The event will feature a fireside chat moderated by AGSI President Ambassador Douglas A. Silliman.

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Prime Minister Mohammed al-Sudani’s Reconstruction and Development Coalition emerged from the elections with the largest number of seats, a result widely interpreted as an endorsement of his pragmatic governing style, tangible success in reconstruction, and relative success in balancing competing domestic and external pressures. Yet electoral victory alone does not translate into political continuity in Iraq’s post-2003 system. Iraqis do not elect the top leaders directly; they elect the legislators, whose voting on consequential political and legislative business is subject to the will of their respective political leaders. Parliamentary arithmetic, constitutional rules, and factional bargaining matter more than popular mandates.

Despite Sudani’s electoral victory, the Coordination Framework, an assortment of Shia political coalitions, consolidated itself as the largest bloc in the newly elected Council of Representatives. Under the Iraqi Constitution, that status grants the Coordination Framework the right to nominate the next prime minister. Exercising this prerogative, the Coordination Framework denied the incumbent prime minister, Sudani, a second term, underscoring once again that Iraq’s premiership is determined less by voter preference than by elite consensus within Shia politics – a consensus that is carefully formed after extensive consultation with Iraqi ethnosectarian leaders and prominent regional and international actors whose national interests intersect with Iraq’s domestic and foreign policies.

What followed, however, was unexpected. Rather than resist or withdraw quietly, Sudani executed a bold political maneuver: He withdrew his candidacy and endorsed former Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki as the Coordination Framework’s candidate. In doing so, Sudani effectively turned the tables on the very bloc that had sidelined him. His endorsement placed the Coordination Framework in an awkward position: Rejecting Maliki would risk fracturing the alliance, while accepting him would revive a deeply polarizing figure whose legacy remains controversial inside and outside Iraq. Sudani further pledged full cooperation with Maliki should the latter lead the government, a move that effectively consolidated Maliki’s position and raised the political costs of resistance to his candidacy. The voices of dissent, a minority within the Coordination Framework, must choose to join the majority or lose the chance to play a significant executive role in the coming four years.

Maliki’s potential return immediately triggered regional and international reactions. Iran was quick to endorse his candidacy, a move that carried symbolic weight far beyond diplomatic signaling. For Maliki’s critics – both Iraqi and international – Iran’s support reinforced the long-standing perception that he represents Tehran’s preferred strongman in Baghdad. Even for Iraqis who do not oppose Iranian influence outright, the optics were damaging: The narrative of Maliki as an “Iranian choice” resurfaced with force, complicating efforts to frame his candidacy as a purely Iraqi decision.

Internal opposition soon followed. Two prominent Shia leaders within the Coordination Framework – Qais Khazali and Ammar al-Hakim – voiced objections to Maliki’s nomination. Their resistance reflected both ideological concerns and, perhaps, political calculations, as Maliki’s dominance threatens to marginalize rival Shia leaders within any future government. Opposition also emerged from outside the Shia camp. Former Council of Representatives Speaker Mohammed Halbousi, leader of the largest Sunni bloc whose candidate for speaker was already elected, openly rejected the prospect of Maliki’s return, signaling that Sunni cooperation with a Maliki-led government would be far from guaranteed.

The Kurdish response, by contrast, was favorable. With their candidate for the Iraqi presidency yet to be identified and elected, no major Kurdish faction publicly objected to Maliki’s candidacy. In fact, the prominent Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani welcomed his nomination, viewing the situation through a strategic lens. Barzani likely calculated that accommodating Maliki could strengthen the Kurdistan Democratic Party’s bid to secure the Iraqi presidency – a post traditionally held by its rival, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. In this sense, Kurdish pragmatism – and calculation –once again prevailed, as Erbil focused on maximizing institutional gains rather than shaping Baghdad’s leadership.

The most dramatic intervention came from Washington – and it came late. Throughout most of the government-formation process, the administration of President Donald J. Trump refrained from taking a public position, seemingly respecting Iraq’s claim that forming a government is a sovereign, internal matter. That restraint ended abruptly when Trump issued a public warning on social media, stating that, if Maliki were appointed prime minister, “the United States of America will no longer help Iraq and, if we are not there to help, Iraq has ZERO chance of Success, Prosperity, or Freedom.”

The timing of the message proved as consequential as its content. By the time the warning was issued, the Coordination Framework had already announced Maliki as its official candidate. What might have been leverage early in the process instead became a blunt veto delivered at the eleventh hour, throwing Iraq’s political class into an impossible dilemma. The Coordination Framework now faces a lose-lose choice. Proceeding with Maliki risks severe repercussions from the United States, potentially affecting economic assistance, security cooperation, and Iraq’s broader international standing. Backing down, however, would undermine the Coordination Framework’s claim to sovereignty and reinforce the perception that Iraq’s governments are shaped by external pressure – whether from Washington or Tehran. Either path damages the Coordination Framework’s credibility and deepens public cynicism about the Iraqi political process.

More broadly, Iraq itself stands to lose regardless of the outcome. A government formed in defiance of the United States risks isolation and instability. A government reshaped under direct, public U.S. pressure risks being dismissed as a puppet regime, trapped in the zero-sum rivalry between Washington and Tehran. In both scenarios, Iraqi agency is diminished.

At present, the Coordination Framework has little room to maneuver. The only viable strategy that preserves a semblance of dignity is delay. Constitutionally, this can be achieved by postponing the election of a president, a process that requires a two-thirds quorum in parliament. Without a president, the formal process of appointing a prime minister and forming a cabinet cannot move forward. The last government formation took an entire year from the general election to the confirmation of Sudani’s government. Such delay would not resolve the crisis, but it would buy time; and time, in this context, is political currency. A prolonged government-formation process could open space for quiet negotiations between Baghdad and Washington, potentially producing a compromise blueprint that avoids a direct confrontation. It might also allow internal dynamics within the Coordination Framework to pivot from its current position, presenting an alternative consensus candidate or a recalibrated political arrangement.

Yet delay carries its own risks. Iraq has lived through prolonged political paralysis in the past, and the costs are well known: stalled reforms, eroding public trust, growing social frustration, and strong potential for security risks. Furthermore, each additional month without the formation of a government risks reinforcing the perception that Iraq’s political leadership is struggling to provide effective governance and sustained direction. Iraqi society has demonstrated notable patience over the past two decades, accepting persistent shortcomings in governance while continuing to engage constructively in the democratic process. Citizens have participated consistently in elections and made significant sacrifices, including mobilizing to defend the political system against the threat posed by the Islamic State group. In return, public expectations remain modest, centered on achieving a dignified standard of living and the consistent provision of essential services.

