iran, which ended with a U.S. attack on Iranian nuclear facilities, and the separate Iranian and Israeli missile strikes on Qatar in June and September 2025, respectively, illustrated the challenges in maintaining order and security in the Gulf and the rising cost of any sustained clash in human as well as political and economic terms.

Multiple dilemmas are metastasizing in U.S.-Gulf relations as the White House has grown increasingly unpredictable and, post-Venezuela intervention, arguably more cavalier in its conduct of foreign policy. Seeming U.S. tolerance for (geo)political uncertainty, globally as well as regionally, cuts against the de-risking approaches of governments in the Gulf, especially in Saudi Arabia, as major economic and energy projects move toward delivery. The planned buildout of artificial intelligence infrastructure in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates would be put at risk from any new or prolonged conflict with Iran. So, too, would the trillions of dollars in pledged investments in the United States made during Trump’s three-country tour of the Gulf in May 2025 and visits of senior figures to the White House in the president’s first year back in office.

AI has rapidly emerged as one of Saudi authorities’ key areas of focus as Vision 2030 enters its final stage, alongside mining and critical minerals as a priority for investment. The prospect of a U.S. strike on Iran came as thousands of delegates attended the fifth annual Future Minerals Forum in Riyadh and the Saudi Arabian Mining Company, known as Maaden, unveiled plans to become one of the biggest commodity producers in the world over the next decade. Large delegations from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE traveled to Davos in Switzerland to participate in the World Economic Forum’s annual meeting, which began on January 19, the same day that DIMDEX, a major maritime defense exhibition, convened in Doha. Dubai, meanwhile, is gearing up to host the annual World Government Summit in early February, as the Gulf states cement their positioning as connectors of capital, energy, and trade flows.

Calls for diplomacy by Gulf officials (which Saudi analysts have been at pains to emphasize were not aimed at influencing the White House either way) likely reflect two points of specific concern at any new escalatory spiral with Iran. The first is a sense of doubt that the Trump administration has a coherent plan that goes beyond a renewed campaign of airstrikes as well as a feeling that military intervention is unlikely to trigger any positive political outcome. Mixed messaging from the Trump administration after the removal of Nicolás Maduro from power in Venezuela may only have amplified feelings of unease that U.S. policymakers lack a “day after” plan. While there is little affinity in Gulf capitals for the regime of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in Tehran, there is also a risk that leadership with its back to the wall and facing decapitation might engage in a desperate last stand by abandoning all restraint in responding to any new kinetic action.

This links to a second point of concern: From a Gulf perspective, “red lines” keep being crossed, and the threshold for getting entangled in conflict seems to draw closer each time. The “tit-for-tat” strikes exchanged by Iran and Israel in April and October 2024 were followed by the June 12-day war, which bypassed the Gulf states during the conflict itself. However, the Iranian decision to respond to the June 22 U.S. bombing of its nuclear sites by striking Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, home to the forward headquarters of U.S. Central Command, the following day, was a significant act of aggression (even if it was choreographed, unlike the Israeli missile strike on Doha in September) against the territory of a Gulf state. The pattern of escalation in each round of conflict has heightened uncertainty over what line may be crossed next, such as the targeting of energy and other critical infrastructure vulnerabilities, including desalination plants, or severe disruption to shipping in the Gulf.

There are multiple reasons why officials in the Gulf Cooperation Council and other regional states wish to de-escalate tensions with Iran. Recent developments in Yemen and the Horn of Africa have highlighted the Saudi interest in avoiding further state collapse and fragmentation of authority in regions deemed vital to the kingdom’s security. Policymakers in Doha are not only aware of the threat of new strikes against Qatar – which would be the third in less than a year – but also cognizant of their large-scale expansion of natural gas liquefaction capacity in the North Field, whose first phase is nearing completion. Their counterparts in Muscat recently unveiled a new five-year development plan and an international financial center as part of Oman’s continuing economic diversification. Leaders in Egypt will not want to see renewed regional instability cast a shadow over the gradual return of international shipping to the Red Sea and passage through the Suez Canal.

Gulf leaders have agency and leverage with the Trump administration, which includes direct as well as indirect channels to the White House, the former through key interlocutors, such as advisors Steven Witkoff and Jared Kushner (both present in Davos) as well as Massad Boulos. Emirati officials are likely seeking clarification from the administration over Trump’s January 13 claim that countries trading with Iran will be hit by new 25% tariffs, given that the UAE is the second-largest trade partner of Iran after China. The UAE and Qatar both signed onto the Pax Silica Declaration in mid-January as part of the U.S.-led initiative to safeguard technology supply chains and integrate U.S. partners into global hi-tech agreements. Such webs of positive interconnectivity present win-win solutions for the United States and Gulf states but need a predictable and reliable decision-making landscape if they are to maximize results.

