Leaders in the Gulf states largely escaped the whiplash treatment meted out by the administration to allies and adversaries alike. However, this sweet spot, cemented by the commercial and investment partnerships that characterized the first year of Trump’s second term, is offset by the precarity of being on the frontline of increasing U.S.-Iran volatility. Both the June 2025 12-day war between Israel and Iran, which ended with a U.S. attack on Iranian nuclear facilities, and the separate Iranian and Israeli missile strikes on Qatar in June and September 2025, respectively, illustrated the challenges in maintaining order and security in the Gulf and the rising cost of any sustained clash in human as well as political and economic terms.

Multiple dilemmas are metastasizing in U.S.-Gulf relations as the White House has grown increasingly unpredictable and, post-Venezuela intervention, arguably more cavalier in its conduct of foreign policy. Seeming U.S. tolerance for (geo)political uncertainty, globally as well as regionally, cuts against the de-risking approaches of governments in the Gulf, especially in Saudi Arabia, as major economic and energy projects move toward delivery. The planned buildout of artificial intelligence infrastructure in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates would be put at risk from any new or prolonged conflict with Iran. So, too, would the trillions of dollars in pledged investments in the United States made during Trump’s three-country tour of the Gulf in May 2025 and visits of senior figures to the White House in the president’s first year back in office.

AI has rapidly emerged as one of Saudi authorities’ key areas of focus as Vision 2030 enters its final stage, alongside mining and critical minerals as a priority for investment. The prospect of a U.S. strike on Iran came as thousands of delegates attended the fifth annual Future Minerals Forum in Riyadh and the Saudi Arabian Mining Company, known as Maaden, unveiled plans to become one of the biggest commodity producers in the world over the next decade. Large delegations from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE traveled to Davos in Switzerland to participate in the World Economic Forum’s annual meeting, which began on January 19, the same day that DIMDEX, a major maritime defense exhibition, convened in Doha. Dubai, meanwhile, is gearing up to host the annual World Government Summit in early February, as the Gulf states cement their positioning as connectors of capital, energy, and trade flows.

Calls for diplomacy by Gulf officials (which Saudi analysts have been at pains to emphasize were not aimed at influencing the White House either way) likely reflect two points of specific concern at any new escalatory spiral with Iran. The first is a sense of doubt that the Trump administration has a coherent plan that goes beyond a renewed campaign of airstrikes as well as a feeling that military intervention is unlikely to trigger any positive political outcome. Mixed messaging from the Trump administration after the removal of Nicolás Maduro from power in Venezuela may only have amplified feelings of unease that U.S. policymakers lack a “day after” plan. While there is little affinity in Gulf capitals for the regime of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in Tehran, there is also a risk that leadership with its back to the wall and facing decapitation might engage in a desperate last stand by abandoning all restraint in responding to any new kinetic action.

This links to a second point of concern: From a Gulf perspective, “red lines” keep being crossed, and the threshold for getting entangled in conflict seems to draw closer each time. The “tit-for-tat” strikes exchanged by Iran and Israel in April and October 2024 were followed by the June 12-day war, which bypassed the Gulf states during the conflict itself. However, the Iranian decision to respond to the June 22 U.S. bombing of its nuclear sites by striking Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, home to the forward headquarters of U.S. Central Command, the following day, was a significant act of aggression (even if it was choreographed, unlike the Israeli missile strike on Doha in September) against the territory of a Gulf state. The pattern of escalation in each round of conflict has heightened uncertainty over what line may be crossed next, such as the targeting of energy and other critical infrastructure vulnerabilities, including desalination plants, or severe disruption to shipping in the Gulf.