Ultimately, the current crisis is about more than Maliki’s return. It is a test of whether Iraq can assert genuine sovereignty in a system still shaped by foreign influence, factional vetoes, and constitutional loopholes. For the Coordination Framework, Iraq’s political elite, and Iraq itself, the choices made in the coming weeks will carry consequences far beyond the formation of the next government.

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Leaders in the Gulf states largely escaped the whiplash treatment meted out by the administration to allies and adversaries alike. However, this sweet spot, cemented by the commercial and investment partnerships that characterized the first year of Trump’s second term, is offset by the precarity of being on the frontline of increasing U.S.-Iran volatility. Both the June 2025 12-day war between Israel and Iran, which ended with a U.S. attack on Iranian nuclear facilities, and the separate Iranian and Israeli missile strikes on Qatar in June and September 2025, respectively, illustrated the challenges in maintaining order and security in the Gulf and the rising cost of any sustained clash in human as well as political and economic terms.

Multiple dilemmas are metastasizing in U.S.-Gulf relations as the White House has grown increasingly unpredictable and, post-Venezuela intervention, arguably more cavalier in its conduct of foreign policy. Seeming U.S. tolerance for (geo)political uncertainty, globally as well as regionally, cuts against the de-risking approaches of governments in the Gulf, especially in Saudi Arabia, as major economic and energy projects move toward delivery. The planned buildout of artificial intelligence infrastructure in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates would be put at risk from any new or prolonged conflict with Iran. So, too, would the trillions of dollars in pledged investments in the United States made during Trump’s three-country tour of the Gulf in May 2025 and visits of senior figures to the White House in the president’s first year back in office.

AI has rapidly emerged as one of Saudi authorities’ key areas of focus as Vision 2030 enters its final stage, alongside mining and critical minerals as a priority for investment. The prospect of a U.S. strike on Iran came as thousands of delegates attended the fifth annual Future Minerals Forum in Riyadh and the Saudi Arabian Mining Company, known as Maaden, unveiled plans to become one of the biggest commodity producers in the world over the next decade. Large delegations from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE traveled to Davos in Switzerland to participate in the World Economic Forum’s annual meeting, which began on January 19, the same day that DIMDEX, a major maritime defense exhibition, convened in Doha. Dubai, meanwhile, is gearing up to host the annual World Government Summit in early February, as the Gulf states cement their positioning as connectors of capital, energy, and trade flows.

Calls for diplomacy by Gulf officials (which Saudi analysts have been at pains to emphasize were not aimed at influencing the White House either way) likely reflect two points of specific concern at any new escalatory spiral with Iran. The first is a sense of doubt that the Trump administration has a coherent plan that goes beyond a renewed campaign of airstrikes as well as a feeling that military intervention is unlikely to trigger any positive political outcome. Mixed messaging from the Trump administration after the removal of Nicolás Maduro from power in Venezuela may only have amplified feelings of unease that U.S. policymakers lack a “day after” plan. While there is little affinity in Gulf capitals for the regime of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in Tehran, there is also a risk that leadership with its back to the wall and facing decapitation might engage in a desperate last stand by abandoning all restraint in responding to any new kinetic action.

This links to a second point of concern: From a Gulf perspective, “red lines” keep being crossed, and the threshold for getting entangled in conflict seems to draw closer each time. The “tit-for-tat” strikes exchanged by Iran and Israel in April and October 2024 were followed by the June 12-day war, which bypassed the Gulf states during the conflict itself. However, the Iranian decision to respond to the June 22 U.S. bombing of its nuclear sites by striking Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, home to the forward headquarters of U.S. Central Command, the following day, was a significant act of aggression (even if it was choreographed, unlike the Israeli missile strike on Doha in September) against the territory of a Gulf state. The pattern of escalation in each round of conflict has heightened uncertainty over what line may be crossed next, such as the targeting of energy and other critical infrastructure vulnerabilities, including desalination plants, or severe disruption to shipping in the Gulf.

There are multiple reasons why officials in the Gulf Cooperation Council and other regional states wish to de-escalate tensions with Iran. Recent developments in Yemen and the Horn of Africa have highlighted the Saudi interest in avoiding further state collapse and fragmentation of authority in regions deemed vital to the kingdom’s security. Policymakers in Doha are not only aware of the threat of new strikes against Qatar – which would be the third in less than a year – but also cognizant of their large-scale expansion of natural gas liquefaction capacity in the North Field, whose first phase is nearing completion. Their counterparts in Muscat recently unveiled a new five-year development plan and an international financial center as part of Oman’s continuing economic diversification. Leaders in Egypt will not want to see renewed regional instability cast a shadow over the gradual return of international shipping to the Red Sea and passage through the Suez Canal.

Gulf leaders have agency and leverage with the Trump administration, which includes direct as well as indirect channels to the White House, the former through key interlocutors, such as advisors Steven Witkoff and Jared Kushner (both present in Davos) as well as Massad Boulos. Emirati officials are likely seeking clarification from the administration over Trump’s January 13 claim that countries trading with Iran will be hit by new 25% tariffs, given that the UAE is the second-largest trade partner of Iran after China. The UAE and Qatar both signed onto the Pax Silica Declaration in mid-January as part of the U.S.-led initiative to safeguard technology supply chains and integrate U.S. partners into global hi-tech agreements. Such webs of positive interconnectivity present win-win solutions for the United States and Gulf states but need a predictable and reliable decision-making landscape if they are to maximize results.

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The UAE and Serbia’s distinctive partnership is marked by high-level ties, with UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan and Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic sharing a strong personal rapport bolstered by multiple visits in recent years. But bilateral ties have not always been warm. During the 1990s and 2000s, relations were significantly strained. Amid the breakup of Yugoslavia, the UAE supported Bosniak forces during the 1992-95 Bosnian war and was one of a few Arab states that backed NATO’s military campaign against Slobodan Milosevic’s regime in 1999. The Gulf country also contributed troops to NATO’s peacekeeping mission in Kosovo and was the first Arab state to recognize Kosovo in 2008.

The relationship began to evolve in the late 2000s and early 2010s, as Serbia, while reeling from the 2008-09 global financial crisis, sought urgently needed foreign direct investment, making the Gulf an increasingly important region for Belgrade to cultivate closer ties. From 2010-19, the UAE became Serbia’s fourth-largest foreign direct investor – trailing only the European Union, Russia, and China. In 2025, a comprehensive economic partnership agreement between the UAE and Serbia came into effect, designed to enhance bilateral trade, investment, and private sector cooperation across key sectors, such as renewable energy, agriculture, logistics, and technology. By reducing or eliminating duties on more than 96% of tariff lines, the agreement is expected to significantly boost trade between Serbia and its leading Gulf Cooperation Council trading partner. Notably, this comprehensive economic partnership agreement with Serbia became the UAE’s 10th to come into force.