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In the few days since that dramatic raid, the narrative in Washington has changed with Trump stating publicly that the United States intends to run Venezuela and take direct control of Venezuelan oil exports and revenue “indefinitely.” During a January 9 meeting with CEOs and senior executives of U.S. and international oil companies, Trump said Venezuela would hand over 50 million barrels of its crude to be refined or marketed by the United States “immediately.” This might have an impact on near-term oil supplies at a time when the market is well supplied, though much of the extra heavy Venezuelan oil is likely to be taken by U.S. refineries for blending with the lighter grades produced domestically. “We have the refining capacity – was actually based very much on the Venezuelan oil, which is a heavy oil, very good oil, great oil,” Trump said during the televised meeting. He also urged the international oil companies to help rehabilitate the Venezuelan oil industry that he said had been mismanaged and would require $100 billion in investments to achieve its true potential.

Global oil prices did not react to the developments in Venezuela. There might be longer term implications for supply, but few experts expect an immediate surge in Venezuelan oil production given the dilapidated state of the Venezuelan oil industry’s infrastructure, the need for a new fiscal regime and hydrocarbon law, and concerns about continued insecurity – issues raised by some executives during the meeting at the White House. Brent crude oil was trading between $61 per barrel and $63/bbl, roughly at the same level at the close of business in December 2025, in the days following the intervention in Venezuela. They rose sharply on January 13 to trade above $65/bbl on market fears of disruption to Iranian oil supplies amid a wave of nationwide protests that began at the end of December.

From a narrow market perspective, the implications for OPEC are modest in the short term. Venezuela’s output, hovering just below 1 million barrels per day (around 1% of global supply), remains far below its late-1990s peak of nearly 3.5 mb/d. This is a fraction of what the country could produce given its massive resource base, estimated at 303 billion barrels, the largest in the world, though not all of it is commercially viable. On paper, Venezuela’s oil reserves exceed Saudi Arabia’s 267 billion barrels, but Saudi Arabia has capacity to produce more than 10 times as much oil as Venezuela thanks to a stable government and a well-run state oil company in Saudi Aramco. The United States, with 44 billion barrels of reserves, is today the world’s largest oil producer due to the surge in shale oil production that allowed it to overtake Saudi Arabia and Russia, with current U.S. oil production estimated at over 20 mb/d.

In Venezuela, decades of underinvestment, infrastructure decay, and institutional collapse at state oil company Petróleos de Venezuela, known as PDVSA, as well as more recent U.S. sanctions mean that even under optimistic assumptions production growth would be slow, capital intensive, and measured in years rather than months. This helps explain why oil prices have remained relatively calm, despite the geopolitical drama, and why OPEC has made no official comment on the developments.

What matters for OPEC, and for the market, is not reserves in the ground but barrels that can be produced and marketed effectively. Venezuela has had to rely on oil swaps with Iran, another OPEC member struggling with a collapsing economy due to sanctions, and on China, which receives some Venezuelan oil as debt repayment.

As one of OPEC’s five founding members at a time when its production was on the rise, Venezuela was able to shape policy decisions within the group. That influence waned after the late Hugo Chavez took over management of the oil sector from PDVSA, firing hundreds of employees and squeezing the oil giant’s revenue to fund his populist agenda as Venezuela’s president. Production plummeted further after a 2002-03 strike by PDVSA oil workers crippled the industry. Oil production fell below 500,000 b/d, and exports were severely disrupted. Thousands of employees were fired or left the country. Even after production recovered in subsequent years, the industry never regained its prestrike technical depth, as the government’s take increased.

In 2007, Chavez expelled major U.S. oil companies, including ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips, and seized their assets, for which the companies are still awaiting billions of dollars in compensation. Chevron was the only major U.S. oil company that stayed, operating under a special U.S. license, and could ramp up production in the short term.

While major oil companies often operate in risky environments, they require guarantees of returns on their investments in a stable fiscal environment. Both ExxonMobil and Chevron are considering investments in Iraq’s energy sector, which also faces an unpredictable political future given the current postelection paralysis but provides lower cost and higher quality crude than Venezuela’s extra heavy oil.

Tackling methane emissions from Venezuela’s oil and gas operations would be an additional cost to any potential investor. The International Energy Agency noted in the “Latin America Energy Outlook 2023” that “the methane emissions intensity of oil and gas operations in Venezuela is five-times the world average, and their flaring intensity is over seven-times higher the global average.” Although the environmental impact of methane emissions may not be of much concern to the current U.S. administration, it is relevant to the multinational oil companies. At the December 2023 COP28 climate summit in Dubai more than 50 oil and gas companies, including the U.S. majors, pledged to reduce methane emissions from their operations to near zero by 2030. Methane is a powerful greenhouse gas that traps heat close to the earth’s surface. Venezuela is not a signatory to the Global Methane Pledge.