There are multiple reasons why officials in the Gulf Cooperation Council and other regional states wish to de-escalate tensions with Iran. Recent developments in Yemen and the Horn of Africa have highlighted the Saudi interest in avoiding further state collapse and fragmentation of authority in regions deemed vital to the kingdom’s security. Policymakers in Doha are not only aware of the threat of new strikes against Qatar – which would be the third in less than a year – but also cognizant of their large-scale expansion of natural gas liquefaction capacity in the North Field, whose first phase is nearing completion. Their counterparts in Muscat recently unveiled a new five-year development plan and an international financial center as part of Oman’s continuing economic diversification. Leaders in Egypt will not want to see renewed regional instability cast a shadow over the gradual return of international shipping to the Red Sea and passage through the Suez Canal.

Gulf leaders have agency and leverage with the Trump administration, which includes direct as well as indirect channels to the White House, the former through key interlocutors, such as advisors Steven Witkoff and Jared Kushner (both present in Davos) as well as Massad Boulos. Emirati officials are likely seeking clarification from the administration over Trump’s January 13 claim that countries trading with Iran will be hit by new 25% tariffs, given that the UAE is the second-largest trade partner of Iran after China. The UAE and Qatar both signed onto the Pax Silica Declaration in mid-January as part of the U.S.-led initiative to safeguard technology supply chains and integrate U.S. partners into global hi-tech agreements. Such webs of positive interconnectivity present win-win solutions for the United States and Gulf states but need a predictable and reliable decision-making landscape if they are to maximize results.

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These tactics have been used during Iran’s most recent wave of protests that erupted in December 2025. The Iranian government has responded with one of its most severe crackdowns yet, imposing a complete internet blackout across the country that has left the population digitally isolated from the outside world. For nearly a week, international phone lines were also severed, making it extraordinarily difficult for anyone outside Iran to reach family, friends, or sources inside the country. This communications blackout has served a dual purpose: It has prevented protesters from coordinating their activities and documenting regime violence, while simultaneously creating an information vacuum making it nearly impossible for international observers to verify reports of state brutality. The shutdown has demonstrated how digital repression has evolved into an essential tool of authoritarian survival in Iran. It has been be deployed to cut the population’s connection not just to each other but to the rest of the world.

DNS Spoofing

The Domain Name System functions as the internet’s phone book. When a user types a URL, for example “facebook.com,” into a browser, DNS servers translate the domain name into a numerical address that computers use to find a website.

When Iranian users try to visit a blocked website, Iranian authorities can configure DNS servers to redirect them to fake addresses that either show an error page or just do not work. Iranian users can bypass DNS spoofing by using virtual private networks that send DNS requests through an encrypted VPN tunnel to DNS servers outside Iran. Instead of asking Iranian DNS servers, the computer asks the VPN provider’s DNS servers for the real address.

HTTP Filtering

Hypertext Transfer Protocol is the basic protocol that computer browsers use to request web pages. When users click on a link or type a URL, the browser sends an HTTP request that includes information about which website they are trying to reach. Iran’s deep packet inspection system acts like a security guard reading every letter the users post. It examines each request by every user and checks if they are trying to access blocked content. If the system detects the browser is trying to reach blocked content, it can send an error page instead of the real website or simply cut the connection, making it look like the website is not responding.

Iranian users can bypass this with a VPN that encrypts internet traffic before it leaves a user’s system. The government deep packet inspection system can see that there is data flowing to the VPN server, but it cannot read the encrypted content inside.

TLS and SNI Filtering

Transport Layer Security is the encryption that protects users’ data. When a user first connects to a secure website, the browser sends a message that includes the website name in clear text. This is called the Server Name Indication. Even though the rest of the connection is encrypted and private, the deep packet inspection system can still read the website name in that initial message. It is like sending a sealed envelope through the mail, but the address on the outside is visible to anyone handling it.

When Iranian users try to connect to banned sites (such as Instagram, X, or Telegram) using encryption, their browser first sends a message that includes the name of the website. Iran’s internet monitoring system reads that and can immediately cut their connection.

When a user connects to a secure HTTPS website, the SNI is visible even though the rest is encrypted. But when using a VPN, the entire connection to the website – including that initial message – is wrapped in another layer of encryption to the VPN server. Iran’s system can still detect that the system is connecting to a VPN server but not which websites are accessed through it.