Beyond the economic benefits of bilateral ties, relations with the UAE and other Middle Eastern countries have enabled the Vucic government to frame Belgrade’s ties with the Islamic world in markedly positive terms, emphasizing cooperation, stability, and economic partnerships – language that contrasts sharply with Serbia’s pariah status and the Islamophobic rhetoric of the 1990s, when Vucic and other officials in the Milosevic regime were associated with nationalist anti-Muslim discourse.

Over the years, the UAE has come to view Serbia as a strategically attractive destination for investment, owing to its geographic position at the crossroads of Central Europe and the Balkan Peninsula and between the European Union and Middle East. Serbia has also been particularly important to the UAE for food security. With the desert country heavily reliant on food imports, Emirati entities, such as the UAE Development Fund and Al Dahra agriculture company, have invested heavily in Serbia’s agricultural sector.

The UAE’s overseas investment approach, with investments typically state coordinated, politically supported, and negotiated at the government-to-government level rather than on purely commercial terms, has proved particularly appealing to the Vucic government. It has also likely functioned more smoothly within Serbia’s political and institutional environment than it would in a European Union member state, where transparency requirements, rule-of-law standards, and anti-corruption regulations are far more stringent than in a Balkan country outside the bloc.

Belgrade Waterfront: Flagship Investment

The most high-profile Emirati investments in Serbia have come from UAE-based developer Eagle Hills. Since 2015, Eagle Hills has been playing a major role in the financing and construction of the Belgrade Waterfront – a vast mixed-use development project promised to attract 3.5 billion euros (approximately $4.1 billion) in investments along the Sava River. The project has played a significant role in reshaping Belgrade’s skyline, lending it a distinctly Dubai-inspired profile, and positioning the city as an emerging European capital seeking to narrow the gap with its Western European counterparts. Its realization has been heavily facilitated by close coordination at the highest levels of leadership in the UAE and Serbia, firmly rooted in broader diplomatic ties.

At the same time, Eagle Hills’ involvement in the Belgrade Waterfront has not been without controversy. Allegations of corruption, deaths of construction workers, and illegal demolitions to expedite construction, alongside environmental concerns and limited transparency, have generated substantial criticism and public discontent within segments of Serbian society.

Aviation Ties and Strategic Connectivity

In 2013, Etihad Airways acquired a 49% stake in Serbia’s national carrier, Air Serbia, playing a central role in the rebranding and management of the former Jat Airways. In 2020, Etihad reduced its ownership stake to 18% as the Serbian government recapitalized the airline to help it during the coronavirus pandemic crisis. Despite this substantial divestment, the partnership proved instrumental in strengthening Belgrade’s air connectivity not only with the UAE but also with the wider Gulf region. By 2023, Air Serbia had returned to full state ownership. Nevertheless, bilateral cooperation in the aviation sector endured, including a codeshare agreement concluded between Etihad Airways and Air Serbia in 2024.

Defense and Arms Cooperation

The arms trade is a key pillar of Emirati-Serbian relations. In 2013, Serbia and the UAE announced their first arms deal, estimated at $214 million. The partnership has continued through ammunition sales and joint projects. It offers Serbia access to lucrative Middle Eastern arms markets, as it seeks to expand its presence as a global arms supplier and provides the UAE with a dependable supply of weapons and the means to distribute them to its regional partners.

In the lead-up to Belgrade’s September 2025 “Unity of Strength” military parade, the Serbian armed forces conducted exercises with UAE-developed Shadow 25 and Shadow 50 one-way attack drones. This was the first time these systems had been seen publicly in Europe. Developed by Abu Dhabi-based advanced technology and defense conglomerate EDGE Group, the drones differ in speed and payload yet share mobile launch capabilities. Their public display came on the heels of recent EDGE agreements to broaden defense cooperation and promote these systems across Europe. While Serbian officials have not formally confirmed the acquisition, the drones’ presence signals deepening defense ties with the UAE and underscores Serbia’s growing interest in loitering munitions amid escalating regional security concerns.

Artificial Intelligence and Digital Statecraft

In February 2024, at the World Government Summit in Dubai, Serbia and the UAE signed a memorandum of understanding to advance cooperation in artificial intelligence, aiming to deepen collaboration on AI development and its practical applications. According to Serbian officials, the agreement enables Serbian scientific institutes, startups, and other entities to use a UAE-developed large language model, described as practically equivalent to ChatGPT, to support their AI projects. It builds on a series of prior AI- and technology-focused partnerships, including the establishment with Emirati support of smart police stations in Serbia, Serbian collaboration with Abu Dhabi-based AI firm G42, and joint initiatives in health care, biotechnology, and digital infrastructure.

Serbia is also part of the UAE’s broader strategy to expand its global AI and digital footprint. Belgrade signed an agreement with technology group e& enterprise to triple Serbia’s data center capacity to 40 megawatts, complementing similar UAE-backed projects across Europe.

Belgrade’s Multipolar Foreign Policy

Rooted in the nonaligned foreign policy tradition of Yugoslavia under Josip Broz Tito, the Vucic government has long sought to navigate competing geopolitical currents to safeguard Serbia’s autonomy. Constantly striving to keep multiple options open, Belgrade deliberately avoids overly deep alignment with any single bloc at the expense of others. While seeking to carefully balance relations between East and West, Serbia has also consistently pursued stronger ties with influential states in the Global South, including across the Arab world, and the UAE has become the most consequential Arab state in this strategy.

The deepening UAE-Serbia partnership reflects more than opportunistic dealmaking amid geopolitical strain. It also illustrates how two states with distinct but complementary strategic objectives have identified enduring value in one another. For Belgrade, Abu Dhabi offers a rare combination of capital, political backing, and geopolitical flexibility at a time of mounting pressure from broadly gauged Western sanctions focused on Russia, regional insecurity, and economic vulnerability. For the UAE, Serbia represents a receptive gateway into Europe, expanding Abu Dhabi’s geostrategic reach and influence across emerging markets and offering economic diversification opportunities.

A Strategic Foothold in the Western Balkans

Yet this relationship is neither cost free nor necessarily assured for the long term. Emirati investments and defense cooperation have been enabled by highly centralized decision making and strong personal ties between leaders, a dynamic that has facilitated speed and scale but also generated controversy surrounding transparency, governance, and public accountability. As Serbia faces growing domestic unrest and the eventual transition to a post-Vucic political landscape, the sustainability of this model may be increasingly tested.

The UAE-Serbia relationship appears resilient but contingent. Its future will depend not only on broader regional and global shifts but also on whether bilateral cooperation becomes more institutionalized and transparent or remains heavily personalized and transactional. What is clear, however, is that the UAE has secured a lasting strategic foothold in the Western Balkans, and Serbia has gained an influential Arab partner that is likely to remain central to Belgrade’s multipolar foreign policy calculus.