ExxonMobil’s CEO, Darren Woods, was virtually alone among the executives to argue that Venezuela was not currently an attractive investment prospect. He told the U.S. president, “We first got into Venezuela back in 1940s. We’ve had our assets seized there twice. And so, you can imagine to re-enter a third time would require some pretty significant changes from what we’ve historically seen here … If we look at the legal and commercial constructs – frameworks – in place today in Venezuela, today it’s uninvestable. And so significant changes have to be made,” including to the country’s hydrocarbon law and its legal system, he added.

For decades prior to the Chavez presidency, PDVSA acted as a state within a state, with the head of the company enjoying greater power than the minister of energy. Such was PDVSA’s influence that one minister had compared it to “an elephant in a swimming pool” because of the ripple effect its decisions had on the country’s economy, according to a section in the book “Oil Leaders” by former senior Saudi oil advisor Ibrahim AlMuhanna.

As its oil production slumped so did Venezuela’s influence in OPEC. Today, effective market management rests with the Gulf states – led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates – alongside Russia within the OPEC+ alliance. That concentration of influence has delivered stability, but it also means Arab producers are acutely sensitive to any precedent that weakens producer sovereignty or normalizes external intervention in oil-exporting states.

Another dimension that matters for the Middle East is the question of influence within OPEC and OPEC+. With the United States now asserting de facto control over Venezuelan oil sales and revenue, will that translate into indirect influence on OPEC or OPEC+ deliberations? Could the United States eventually push for Venezuela’s withdrawal from the organization? It is far too early to answer these questions, but they are ones that Gulf producers and other members will no doubt be discussing behind closed doors.

At present, Venezuela is exempt from OPEC+ output quotas, and the United States would certainly not allow production to be dictated by the Saudi- and Russian-led alliance even if production were to increase. There is a consensus among experts that it will take years or even decades to restore Venezuelan production beyond the 2025 average of 930,000 b/d.

Ivan Sandrea, a Venezuelan energy expert and a former head of oil supply at OPEC, wrote in a LinkedIn post that he had reviewed crude oil production data from Iran, Iraq, Algeria, Libya, and Venezuela – all members of OPEC – over 1970-75 and examined how long it took each to recover peak production. All five have suffered from output declines either because of geology, lack of investment in new capacity, internal strife, or sanctions. He noted that the period was chosen specifically because “it marked the peak of Venezuelan production, preceded the Iranian Revolution, and came before major regime change, conflict, and structural disruption across several OPEC producers.” (It was also during this period that OPEC wielded its oil weapon with the 1973 oil embargo, which led to the rise of North Sea oil and a U.S. quest for energy independence at a time when the Middle East was one of its biggest suppliers.)

In an accompanying chart, Sandrea showed that recovery is generally slow, uneven, and rarely linear, and that geology is not the primary constraint. Iran, Libya, and Algeria needed 20 years to recover production, while Iran and Venezuela never fully recovered. Iran produced 3.3 mb/d of crude oil in November 2025, according to secondary source estimates cited by OPEC, which is roughly half what it produced at its peak in the mid-1970s and far below current capacity.

Sandrea pointed out that Venezuela is the most extreme case with production today at 20% of its peak level. This, he wrote, reflects “profound destruction of capacity rather than resource depletion.” Iraq, by contrast, managed to restore and significantly expand production within roughly a decade following the ouster of Saddam Hussein in 2003. “For Venezuela, the challenge – and the opportunity – is clear,” he wrote, adding that it would likely take more than 10 years to restore production in Venezuela, assuming discipline and sustained execution. “Expectations of a rapid production surge should therefore be tempered accordingly.”

The U.S. Energy Information Administration admitted as such in a February 2024 analysis of Venezuela’s oil sector. In the report, the EIA estimated that Venezuela’s total energy production declined by an average 8.2% between 2011 and 2021 due to what it said was “government mismanagement, international sanctions, and the country’s economic crisis.” As a result, it expects crude oil output growth to be limited even after the lifting of U.S. sanctions.

Should U.S. firms return to Venezuela, they would find a sector hollowed out by years of underinvestment, operational decay, and institutional dysfunction. For OPEC’s Middle Eastern core, the significance of Venezuela’s upheaval lies less in near-term supply than in the precedent it sets. A founding member of the organization is now effectively under external control, raising questions about sovereignty, influence, and the resilience of producer-led market management.