Protocol Whitelisting

Different internet applications use different protocols, or sets of rules for communication. Web browsing uses HTTP or HTTPS, email uses Simple Mail Transfer Protocol, and video calls and VPNs use their own specific protocols. Iran’s system uses a whitelist approach that only allows three types of traffic to pass through: DNS (to look up website addresses), HTTP (for regular websites), and HTTPS (for secure websites). Everything else is blocked. This includes Secure Shell connections for remote computer access, custom applications or gaming protocols, peer-to-peer file sharing, and most encrypted communication tools. Protocol whitelisting is also Iran’s most effective measure to disable VPNs.

Traditional VPNs are largely ineffective because of protocol whitelisting at the centralized border gateway. The government does not need to decrypt VPN traffic or identify which websites users are visiting. It simply can block all VPN protocols from connecting in the first place. This is why internet shutdowns by the Iranian government are so effective. By combining multiple filtering layers with protocol whitelisting, the government neutralizes most circumvention tools without having to break encryption.

Border Gateway Protocol Control

Instead of each internet service provider implementing blocking measures separately, Iran has a single control point that all internet traffic passes through. The state-owned Telecommunication Company of Iran designed a system through which all internet traffic must travel through one channel – owned and operated by the state – to leave Iran and reach the global internet. That point of exit is the “border gateway.”

This means every internet provider in Iran essentially blocks the same content in the same way, because it is all being filtered at one central location. The government can instantly tighten or loosen restrictions across the entire country by adjusting one system, not thousands. Even using a different internet provider doesn’t help avoid the censorship, because all traffic eventually passes through this same checkpoint.

Imagine a country with only one international airport. No matter which taxi company is used to get there, everyone has to pass through the same security checkpoint where bags are searched and certain items are confiscated. Iran’s internet works the same way, all traffic funnels through one inspection point before leaving the country.

Building Digital Repression

Iran has not developed its censorship infrastructure in isolation. The regime has received assistance from China, the world’s most experienced practitioner of internet control. Over recent decades, Iran has paid hundreds of millions of dollars to Chinese telecommunication contractors to provide monitoring of landline, mobile, and internet communications. This includes deep packet inspection technology that can track internet users, reconstruct email messages, block internet traffic, and deliver manipulated web pages. As part of their 25 year strategic partnership agreement, the two countries have committed to expand their cooperation in cyberspace. Iran has been able to turn to China’s model of information control while adapting it to local requirements. Notably, Chinese experts have assisted Iran with building its National Information Network, a domestic internet infrastructure designed to function independently of the global internet. Marketed as conforming to Islamic values, the network includes domestic alternatives to search engines, messaging services, social media platforms, email systems, and even smartphone operating systems. For the regime, it provides the technical foundation for isolating Iranian citizens from global information during crises, while simultaneously developing domestic technological expertise that can be deployed for surveillance and control.

Beyond acquiring foreign technology, the Iranian government has pursued a deliberate strategy of building indigenous digital capabilities through what is referred to by local officials as the “jihad of knowledge.” Iran’s strategy for developing the country’s knowledge-based sector and efforts toward the “purification of higher education” have helped the government advance its cyber capabilities. This strategic framework involves training ideologically loyal Iranian tech experts and scientists to advance government projects, investing heavily in developing indigenous cyber capabilities through domestic research institutions and tech companies and collaborating with like-minded authoritarian states to acquire advanced surveillance and censorship technologies.

Internet Shutdowns as Weapons Against Protest

These investments in foreign collaboration and domestic technological development have borne fruit in several internet shutdowns since 2019, deployed primarily to suppress popular uprisings and cut off protesters from organizing tools and global attention.