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Yet, following a series of coups in the Sahel, the presence of Western countries in the region began to shrink, particularly with the withdrawal of French and U.S. military forces from parts of the region. And Iran has moved to fill the geopolitical void, notably providing training and military equipment, such as combat drones and surface-to-air missiles, to Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso.

Iran’s interest in cooperating with the Sahel countries is partially driven by its nuclear program. In 2024, there were reports that Iran was negotiating with Niger’s military, offering advanced military equipment in exchange for access to approximately 300 tons of uranium concentrate from deposits near Arlit in Niger. Iran and Niger denied the deal, which would have been valued at $56 million. The alleged deal may have contributed to tensions with the U.S. military presence in Niger, leading Niger to end its defense cooperation agreement with Washington, prompting a U.S. troop withdrawal.

Iran’s interest in developing closer ties with Niger goes back to the 2010s under the administration of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, with Iran’s focus on its nuclear program, but there has been a notable flurry of activity in recent years. In 2023 an Iranian delegation visited Niger, and a year later the Nigerian prime minister traveled to Tehran. In April 2025, the two countries signed an economic cooperation agreement, followed by a memorandum of understanding in May to expand security coordination.

Iran has also increased engagement with other Sahel countries. In 2022, then Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian visited Mali, and his political affairs advisor, Ali Bagheri Kani, visited Burkina Faso in 2023. In September 2023, the foreign minister of Burkina Faso visited Tehran to meet with Ebrahim Raisi, who was Iran’s president at the time before his death in 2024. In October 2024 Burkina Faso and Iran signed a memorandum of understanding on civil nuclear cooperation. Talks on closer cooperation in this field have been taking place with Mauritania as well.

Tehran is also looking to advance commercial and investment relations to help weather the sanctions regime. Deals between Iran and the military elites of African countries could potentially provide Iranian companies with the opportunity to exploit local natural resources and mitigate the effect of Western sanctions. In 2024, Iran held “Expo 2024,” to present Iranian products to African and other international importers, and the “Iran-Africa Economic Cooperation Conference,” to discuss international trade.

Iran’s efforts to increase its presence in the Sahel region through trade and arms deals not only have significant economic benefits, but they are part of a broader strategy aimed at reducing Iran’s isolation on the international stage. Tehran is also interested in expanding its beleaguered “axis of resistance” network beyond the more traditional boundaries of the Middle East, and the Western withdrawal from the Sahel presents an opportunity to fill in the security void. Iran is also using soft power through television, radio, and cultural events to appeal to Shia communities, particularly in Mali, Mauritania, and Niger.

With its “axis of resistance” severely degraded since the start of the Gaza war, Tehran saw an opening in the Sahel to partially compensate for its foreign policy failures in the Middle East. Tehran has also tried to capitalize on the sympathy that has arisen in the Sahel region toward the Palestinians and, at the same time, widen a wedge among African countries and Washington that has emerged in recent years.

Iran also seeks to limit Israel’s influence in the Sahel. In late 2024, Tehran proposed setting up a joint economic and trade commission with Sudan. This followed the restoration of diplomatic ties severed since the mid-2010s. Iran wants to limit the impact of the Abraham Accords and Sudan’s normalization of ties with Israel. Iran has also reportedly supplied the Sudanese Armed Forces with modern weaponry, such as Ababil-3 and Mohajer-6 drones, which allowed the Sudanese Armed Forces to regain the upper hand with a decisive counteroffensive and retake the capital Khartoum from the Rapid Support Forces in March 2025. In May, Iran also signed a security treaty with Ethiopia. That agreement envisions closer Iranian-Ethiopian collaboration on issues such as prevention of cross-border crime as well as military training.

On their end, Sahel countries that have been traditionally dominated by Western countries are also working to diversify their foreign relations and are bringing Iran into the mix. Despite its efforts and mixed success, Tehran is not as well positioned to play a central role in the Sahel as powers such as Russia, China, and even Turkey. Over the past year, Ankara has expanded its links with the Sahel region through humanitarian aid via the Turkish Red Crescent, Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency, and Maarif Foundation (an educational foundation). Turkey has also increased military ties, supplying drones to Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali. Moreover, Chad and Turkey reportedly reached an agreement for Ankara to take control of a military base in Abéché, which previously hosted French troops. In July 2025, Turkey and Niger signed a military cooperation agreement.

Iran is attempting to present itself to the Sahel countries as a reliable partner in the fight against Sunni jihadist groups and a partner in promoting regime stability. At the same time, it is trying to build lucrative commercial and investment deals. Iran still has many tentative areas of military-technical cooperation with the Sahel countries that are not yet fully developed. Given its perceived interests and invested effort to date in the Sahel, Iran’s engagement with the region is likely to increase, fed by the cascade of foreign policy setbacks it has suffered closer to home. Moreover, Western countries’ apparently accelerating retreat from the Sahel will almost certainly create additional opportunities for Iran to exploit.

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Riyadh’s Strategic Motivations

One year after the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, relations between Riyadh and Damascus have undergone a dramatic reversal. The transformation has been driven by overlapping geopolitical shifts, economic ambitions, and Saudi Arabia’s determination to shape a new regional order that privileges Arab leadership over Iranian influence and channels cooperation with Turkey to constrain any outsized regional ambitions.

For over a decade, Saudi Arabia was one of Assad’s fiercest adversaries, supporting opposition forces and viewing Damascus as a conduit for Iranian expansionism. Assad’s abrupt collapse in December 2024 – toppled by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, led by Ahmed al-Sharaa – upended that paradigm. The kingdom quickly moved to engage the new leadership, calculating that early outreach could prevent Syria’s descent into renewed chaos or Iranian reentrenchment.

At the core of Riyadh’s post-Assad strategy lie three imperatives: security containment, geopolitical balancing, and economic opportunity. First, Saudi Arabia seeks to preempt the resurgence of transnational jihadism and disrupt the narcotics economy – particularly the Captagon trade – that has corroded Syrian institutions and flooded Gulf markets. A stable, cooperative Damascus is seen as essential to shielding Saudi borders and domestic stability.

Second, Riyadh seeks to reassert Arab primacy in the Levant by weakening Iranian networks while keeping Turkish ambitions in check. In Syria – the Levant’s center of gravity – Saudi financial leverage and Turkish military weight make cooperation necessary, even as their complementary roles sharpen Riyadh’s wariness of Ankara’s regional aspirations. By exploiting Turkey’s dependence on Saudi and broader Gulf capital, Riyadh can work with Ankara when interests align while still constraining its bid for dominance.