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2021: A Bad Year for Gulf-Lebanese Relations

In 2021, Lebanon’s relations with the Gulf states spiraled. Hezbollah maintained its grip on Lebanese politics both through its mafia-like enforcement of order and its long-standing relationship with then-President Michel Aoun and his Christian party, the Free Patriotic Movement. This monopoly cast a large shadow over Lebanese politics and decision making, particularly as it pertained to Lebanon’s relationship with its neighbors.

George Kordahi, who served as Lebanon’s minister of information at the time, made disparaging comments about the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen, calling it “futile and pointless” and said that the Houthis were “defending themselves against an external aggression.” This came six months after then Lebanese Foreign Minister Charbel Wehbe used derogatory terms to describe the Saudis. Many Gulf Cooperation Council countries were convinced that Lebanon was pursuing a pro-Iran foreign policy that was intended to undermine the Gulf’s agenda.

Meanwhile, media accounts reported that Hezbollah was smuggling disassembled weapons into Yemen and conducting training for Yemen’s Houthi fighters. There have even been unconfirmed reports that Hezbollah’s leadership may have influenced Houthi financial and military operation decisions.

Moreover, in April 2021, Saudi authorities discovered a shipment of 5.3 million smuggled Captagon pills in pomegranate crates at the Jeddah airport. The Gulf states viewed Hezbollah’s sway in Lebanon, involvement in Yemen, and effort to corrupt Gulf society through the sale of drugs as a war being waged against them.

Lebanon’s Economic Crisis

In response, Saudi Arabia in October 2021 expelled Lebanon’s ambassador, banned all Lebanese imports, and recalled its ambassador to Lebanon. In solidarity, Bahrain, Kuwait, and the UAE recalled their ambassadors as well. (These Gulf ambassadors have since returned to Beirut). Then, in early 2022, Saad Hariri, Lebanon’s former prime minister and leader of the Sunni community in Lebanon, announced that he would suspend all his political activities in advance of that year’s parliamentary elections. The announcement was linked to tensions between the Saudi royal family and Hariri. Even the Emiratis, who agreed to host Hariri, emphasized to him that he would be allowed to conduct his business affairs in the UAE on the condition that he suspend his political activities.

As Lebanon’s relationship with the Gulf was deteriorating, it suffered the effects of one tragedy after another. In 2019, Lebanon endured a severe economic collapse, as its gross domestic product fell by nearly 40% in real terms, its currency lost 98% of its value, and depositors were not allowed to access their funds held at local banks. In August 2020, during the height of coronavirus pandemic restrictions, an estimated 2,750 tons of unsafely stored ammonium nitrate exploded at Beirut’s port causing the largest nonnuclear blast in modern history, resulting in hundreds of deaths, thousands of injuries, and billions of dollars in damage.

Rather than bringing relief from such tragedies, Iran’s support to Hezbollah has only added to the suffering of the Lebanese people, including the largely pro-Hezbollah Shia population in the south. Hezbollah used its sway to block for more than two years the election of a president that it viewed unfriendly to the group’s agenda, leading to political gridlock and paralysis. It was not until Israel’s attacks in 2024 in southern Lebanon, weakening Hezbollah, that the group realized it could no longer stand in the way of electing the president. And with Joseph Aoun’s election as president in January, the gridlock ended.

What Does Lebanon Need To Do?

In June 2023, the International Monetary Fund issued a report with economic reform recommendations to stabilize the Lebanese economy. The reforms included enhanced governance transparency, a strengthened anticorruption framework, improved performance among state owned enterprises, debt restructuring, a unified exchange rate, and protection for small depositors. It is generally accepted within Lebanon and among international observers that the country’s political elite are deliberately blocking much-needed reforms to protect their financial interests.

Between 1963 and 2022, Gulf states gave Lebanon an estimated $9 billion in grants, excluding loans and investments. But they have stressed that that era is over. Gulf capitals have linked any new financial packages to reforms, such as combatting corruption and restoring confidence in the banking system as proposed by the IMF, and, crucially, disarming Hezbollah. Saudi commentator Ali Shihabi said that Saudi Arabia “does not want to invest in a black hole.”

Like other Gulf states, Saudi Arabia generally frames its position on Hezbollah’s disarmament in terms of support for state control of weapons and in the context of adherence to relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions (which include provisions on disarmament). How a relatively weak Lebanese central government, with armed forces outgunned for decades by Hezbollah, would accomplish such disarmament without prompting significant internal instability remains unclear. However, as the Lebanese government and the international community continue to make progress on the question of Hezbollah’s weapons, it is widely expected that the mafia state created by the militia will no longer be able to survive, and the much needed and long-awaited economic reforms called for by the Gulf states and others will finally be enacted.