In 2019, authorities ordered internet service providers and mobile operators to withdraw border gateway protocol routes, which tell the internet how to reach Iranian networks. Following Mahsa Amini’s death and subsequent protests in 2022, Iran adopted a slightly different approach. Rather than a complete blackout, authorities imposed recurring “digital curfews” on mobile networks during evening protest hours. For 13 consecutive days in September and October, mobile providers, such as Irancell and the Mobile Communications Company of Iran, were repeatedly disconnected from international traffic, and then the connections were restored overnight. This targeted strategy allowed the regime to disrupt real-time protest coordination while maintaining connectivity for domestic services and reducing economic damage. It also created psychological uncertainty, as users never knew exactly when access would disappear.

In 2025, following the outbreak of the June conflict with Israel, Iran preserved its global internet presence while using centralized filtering at the national border to block actual access. This “stealth blackout” fooled traditional monitoring tools that rely on routing data. Authorities deployed multiple censorship layers simultaneously: DNS spoofing redirected requests to fake addresses, protocol whitelisting blocked all traffic except basic web browsing, and deep packet inspection examined and filtered individual data packets. The government justified these measures as necessary to protect the country’s digital infrastructure from Israeli cyberattacks. While this claim may have had some legitimacy, the timing and comprehensiveness of the restrictions also revealed fears of popular uprising at a moment when the regime was militarily and politically vulnerable.

Internet shutdowns serve multiple strategic objectives for the Iranian regime. By severing digital connections during protests, authorities prevent real-time mobilization and coordination among demonstrators, making organized resistance far more difficult. The psychological impact on protesters is equally significant. Isolated from global attention and unable to share evidence of state violence, protesters face demoralization and doubt about whether their struggles matter to the outside world. These digital blackouts also create strategic ambiguity for the international community: When journalists, human rights organizations, and policymakers cannot verify what is happening on the ground, they may – in essence be forced to – accept regime narratives that minimize atrocities or justify crackdowns as necessary security measures, given that all nonregime information is shut off. As average citizens remain cut off, senior regime officials, state-owned news agencies, and government propagandists continue to operate online with full access, bypassing the very filtering systems imposed on the population, to give interviews to international media and shape narratives on social platforms. Internet shutdowns also sever the vital connection between protesters inside Iran and opposition diaspora communities. It is useful in slowing down, or dismantling, the formation of effective international solidarity campaigns that can amplify Iranian protesters’ voices and put pressure on foreign governments to respond. The Iranian regime’s internet censorship and shutdowns, therefore, function as comprehensive weapons of political warfare, designed to isolate, demoralize, and ultimately suppress dissent by controlling not just information flows but the very possibility of collective action and international witness.

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Yet, following a series of coups in the Sahel, the presence of Western countries in the region began to shrink, particularly with the withdrawal of French and U.S. military forces from parts of the region. And Iran has moved to fill the geopolitical void, notably providing training and military equipment, such as combat drones and surface-to-air missiles, to Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso.

Iran’s interest in cooperating with the Sahel countries is partially driven by its nuclear program. In 2024, there were reports that Iran was negotiating with Niger’s military, offering advanced military equipment in exchange for access to approximately 300 tons of uranium concentrate from deposits near Arlit in Niger. Iran and Niger denied the deal, which would have been valued at $56 million. The alleged deal may have contributed to tensions with the U.S. military presence in Niger, leading Niger to end its defense cooperation agreement with Washington, prompting a U.S. troop withdrawal.

Iran’s interest in developing closer ties with Niger goes back to the 2010s under the administration of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, with Iran’s focus on its nuclear program, but there has been a notable flurry of activity in recent years. In 2023 an Iranian delegation visited Niger, and a year later the Nigerian prime minister traveled to Tehran. In April 2025, the two countries signed an economic cooperation agreement, followed by a memorandum of understanding in May to expand security coordination.

Iran has also increased engagement with other Sahel countries. In 2022, then Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian visited Mali, and his political affairs advisor, Ali Bagheri Kani, visited Burkina Faso in 2023. In September 2023, the foreign minister of Burkina Faso visited Tehran to meet with Ebrahim Raisi, who was Iran’s president at the time before his death in 2024. In October 2024 Burkina Faso and Iran signed a memorandum of understanding on civil nuclear cooperation. Talks on closer cooperation in this field have been taking place with Mauritania as well.