Third, Syria offers economic opportunity. Syria’s reconstruction, which the World Bank estimates will cost at least $216 billion, offers a vast arena for Gulf investment. Saudi official statements and bilateral agreements point toward the use of sovereign capital and private enterprise to rehabilitate infrastructure, energy grids, and transportation corridors, with the apparent aim of gradually integrating Syria into a Gulf-linked regional economic ecosystem centered on Saudi capital. Development, in this calculus, becomes an instrument of influence.

Saudi Arabia and Syria are discussing data cables linking the kingdom to Europe as part of a regional artificial intelligence and digital hub initiative, and the Saudi Telecom Company submitted a proposal for the project. Saudi renewable energy leader ACWA Power is also among Saudi companies poised to invest in Syria. In parallel, an International Monetary Fund team has already been in Damascus to support efforts to strengthen the capacity of Syria’s central bank, ensuring it can perform its essential functions and serve as a stabilizing anchor for the national economy.

Politically, Sharaa’s emphasis on nationalism and state restoration over ideological militancy resonates with Gulf sensibilities. His pragmatic willingness to distance Syria from Iran and Islamist movements has given Riyadh a rare opportunity to cultivate a partner that, while fragile, shares the Saudi preference for stability through state authority rather than revolutionary ideology.

With this in mind, Sharaa appears to have concluded that the surest route to Western goodwill runs through deepening alignment with Saudi Arabia, one of Washington’s primary Arab partners. Taken together, these moves signal Damascus’ recognition that Saudi Arabia – not Iran or Russia – is now the indispensable gateway to postwar normalization and economic reintegration. This calculation reflects a broader strategic shift, namely that Syria’s long-term sovereignty and economic recovery now depend less on ideological alignments and more on embedding the country within a Saudi-led, Western-endorsed framework.

In essence, Saudi Arabia views Syria’s transition not simply as regime change but as a geopolitical reset, a chance to entrench Gulf leadership across the northern Arab tier and to demonstrate that Arab reconstruction, not Iranian patronage or Turkish leverage, will determine the region’s future.

Milestones in a Rapid Rapprochement

The speed of normalization since late 2024 underscores Riyadh’s strategic urgency. The reopening of the Saudi Embassy in Damascus in September 2024 symbolized Syria’s reentry into the Arab system. Sharaa’s reciprocal visit to Riyadh in February 2025, his first foreign trip, sealed the personal rapport underpinning the political thaw.

Diplomatic efforts unfolded rapidly. A January summit in Riyadh gathered foreign ministers from the Gulf Cooperation Council states, Syria, the United States, and the European Union – signaling consensus on Syria’s reintegration and underscoring Saudi Arabia’s emergence as the principal convener of postwar diplomacy.

The pace accelerated further in March, when a Saudi-mediated border demarcation agreement between Syria and Lebanon, overseen by Saudi Defense Minister Khalid bin Salman, established mechanisms to curb militancy and cross-border smuggling, issues central to Riyadh’s security agenda.

Economic engagement quickly followed the political thaw. After the administration of President Donald J. Trump lifted select sanctions in mid-May – marking a successful lobbying effort by the Saudi crown prince – Saudi Arabia, together with Qatar, settled Syria’s $15 million arrears to the World Bank and later they jointly pledged $89 million to help maintain vital public services and cover state salaries. The Syrian-Saudi Investment Forum in Damascus in July concluded with a $6.4 billion Saudi investment pledge and the signing of a slew of agreements covering infrastructure, banking, energy, and real estate, alongside feasibility studies for a Syrian stock exchange and new power-generation projects. The two countries also concluded a bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement and established a Saudi-Syrian Business Council.

Building on this momentum, Sharaa doubled down on the strategy he apparently believed would secure Western backing, visibly tying Syria’s recovery narrative to Saudi capital, regional leadership, and reformist branding. Addressing the Future Investment Initiative in Riyadh in late October, Sharaa underscored Saudi Arabia’s “key role” in rebuilding postwar Syria while courting global investors. He cast Syria as an emerging trade corridor and noted that it had already attracted more than $28 billion in pledged foreign investment. In mid-November, the Saudi tanker Petalidi delivered the first crude-oil grant shipment to help stabilize refinery operations and bolster Syria’s wider economic recovery.

For Washington, this alignment fits neatly within its broader posture of “strategic minimalism,” supporting a Gulf-led stabilization effort that limits Iran’s influence, contains Russia’s footprint, and avoids the costs of direct U.S. engagement. Russia’s muted presence in this phase of Syria’s transition – shaped by bandwidth constraints from the war in Ukraine and an implicit recognition that Gulf financing will dictate Syria’s future political economy – further underlines the shifting balance of power.

Politically, Saudi Arabia has sought to recast Syria as a stabilizing pillar rather than a flashpoint. It has condemned Israeli airstrikes on Syrian territory and championed respect for sovereignty in United Nations and Arab League forums, situating Damascus within a Gulf-led security narrative. Riyadh has approached the integration of former HTS members into local governance pragmatically, focusing on stability and effective administration rather than rigid ideological scrutiny. It remains to be seen whether the December 13 killing of two U.S. military personnel and one civilian interpreter, at a site near Palmyra in central Syria, will upend some of the assumptions for the integration of HTS by Riyadh, Damascus, and Washington. The incident may also test the viability of Washington’s preference for engagement in Syria through strategic minimalism.

Riyadh’s proactive posture may also reflect lessons from its past hesitations – particularly in Yemen and Iraq – where delayed engagement arguably contributed to Iran entrenching itself deeply before Saudi Arabia acted. Its early, front-loaded engagement in Syria is thus best understood as a preemptive strategy to shape conditions before rival actors can fill the vacuum.

The Expanding U.S.-Saudi-Syrian Triangle

All these developments suggest the Syria file is now embedded within a broader U.S.-Saudi strategic compact. Congress’ repeal of the 2019 Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act under the National Defense Authorization Act removes the broadest sanctions constraining engagement with Syria. In place of automatic snapbacks, Washington has installed a four-year conditional oversight framework tied to security and governance benchmarks. For Riyadh, the move lowers legal exposure and shifts investment decisions decisively toward managing Syria’s political and security risks rather than sanctions risk.

Within that newly permissive – but still conditional – framework, for Riyadh, this partnership confers immense strategic dividends. It amplifies Saudi Arabia’s diplomatic weight, aligns its regional ambitions with Washington’s minimalist engagement model, and cements its image as the indispensable Arab interlocutor between Damascus and the West. For Syria, it offers political rehabilitation and economic lifelines.