In August, U.S. Special Envoy for Syria – and U.S. Ambassador to Turkey – Thomas Barrack announced a plan to disarm Hezbollah by the end of 2025. It outlines an economic strategy for Lebanon that combines regional investment with security reforms. This plan also includes Saudi Arabia and Qatar investing in an economic zone in southern Lebanon to create job opportunities for former Hezbollah members who agree to lay down their weapons. Media accounts indicate that the plan for disarming Hezbollah will rely on persistent Israeli military pressure on the group, which could prolong the depopulation of some border villages and lead to a more militarized southern Lebanon.

Prospects for Gulf-Lebanon Ties

Given the key to any Gulf-Lebanon rapprochement is Hezbollah surrendering its weapons, the path to get there is going to be filled with landmines both figurative and literal. This does not mean that steps can’t be taken to move toward this goal. The first big hurdle was the election of Aoun and the appointment of Prime Minister Nawaf Salam. Lebanon now has a leadership that seems ready to bring the country back into the Arab and Western fold.

In March, Aoun was the first Lebanese head of state in eight years to visit Saudi Arabia, where he met Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. During the visit, the two leaders discussed taking steps to resume Lebanese exports to Saudi Arabia and have Saudi citizens once again travel to Lebanon, according to the Office of the Presidency. In the months that followed, Aoun also visited Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE to present Lebanon as “open for business.” Saudi Arabia has responded positively and, in November, announced plans to boost commercial ties to Lebanon after reports that “the Lebanese government and security forces demonstrated efficacy in curbing drug exports over recent months,” according to a senior Saudi official.

Accounting for more than 19% of GDP prior to the economic collapse in 2019, tourism has emerged as the fastest route toward restoring ties to Gulf countries and reviving the economy. “Tourism is a big catalyst, and so it’s very important that the bans get lifted,” said Laura Khazen Lahoud, Lebanon’s tourism minister. Shortly after Aoun’s visit, the UAE officially lifted its travel ban on UAE nationals visiting Lebanon, according to the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia are considering similar moves. Qatar never imposed a travel ban, so Qatari nationals have continued to travel to Lebanon.

Emirati and Gulf interests in Lebanon are likely to include investments in the energy sector and development of the gas fields in the eastern Mediterranean. The UAE may also be willing to contribute by providing equipment and training to universities and hospitals and by rehabilitating key infrastructure, particularly the Beirut port and the country’s road and bridge networks.

Remittances in Lebanon in 2025 are expected to reach $7.31 billion, with an annual growth rate of 4.5% over the next several years. Before the rupture with the Gulf, the majority of Lebanese expatriates in the Gulf were in Saudi Arabia with more than 300,000, the UAE was close behind with nearly 200,000, and Kuwait had around 42,000. From 2020-22 alone, more than 80,000 Lebanese moved to the Gulf in search of jobs. Remittances from the Gulf remain a critical component of the Lebanese economy.

Approaching the end of the year, Saudi Arabia has already made another strong gesture of support to the Lebanese government. Along with the United States and France, Saudi Arabia announced on December 18 that it will host an international conference early in 2026 in support of the Lebanese army. Aoun expressed his heartfelt gratitude and emphasized his commitment to ensuring that the money will be used in a transparent and responsible manner to help Lebanon resume its rightful place as a member of the Arab nations.

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As the protests spread nationally, the list of demands grew. Economic demands were high on the list – with the youth unemployment rate topping 35%, protesters called for more jobs as well as higher wages and lower prices and higher subsidies for basic goods. At the same time, they called for lower expenditures on the 2025 Africa Cup and 2030 World Cup. They demanded improvements in education, health care, housing, and public transit. They called for the release of detained protesters and effective measures against corruption, including the removal of corrupt political parties from the governing coalition. Interestingly, they also called for the adoption of English over French as Morocco’s second national language after Arabic, and, notably, most protest signs were in English – relatively few were in Arabic, with almost none in French. Increasing numbers of young Moroccans prefer English over French, replacing “colonial” French with the preferred language of international commerce and communications.

The protests brought to mind the Arab Spring protests of 2011, which resulted in significant political changes in Morocco. The resonance with the earlier protests was enough to spark a reaction and support, albeit modest, from fellow monarchies in the Gulf. Moroccan King Mohammed VI’s regularly scheduled address to the Parliament on October 10 signaled his refusal to accede to the most forceful demands, notably the removal of the prime minister. Still, the protests have been a reminder both that ties among fellow monarchs persist and that youth ambitions in the region have not been fully met. Typically, protests in Morocco trigger cabinet reshuffles and, at times, prime minister replacements, institutional mechanisms that insulate to some degree but also serve as a proxy for direct criticism of the monarch.