Tehran is also looking to advance commercial and investment relations to help weather the sanctions regime. Deals between Iran and the military elites of African countries could potentially provide Iranian companies with the opportunity to exploit local natural resources and mitigate the effect of Western sanctions. In 2024, Iran held “Expo 2024,” to present Iranian products to African and other international importers, and the “Iran-Africa Economic Cooperation Conference,” to discuss international trade.

Iran’s efforts to increase its presence in the Sahel region through trade and arms deals not only have significant economic benefits, but they are part of a broader strategy aimed at reducing Iran’s isolation on the international stage. Tehran is also interested in expanding its beleaguered “axis of resistance” network beyond the more traditional boundaries of the Middle East, and the Western withdrawal from the Sahel presents an opportunity to fill in the security void. Iran is also using soft power through television, radio, and cultural events to appeal to Shia communities, particularly in Mali, Mauritania, and Niger.

With its “axis of resistance” severely degraded since the start of the Gaza war, Tehran saw an opening in the Sahel to partially compensate for its foreign policy failures in the Middle East. Tehran has also tried to capitalize on the sympathy that has arisen in the Sahel region toward the Palestinians and, at the same time, widen a wedge among African countries and Washington that has emerged in recent years.

Iran also seeks to limit Israel’s influence in the Sahel. In late 2024, Tehran proposed setting up a joint economic and trade commission with Sudan. This followed the restoration of diplomatic ties severed since the mid-2010s. Iran wants to limit the impact of the Abraham Accords and Sudan’s normalization of ties with Israel. Iran has also reportedly supplied the Sudanese Armed Forces with modern weaponry, such as Ababil-3 and Mohajer-6 drones, which allowed the Sudanese Armed Forces to regain the upper hand with a decisive counteroffensive and retake the capital Khartoum from the Rapid Support Forces in March 2025. In May, Iran also signed a security treaty with Ethiopia. That agreement envisions closer Iranian-Ethiopian collaboration on issues such as prevention of cross-border crime as well as military training.

On their end, Sahel countries that have been traditionally dominated by Western countries are also working to diversify their foreign relations and are bringing Iran into the mix. Despite its efforts and mixed success, Tehran is not as well positioned to play a central role in the Sahel as powers such as Russia, China, and even Turkey. Over the past year, Ankara has expanded its links with the Sahel region through humanitarian aid via the Turkish Red Crescent, Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency, and Maarif Foundation (an educational foundation). Turkey has also increased military ties, supplying drones to Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali. Moreover, Chad and Turkey reportedly reached an agreement for Ankara to take control of a military base in Abéché, which previously hosted French troops. In July 2025, Turkey and Niger signed a military cooperation agreement.

Iran is attempting to present itself to the Sahel countries as a reliable partner in the fight against Sunni jihadist groups and a partner in promoting regime stability. At the same time, it is trying to build lucrative commercial and investment deals. Iran still has many tentative areas of military-technical cooperation with the Sahel countries that are not yet fully developed. Given its perceived interests and invested effort to date in the Sahel, Iran’s engagement with the region is likely to increase, fed by the cascade of foreign policy setbacks it has suffered closer to home. Moreover, Western countries’ apparently accelerating retreat from the Sahel will almost certainly create additional opportunities for Iran to exploit.

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The Islamic Republic is under severe and mounting pressure, yet its collapse is neither imminent nor inevitable. The current protest wave instead reflects a progressive narrowing of the regime’s strategic options. Iran’s leadership is approaching a critical juncture: It can either pursue a Venezuelan-style accommodation with President Donald J. Trump – potentially entailing leadership change while preserving the regime’s core institutions – or remain on a trajectory of economic deterioration, recurrent mass protest, and the gradual erosion of cohesion within the security services, a process that could ultimately culminate in regime collapse. This latter path would be significantly accelerated should the United States resume military strikes against Iran’s coercive institutions.