Persistent Fault Lines and Risks

Yet beneath the momentum lie vulnerabilities that could unravel the project. Domestically, Syria remains deeply fragmented. Violence has erupted intermittently in Suwayda, and while the March bloodshed in coastal Alawite areas has not repeated, underlying sectarian divisions and tensions remain pronounced. Recent parliamentary appointments hint at inclusivity, but social reconciliation remains nascent at best. The political step that builds on inclusivity, the prospect of some level of representative governance, remains only a contested, notional concept. These domestic fractures, if unaddressed, could compound external pressures and erode the foundations of Riyadh’s stabilization strategy.

Externally, Syria sits at the intersection of rival power projections. Relying on the goodwill it amassed in helping HTS develop and eventually overthrow the Assad regime, Turkey continues to occupy northern territories with troops and through proxy militias, pursuing a problematic buffer-zone agenda that is likely to eventually cause friction with Damascus. By some accounts, remnants of Iranian proxies continue to operate in Syria. Israel’s repeated airstrikes on Shia militias and Hezbollah’s logistical corridors and weapons depots perpetuate volatility. Geir Pedersen, warned in August before his resignation as U.N. special envoy for Syria that the country’s “transition remains on the knife-edge.”

Economically, accelerating sanctions relief is critical, but formal repeal of the Caesar Act does not eliminate all hurdles. Even after formal removal, major investors are likely to wait months before committing substantial capital, given lingering challenges, including Syria’s fragile political governance, persistent security problems, weak infrastructure, and volatile currency.

Smuggling and narcotics trafficking could undercut progress. Saudi efforts to strengthen border enforcement through trilateral coordination with Syria and Iraq remain embryonic and easily disrupted by political shifts or corruption.

The Kurdish question compounds these strains. The U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces still control much of the northeast, including the country’s oil production and agriculture, and the process for integrating these forces into the national army has stalled. Ankara’s hostility toward Kurdish autonomy and Damascus’ reluctance to share power make compromise elusive. A senior SDF commander, Sipan Hemo, recently warned of renewed conflict if negotiations fail, underscoring the volatility of this fault line – his hard line a reminder that tough rhetoric is a part of the negotiations process. Any escalation could derail reconstruction and test Riyadh’s diplomatic agility.

Saudi Postconflict Statecraft

Saudi Arabia’s embrace of the Sharaa government and orchestration of Syria’s regional and international reintegration represent a defining experiment in postconflict statecraft. Using financial leverage, diplomatic pragmatism, and coordination with the United States, Riyadh aims to forge a Gulf-led regional order that prioritizes Arab sovereignty and stability over ideological or proxy-driven agendas. If the strategy succeeds, it will further cement Saudi Arabia’s position as a key regional power.

Success could reshape Syria’s trajectory and the broader Middle Eastern security architecture, positioning Gulf states as both financiers and guarantors of order. Yet domestic fragmentation, residual militancy, competing foreign interests, and uncertain Western politics threaten to derail the project. For now, the Saudi-U.S. partnership stands as a symbol of strategic interdependence, with Riyadh providing capital and regional legitimacy, while Washington offers diplomatic and security backing. Whether this experiment proves a model for Gulf-led stabilization and reconstruction or a cautionary tale of the limits of external engineering will shape the region’s political landscape for years to come.

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As the protests spread nationally, the list of demands grew. Economic demands were high on the list – with the youth unemployment rate topping 35%, protesters called for more jobs as well as higher wages and lower prices and higher subsidies for basic goods. At the same time, they called for lower expenditures on the 2025 Africa Cup and 2030 World Cup. They demanded improvements in education, health care, housing, and public transit. They called for the release of detained protesters and effective measures against corruption, including the removal of corrupt political parties from the governing coalition. Interestingly, they also called for the adoption of English over French as Morocco’s second national language after Arabic, and, notably, most protest signs were in English – relatively few were in Arabic, with almost none in French. Increasing numbers of young Moroccans prefer English over French, replacing “colonial” French with the preferred language of international commerce and communications.

The protests brought to mind the Arab Spring protests of 2011, which resulted in significant political changes in Morocco. The resonance with the earlier protests was enough to spark a reaction and support, albeit modest, from fellow monarchies in the Gulf. Moroccan King Mohammed VI’s regularly scheduled address to the Parliament on October 10 signaled his refusal to accede to the most forceful demands, notably the removal of the prime minister. Still, the protests have been a reminder both that ties among fellow monarchs persist and that youth ambitions in the region have not been fully met. Typically, protests in Morocco trigger cabinet reshuffles and, at times, prime minister replacements, institutional mechanisms that insulate to some degree but also serve as a proxy for direct criticism of the monarch.

Morocco in the Gen Z Protest Wave

Morocco was the 22nd country swept up in a global wave of protests that peaked in September following well-publicized Gen Z protests in Nepal and Madagascar. Previously referred to as the “Asian spring,” worldwide Gen Z protests began earlier in Sri Lanka and Iran (following the death of Mahsa Amini) in 2022; continued in 2024 in Kenya, Bangladesh, Mozambique, and South Korea; and, in 2025, spread to Turkey, Mongolia, Nepal, Timor-Leste, Madagascar, Serbia, Indonesia, Togo, the Philippines, France, Italy, Switzerland, San Marino, the Maldives, Peru, Paraguay, and Morocco.

What ties these global youth protest movements together, other than the ubiquitous skull and crossbones flag and meme (from the Japanese manga series “One Piece”), are concerns over inequality, reductions in standards of living, corruption, democratic backsliding, and increasing authoritarianism. Another common thread has been the important roles of rappers, both in providing protest anthems and as “martyrs” when arrested. Morocco was no exception. Prominent Moroccan rappers in the movement included Don Bigg, Dizzy DROS, ElGrande Toto, and Khtek, and the movement also spawned the viral rap freestyle challenge #FreeKoulchi (Free Everyone).

While some of these protests have toppled governments – for example in Nepal and Bangladesh – others have been more reformist in nature, such as those in Turkey, Indonesia, and Morocco. Young Moroccans presented their demands to Mohammed VI in an October 2 letter that called for the removal of the prime minister, the dismissal of the government, and a plethora of reforms and new policies. A second letter by 60 prominent artists and intellectuals condemned the government’s initial lack of concessions and called for the same reforms and the release of those in detention.

Solidarity From the Gulf States

The Moroccan state’s predicament prompted a series of gestures of support by Gulf Cooperation Council countries. Saudi Prince Turki bin Mohammed bin Fahd bin Abdulaziz, minister of state and member of the Council of Ministers, personally delivered a message to Mohammed VI on October 6 on behalf of Saudi King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. On the same day, the Saudi crown prince’s plane was spotted in Marrakesh, prompting unsubstantiated media reports that Mohammed bin Salman personally participated in the Saudi show of solidarity. In addition, a high-level Saudi delegation visited the capital, Rabat, to discuss increasing cooperation in a wide range of strategic sectors, including bilateral efforts to boost employment. Anwar Gargash, advisor to the president of the United Arab Emirates, issued a statement of solidarity. Al Jazeera covered the protests but significantly softened its tone relative to its coverage of the 2011 Arab Spring protests in Morocco, amid a widely reported reorganization of its senior staff and concomitant shifts in its editorial line.