Morocco in the Gen Z Protest Wave

Morocco was the 22nd country swept up in a global wave of protests that peaked in September following well-publicized Gen Z protests in Nepal and Madagascar. Previously referred to as the “Asian spring,” worldwide Gen Z protests began earlier in Sri Lanka and Iran (following the death of Mahsa Amini) in 2022; continued in 2024 in Kenya, Bangladesh, Mozambique, and South Korea; and, in 2025, spread to Turkey, Mongolia, Nepal, Timor-Leste, Madagascar, Serbia, Indonesia, Togo, the Philippines, France, Italy, Switzerland, San Marino, the Maldives, Peru, Paraguay, and Morocco.

What ties these global youth protest movements together, other than the ubiquitous skull and crossbones flag and meme (from the Japanese manga series “One Piece”), are concerns over inequality, reductions in standards of living, corruption, democratic backsliding, and increasing authoritarianism. Another common thread has been the important roles of rappers, both in providing protest anthems and as “martyrs” when arrested. Morocco was no exception. Prominent Moroccan rappers in the movement included Don Bigg, Dizzy DROS, ElGrande Toto, and Khtek, and the movement also spawned the viral rap freestyle challenge #FreeKoulchi (Free Everyone).

While some of these protests have toppled governments – for example in Nepal and Bangladesh – others have been more reformist in nature, such as those in Turkey, Indonesia, and Morocco. Young Moroccans presented their demands to Mohammed VI in an October 2 letter that called for the removal of the prime minister, the dismissal of the government, and a plethora of reforms and new policies. A second letter by 60 prominent artists and intellectuals condemned the government’s initial lack of concessions and called for the same reforms and the release of those in detention.

Solidarity From the Gulf States

The Moroccan state’s predicament prompted a series of gestures of support by Gulf Cooperation Council countries. Saudi Prince Turki bin Mohammed bin Fahd bin Abdulaziz, minister of state and member of the Council of Ministers, personally delivered a message to Mohammed VI on October 6 on behalf of Saudi King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. On the same day, the Saudi crown prince’s plane was spotted in Marrakesh, prompting unsubstantiated media reports that Mohammed bin Salman personally participated in the Saudi show of solidarity. In addition, a high-level Saudi delegation visited the capital, Rabat, to discuss increasing cooperation in a wide range of strategic sectors, including bilateral efforts to boost employment. Anwar Gargash, advisor to the president of the United Arab Emirates, issued a statement of solidarity. Al Jazeera covered the protests but significantly softened its tone relative to its coverage of the 2011 Arab Spring protests in Morocco, amid a widely reported reorganization of its senior staff and concomitant shifts in its editorial line.

Morocco and the GCC states have a long history of supporting each other in times of need. Following a serious oil spill off Morocco’s coast in 1989 by an Iranian tanker, Saudi Arabia sent Morocco $50 million for the cleanup. When ocean winds and currents unexpectedly pushed the spilled oil offshore and out of harm’s way, the money was used to create Al Akhawayn University, which quickly became the country’s most prestigious institution of higher learning. Morocco famously sent 1,200 troops to defend Saudi Arabia in 1991 following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait despite strong populist headwinds in Morocco. GCC countries made a series of strong gestures during and after Morocco’s large Arab Spring protests, leading to the 2013 establishment of a $5 billion development fund. Morocco joined Saudi Arabia’s military action in Yemen in March 2015, and Moroccan soldiers stayed for nearly four years. When Morocco cut ties with Iran in 2018, it cited Iran’s 2011 interference in Bahrain as one of the reasons.

These gestures of solidarity have accompanied a deepening of economic and business ties. The first Morocco-GCC summit was held in 2016. And, in March, Morocco and the GCC established a joint action plan for 2030. The fifth Moroccan-GCC Investment Forum was held in early November. Increased GCC investment has been and will be critical in helping Morocco weather the current storm.

The King’s Response and a “Victory” for Youth

Mohammed VI responded to the protests in his October 10 address to the new session of Parliament. He called for job creation, improved services, and a reduction in regional inequities and directly criticized the Parliament for inefficiency, but he also – indirectly – criticized protesters for questioning “flagship” projects. These include the construction and refurbishing of seven stadiums for the World Cup, which he argued were no less important to national development and pride than other local infrastructure projects. For example, the new stadium in Casablanca is planned to be the largest in the world, with a capacity of 115,000 spectators. However, the most prominent slogan of Morocco’s protests was “Stadiums are there, but where are the hospitals?” Another was: “At least the FIFA stadium will have a first aid kit! Our hospitals don’t.”

The Moroccan government introduced both economic and political reforms following the protests. On the economic side, it announced a 16% increase in health and education spending amounting to $15 billion. These reforms are slated to create 27,000 jobs in those sectors, build new university hospitals, renovate 90 other hospitals, and expand teacher training and preschool education. On the political side, Morocco introduced bills to increase youth participation in politics, including the easing of candidate eligibility requirements and subsidies of up to 75% for young candidates’ electoral campaigns. “Gen Z 212” responded somewhat tepidly that “these measures must be accompanied by firm measures against corruption and conflicts of interest.”

Then something extraordinary happened: Morocco upset a heavily favored Argentinian team at the 2025 FIFA U-20 World Cup, the youth soccer World Cup, in Chile. Morocco defeated Spain, Brazil, South Korea, the United States, and perennial top seed France to get to the final. Argentina was the only undefeated team and had won the trophy six previous times. On October 19, the young Moroccans beat the offensively and defensively capable Argentinian team 2-0.

Suddenly, many of the same young Moroccans lamenting new stadiums joined the delirium in favor of another huge Moroccan soccer success. Morocco had been the first African or Arab team to reach the Men’s World Cup semifinals in 2022. Its women’s team was reaching new heights as well by unexpectedly qualifying for knockout stages of the 2023 World Cup, the first Arab and North African team to do so. This filled Moroccan youth with pride and is likely to serve to further dampen criticism of soccer stadium construction and refurbishment. But as the monarch and Moroccan youth seem to agree, the country’s political and economic success will depend to a significant degree on greater investment in job creation and services beyond what World Cup success will provide.

The post Friends in Need: Morocco’s Gen Z Protests and the GCC Response appeared first on AGSI.

Since 2022, there has been an exceptional wave of IPO activity in Gulf stock exchanges, raising over $50 billion. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates accounted for most of these proceeds, followed by Oman to a lesser yet still notable extent. These listings have taken place across the Saudi Stock Exchange, Saudi Parallel Market (Nomu), Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange, Dubai Financial Market, and Muscat Stock Exchange.

Government-led initiatives and regulatory reforms have laid the foundation for the Gulf’s IPO surge, strengthening capital markets and opening the door for a wider range of companies to list. What began as a wave dominated by large, high-profile issuers in energy, logistics, and utilities has since expanded to include mid-sized and emerging firms across industries alongside a noticeable shift toward more selective investor behavior. Taken together, these changes suggest that the region’s IPO landscape is entering a more mature and globally aligned phase.

Government-Supported Momentum

Government-led initiatives and regulatory reforms across Gulf states have helped set the stage for the strong IPO momentum in recent years. Capital markets now serve as a key pillar of these countries’ economic diversification strategies. In Saudi Arabia, the Financial Sector Development Program was established in 2018 under Vision 2030 to transform the kingdom’s capital market into a global financial hub. That same year, a privatization program was launched to boost private sector participation by identifying select state-owned assets across various industries to be privatized and listed on the market.

In the years since, Saudi Arabia has rolled out a series of additional reforms to enhance capital market activity. Notably, in 2024, Saudi Arabia introduced the “Updated Investment Law” to streamline the registration process for foreign investors, ensure equal treatment between foreign and domestic investors, and provide protection against expropriation. More recently, the Capital Market Authority, Saudi Arabia’s financial regulatory entity, has reportedly been considering removing restrictions for foreign investors when buying Saudi stocks in an effort to boost capital market liquidity.

In the UAE, both Dubai and Abu Dhabi have taken active steps to deepen their capital markets and attract a more diverse base of issuers and investors. In Dubai in late 2021, the government announced its plan to list 10 state-owned assets on the Dubai Financial Market as part of a broader push to expand the emirate’s stock market size to $816 billion. Abu Dhabi, meanwhile, has focused on strengthening investor access and benchmark visibility, with the Abu Dhabi Exchange partnering, for the first time in the region, with FTSE Russell, a subsidiary of the London Stock Exchange Group, in March 2022 to launch a locally branded benchmark index, the “FTSE ADX 15 Index” as part of a strategy to attract a wider base of international investors.

In January 2022, the UAE shifted to a Saturday-Sunday weekend, from the Friday-Saturday weekend common across the region, to align with global markets. Additionally, the Securities and Commodities Authority issued the Gulf’s first regulatory framework for special purpose acquisition companies.

For Oman, increasing private sector participation in the country’s economy is one of the main objectives of its Vision 2040. In 2022, Oman implemented the “Securities Law” to strengthen investor protection and increase participation in raising capital. In September, Muscat Clearing & Depository introduced its “Internal Regulatory Rulebook” to better align the country’s capital market with international best practices. Additionally, in November, the Muscat Stock Exchange, in cooperation with several government entities, launched the Alternative Investment Market to offer small and emerging companies a more flexible platform for public listing, supporting broader private sector involvement in capital markets.