Morocco and the GCC states have a long history of supporting each other in times of need. Following a serious oil spill off Morocco’s coast in 1989 by an Iranian tanker, Saudi Arabia sent Morocco $50 million for the cleanup. When ocean winds and currents unexpectedly pushed the spilled oil offshore and out of harm’s way, the money was used to create Al Akhawayn University, which quickly became the country’s most prestigious institution of higher learning. Morocco famously sent 1,200 troops to defend Saudi Arabia in 1991 following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait despite strong populist headwinds in Morocco. GCC countries made a series of strong gestures during and after Morocco’s large Arab Spring protests, leading to the 2013 establishment of a $5 billion development fund. Morocco joined Saudi Arabia’s military action in Yemen in March 2015, and Moroccan soldiers stayed for nearly four years. When Morocco cut ties with Iran in 2018, it cited Iran’s 2011 interference in Bahrain as one of the reasons.

These gestures of solidarity have accompanied a deepening of economic and business ties. The first Morocco-GCC summit was held in 2016. And, in March, Morocco and the GCC established a joint action plan for 2030. The fifth Moroccan-GCC Investment Forum was held in early November. Increased GCC investment has been and will be critical in helping Morocco weather the current storm.

The King’s Response and a “Victory” for Youth

Mohammed VI responded to the protests in his October 10 address to the new session of Parliament. He called for job creation, improved services, and a reduction in regional inequities and directly criticized the Parliament for inefficiency, but he also – indirectly – criticized protesters for questioning “flagship” projects. These include the construction and refurbishing of seven stadiums for the World Cup, which he argued were no less important to national development and pride than other local infrastructure projects. For example, the new stadium in Casablanca is planned to be the largest in the world, with a capacity of 115,000 spectators. However, the most prominent slogan of Morocco’s protests was “Stadiums are there, but where are the hospitals?” Another was: “At least the FIFA stadium will have a first aid kit! Our hospitals don’t.”

The Moroccan government introduced both economic and political reforms following the protests. On the economic side, it announced a 16% increase in health and education spending amounting to $15 billion. These reforms are slated to create 27,000 jobs in those sectors, build new university hospitals, renovate 90 other hospitals, and expand teacher training and preschool education. On the political side, Morocco introduced bills to increase youth participation in politics, including the easing of candidate eligibility requirements and subsidies of up to 75% for young candidates’ electoral campaigns. “Gen Z 212” responded somewhat tepidly that “these measures must be accompanied by firm measures against corruption and conflicts of interest.”

Then something extraordinary happened: Morocco upset a heavily favored Argentinian team at the 2025 FIFA U-20 World Cup, the youth soccer World Cup, in Chile. Morocco defeated Spain, Brazil, South Korea, the United States, and perennial top seed France to get to the final. Argentina was the only undefeated team and had won the trophy six previous times. On October 19, the young Moroccans beat the offensively and defensively capable Argentinian team 2-0.

Suddenly, many of the same young Moroccans lamenting new stadiums joined the delirium in favor of another huge Moroccan soccer success. Morocco had been the first African or Arab team to reach the Men’s World Cup semifinals in 2022. Its women’s team was reaching new heights as well by unexpectedly qualifying for knockout stages of the 2023 World Cup, the first Arab and North African team to do so. This filled Moroccan youth with pride and is likely to serve to further dampen criticism of soccer stadium construction and refurbishment. But as the monarch and Moroccan youth seem to agree, the country’s political and economic success will depend to a significant degree on greater investment in job creation and services beyond what World Cup success will provide.

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Since 2022, Southern Yemen has been ruled by an odd amalgamation of interests through the Presidential Leadership Council, while in the North the Houthis have consolidated control over the highlands. The Presidential Leadership Council was never meant to be a long-term solution to Yemen’s many problems. Instead, it was designed to paper over a host of internal rivalries and reunify the anti-Houthi coalition as a single bloc. That hasn’t happened for two simple reasons – one internal and one external.

The Presidential Leadership Council is a Yemeni organization, but it was organized and built by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, each of which selected four members for the committee. The problem is that Saudi Arabia and the UAE don’t agree on what to do in Yemen and neither do their proxies. The head of the council, Rashad al-Alimi, who is backed by Saudi Arabia, favors reunifying the entire country, while Aidarous al-Zubaidi, one of the vice presidents on the council, wants an independent Southern state. Zubaidi is also the head of the Southern Transitional Council, which in recent days launched a major military operation in Hadramout and Mahra apparently as a first step toward seizing unilateral control of the South and, potentially, declaring independence. Southern Transitional Council forces took over military bases, check points, and oil fields, sometimes peacefully and sometimes after a short skirmish. Each time they did so, they replaced the Yemeni national flag with the Southern flag, clearly signaling their intentions.

Once again, there is both an internal and an external reason for the Southern Transitional Council’s offensive, which it has labeled “The Promising Future.” On the domestic front, the precipitating spark was a decision by Amr bin Habrish, Hadramout’s deputy governor and a commander of the Hadramout Tribal Alliance, to deploy troops around oil fields in an effort to secure more revenue. Bin Habrish, who is backed by Saudi Arabia, was quickly confronted by troops loyal to the Southern Transitional Council, who used his move as a pretext for military action. Southern Transitional Council troops, which are funded and armed by the UAE, then moved into Mahra, on the border with Oman, positioning themselves to take control over much of Southern Yemen.

At the same time, on December 5, Alimi abandoned the presidential palace in Aden and boarded a flight to Saudi Arabia. The Saudi troops that had been protecting him in Aden also withdrew, clearing the way for the Southern Transitional Council to take control of the presidential palace, the seat of political power in the South. By December 6, bin Habrish had also flown to Saudi Arabia. This meant that, on the ground in Yemen, the Southern Transitional Council held both the Southern capital of Aden as well as the South’s richest governorate – Hadramout. In parts of the South there are already demonstrations, demanding that the Southern Transitional Council declare independence.

However, as some commentators have pointed out, no matter the internal dynamics and jockeying in Yemen, it is unlikely the Southern Transitional Council would have launched an offensive aimed directly at Saudi-backed forces in Yemen without prior consultation with the UAE. It is no secret that Saudi Arabia is looking to extricate itself from Yemen, and the kingdom had been looking to make a deal with the Houthis brokered by Oman. The Southern Transitional Council takeover, at least in the short term, likely complicates those discussions.