Broader and More Diverse IPO Markets 

Saudi Aramco’s 2019 IPO initially raised $25.6 billion, however, this grew to $29.4 billion after the company exercised its “greenshoe option,” a tool that enables underwriters to sell additional shares to stabilize the share price if demand exceeds supply. The IPO became the largest in history, helping pave the way for other state-linked entities in the region to go public in the years that followed. The momentum accelerated into 2022, when Gulf states, namely Saudi Arabia and the UAE, raised $23.4 billion through IPOs, accounting for roughly 13% of global issuance. The region maintained a strong pipeline in 2023 and 2024, with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Oman accounting for the majority of issuance, collectively raising $10.8 billion in 2023 and $12.9 billion in 2024.  However, in the first half of 2025, Gulf markets raised $3.4 billion, reflecting a 6% year-on-year decline, likely driven by wider global market uncertainty related to unfavorable trade tariffs that led some firms to delay listings.

Source: Kamco Invest

The surge in IPO proceeds in 2022 was mainly driven by a handful of large, high-profile issuances concentrated in energy, utilities, and logistics. That year’s biggest deals included Dubai Electricity and Water Authority at $6.1 billion, ADNOC-backed Borouge at $2 billion, Abu Dhabi Ports Group at $1.1 billion, Emirates Central Cooling Systems at $724 million, Saudi Aramco’s Luberef at $1.32 billion, Power and Water Utility Company for Jubail and Yanbu at $897 million, and Arabian Drilling at $710 million.

This pattern continued into 2023, with most proceeds again coming from energy and logistics, such as ADNOC Gas at $2.5 billion and ADNOC Logistics & Services at $769 million in the UAE. In Saudi Arabia, Ades Holding Co. raised $1.2 billion, while SAL Saudi Logistics Services raised $678 million. In Oman, OQ Gas Networks SAOG raised $749 million, followed by Abraj Energy Services at $244 million.

Although energy, logistics, and utilities dominated in terms of total capital raised, the overall IPO count in 2022 and 2023 was diversified, with a growing number of smaller and medium-sized companies going public across sectors, such as consumer services, pharmaceuticals, and infrastructure. Notable listings from other sectors included Americana Restaurants at $1.8 billion, Salik at $1 billion, Nahdi Medical Co at $1.36 billion, and PureHealth at $986 million.

By 2024, IPO activity in the Gulf featured an even wider range of sectors, with most proceeds coming from outside the traditional energy, utilities, and logistics space. Some of the most prominent offerings included Talabat at $2 billion, Lulu Retail Holdings at $1.72 billion, Dr Soliman Abdel Kader Fakeeh at $763 million, Alef Education Holding PLC at $515 million, and Spinneys 1961 Holding at $375 million.

This trend seems to have continued in 2025, with Saudi Arabia’s flynass raising $1.1 billion, becoming the first airline to go public in the Gulf in nearly 20 years. Other notable listings included Dubai Residential at $584 million, Umm Al Qura for Development & Construction Company at $523 million and Almoosa Health Co. at $450 million.

Large-scale offerings in energy and logistics continued as well over 2024 and 2025, led by Oman’s OQ Exploration and Production at $2 billion, Abu Dhabi’s NMDC Energy at $877 million, and Asyad Shipping Company at $333 million.

Growing Investor Selectivity

Besides the growing participation of smaller-sized firms and a wider sectoral base in Gulf IPO markets, investor behavior in the Gulf is also evolving. This was evident in late October, when Dubai-based classifieds platform Dubbizle announced its plans to postpone its listing, despite robust IPO activity in the region. The company was expected to seek a valuation of around $2 billion through its listing, but the delay came at a time when several newly listed UAE-based firms, including Talabat Holding, Lulu Retail Holdings, and Alec Holdings PJSC, have been trading below their offer price.

This reflects a mismatch between issuer valuation expectations and investor appetite, suggesting that investors in the Gulf are becoming more selective and performance driven in their decisions, marking a notable shift from earlier years when IPO deals were often oversubscribed regardless of financial performance.

As capital markets in the Gulf continue to develop, the next phase of IPO activity will likely place greater emphasis on company performance, transparency, and sustainable earnings growth, mirroring investment behavior in more mature global markets.

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AGSI was pleased to host a discussion on the recent International Monetary Fund report “Economic Prospects and Policy Challenges in the GCC Countries.” The discussion covered the IMF’s assessment of the economic situation in the Gulf states and the outlook for 2026 as well as how fiscal, monetary, financial sector, and structural policies can best be harnessed to deliver strong, sustained, and diversified growth in the future.   

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