What is unclear is whether Saudi proxy forces in Yemen will push back militarily against the Southern Transitional Council and, relatedly, whether it is prepared to declare an independent Southern state and disband the Presidential Leadership Council. Either of these possibilities could spark renewed fighting in the South, which could easily tip Yemen back into a renewed civil war.

Yemen has been broken for years. Saleh pillaged the South after the civil war in 1994, sowing some of the early seeds of state failure. Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi, who succeeded Saleh in 2012, was largely inept, making decisions like splitting the central bank, which only made a bad situation worse. The Presidential Leadership Council is paralyzed by infighting and indecision. The Southern Transitional Council is betting that if the South can be united under a single leadership – its own, of course – it can cordon the South off from the Houthis in the North, utilize oil and gas revenue, and create a stable and functioning state. That is a tall order, and it will likely be contested both internally and externally.

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Sharaa’s Astonishing Emergence

Beyond the shocking, scurrying collapse of the regime and hasty retreat of those suddenly helpless allies, year one in the new Syria played out in a manner that has continued to surprise its people and the international community. Four key aspects were particularly noteworthy in shaping that year. The first was the remarkable political performance of interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa. A leader for whom the phrase “love him or hate him” seems to have been invented, he has astonished observers from the very first days post-Bashar al-Assad with his acumen, ability to forge powerfully beneficial relationships, and gift for managing a treacherous communications environment where a few missteps, clustered together, could have led him and Syria toward a very different first year.

A Quickly Established Set of Foreign Relations

Reinforcing already developing relations with leaderships in Turkey and Qatar, he quickly established a strong bond with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who is influential in the Gulf, the wider Arab and Islamic worlds, and corridors of power from Washington to Europe and beyond. With two visits to Abu Dhabi, he also made substantial progress in developing a relationship with the more skeptical leadership in the United Arab Emirates, though that remains a work in progress. Another key potential regional ally is Egypt, but substantial work also remains to be done there to overcome suspicions about the new Syrian regime’s radical Islamist lineage. While the relationship with Turkey will be important on the security front, as Syria strives to rebuild its shattered security forces and assert control over its territory, the Gulf is likely to play the prime role in helping Syria rebuild, marshaling investment, loans, assistance, and the currency of confidence in international finance to persuade a wider circle of players that Syria’s massive reconstruction challenge represents credible opportunity. The Gulf states’ remarkably improved relations with Turkey over the past four years should allow for concerted efforts in Syria, with each country playing to its strengths on the rebuilding and investment effort. Abu Dhabi’s and Riyadh’s now close relations with Turkey also provide a regional security and geopolitical condominium in which a rebuilding Syria sees its future.

Sharaa has thus far adroitly managed a difficult relationship with Russia, navigating between that leadership’s legacy expectations and long memories of warm relations with the Assad regimes, and his own people’s suspicion of the regime of Russian President Vladimir Putin and raw sense of grievance about the brutality with which Russia prosecuted its air war to prop up the Assad regime. He has spoken realistically about the important military legacies of the relationship with Moscow and moved slowly in dealing with the future of Russia’s two former bases in Syria to give the Syrian people time to move toward his calculating approach.

In managing these relations, as in so much else he has done, Sharaa has demonstrated pragmatism – relying on the vocabulary of investment and technocratic accomplishment, rather than turning to an ideological, Islamist lexicon, and on a cool assessment of Syria’s interests, weaknesses, and potential. It is less clear how he will handle Syria’s challenge on the domestic front, where his and his government’s intentions for representative government and inclusiveness remain opaque. Some of his government’s early steps on constitutional efforts, a national dialogue, and signposts for elections fell flat and signaled elements of uncertainty and calculated obscurity that were not reassuring.

Trump Astonishes as Well

In addition to Sharaa’s remarkable performance, two other aspects of Syria’s year of astonishing political developments stand out. The first is President Donald J. Trump’s decision to embrace the former Islamist warlord who would be president. This was a decisional calculus that first became evident as Trump made the first foreign trip of his new administration to visit the Gulf. He absorbed the counsel of Mohammed bin Salman and – reportedly – Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and moved boldly to develop a relationship with the young leader of Syria. Trump’s confident embrace of Sharaa in Riyadh improved the latter’s global standing and dragged Syria in from the political isolation it had suffered under for decades under the Assads. As important, he signaled through detailed executive action that choking U.S. economic sanctions, layered in on Syria over decades, would be lifted. Trump made this decision and stuck with it despite the dismay and second-guessing of elites across U.S. political aisles. Trump built on this momentum, receiving Sharaa at the White House in November amid unconfirmed breaking reports that the United States would be establishing a military relationship with the new government and was already eyeing some real estate for a small military presence outside Damascus. The move would make sense in the context of Syria’s acceptance of the U.S. invitation to join the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. Any Syrian security relationship with the United States would be established under the rubric of joint cooperation to fight the Islamic State group, with its tenacious, if shadowy, presence in the uncontrolled hinterlands of Syria in the Badiya Desert south of Deir al-Zour province. The United States is already cooperating with its local partner, the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces, in northeast Syria in the fight against ISIS.

At Year’s End, Congress Moves Toward Repeal of Caesar Sanctions

Trump’s embrace of Sharaa and his decision on sanctions leads to the final aspect of momentous developments in the new Syria’s year one: the move by the U.S. Congress, exactly one year after Assad’s ignominious flight to Moscow, toward lifting the legislatively imposed Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act. On December 8, House and Senate leaders finally agreed on the precise language that would lift the Caesar Act sanctions. While these sanctions served their purpose in choking off nearly all investment and reconstruction efforts as Assad clung to power in his final years and put unrelenting pressure on Syria’s economy and financial system, their legal and political rationales had collapsed with the fall of the Assad regime. Trump bulldozed past the hesitation and skepticism of those who mused that perhaps it made sense nevertheless to keep those punishing sanctions on Syria, for leverage against the Sharaa government, despite persuasive evidence the sanctions were also causing widespread humanitarian suffering. The Caesar Act repeal, like the original legislation in 2019 and its fresh five-year extension enacted in late 2024, will be included in the massive 2026 National Defense Authorization Act, for which House passage and presidential signature are expected in the coming days. The Senate has already approved it.

And so, Syria’s decades of living dangerously have folded into a year of astonishing developments. In international relations, states, not people, are the main actors. And as Friedrich Nietzsche wrote, “A state, is called the coldest of cold monsters.” This may be an exaggeration for effect, perhaps, but a needed reminder that Syria’s year of astonishing developments is likely to feed into less astonishing, more pedestrian haggling over progress as the state seeks to consolidate its internal and international position. The key will be the development of a political system, over the long haul, that can register the vastly competing aims and interests still emerging in Syria after decades of authoritarian rule and crushing repression, allow for compromise to emerge, and create a political culture that will still be able to embrace and celebrate such difficult, halting progress.

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