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Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s visit to Washington comes at a moment of strategic uncertainty in the Middle East. The United States, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Iran are all recalibrating their policies in the aftermath of the 12-day conflict in June, which reshaped assumptions about Israel’s willingness to strike Iranian targets and exposed weaknesses in Iran’s deterrence posture. Riyadh will likely arrive with two seemingly contradictory objectives regarding Iran. First, the kingdom is looking to secure a formal U.S.-Saudi security pact to deter Iran. Second, Saudi Arabia may explore avenues for indirect mediation between Washington and Tehran to reduce U.S. pressure on Iran and limit the risk of Iranian retaliation against Saudi oil facilities and maritime shipping. This dual strategy reflects Saudi Arabia’s core dilemma – how to contain Iran while minimizing the costs and risks of containment.

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Iran, through its navy and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ navy, regularly conducts maritime drills in this strategic waterway; however, the recent naval exercise was the first since the 12-day conflict with Israel and the U.S. strike on Iranian nuclear sites. The timing, assets involved, and weapon systems tested give critical insights into Iran’s military posturing amid sustained tensions.

The Drill

Rear Admiral Abbas Hassani, commander of the Iranian navy’s second naval region, stated that the exercise was designed to demonstrate Iran’s combat readiness and deterrent capabilities. The drill featured a balanced yet noteworthy mix of precision-guided cruise missiles, surface combatants, and electronic warfare assets.

On the missile front, Iran showcased a broad spectrum of domestically manufactured anti-ship cruise systems, including the 21-mile-range Nadir-1, assessed as capable of sinking 1,500-ton targets, such as corvettes or coastal feeder ships; 124-mile-range Ghader; and 186-mile-range Ghadir.

Despite Tehran’s ability to field modern indigenous air defense capabilities, the accompanying surface combatants highlighted its continued reliance on aging naval platforms.

The Alvand-class frigate Sabalan successfully destroyed a designated sea target with a Ghadir missile. Originally commissioned in 1972, the Sabalan has been technologically surpassed by newer Mowj-class frigates but remains a potent asset thanks to periodic upgrades and the reported capacity to carry up to 16 anti-ship missiles.

The Hendijan-class auxiliary ship Ganaveh, in service since the late 1980s, participated in the drill as both a missile gunboat and launch platform for unmanned aerial vehicles, most likely Ababil-2 drones. Produced by Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industries, the Ababil family is a series of cost-effective tactical drones. The Ababil-2 variant is a low-technology, long-range UAV that can be configured for either loitering munition or intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions.

Despite the evident age of these platforms, their continued deployment reflects Tehran’s strategy of extending the service life of legacy platforms by equipping them with modern, indigenous weapon systems.

Velayat-II onshore missile systems were deployed for coastal defense, with the truck-mounted launchers firing multiple Ghader missiles against offshore surface targets. Electronic warfare units simulated radar and communication jamming operations while also effectively testing man-portable electronic warfare devices to counter incoming hostile threats.

The exercise demonstrated Iran’s continued ability to conduct operations in the Gulf of Oman and adjacent sea lanes to prevent an adversary from entering the country’s mainland by engaging it at sea. The drill also showed Iran maintains capabilities to degrade an opponent’s combat effectiveness within a defined area of operations.

Ultimately, placing the Iranian navy’s second naval region command in charge of the drill highlighted the growing relevance of the theater east of the Strait of Hormuz in Iran’s defense posture. This move and the inauguration of Iran’s Bandar-e Jask naval base in January reflect  Tehran’s intention to strengthen its military basing and logistics beyond the Gulf. While the facility currently has a light military footprint, with key berthing and personnel infrastructure still under construction, its opening demonstrates Iran’s increasing resolve to play a more active role in the high seas.

Dual Messaging

Iran regularly conducts naval exercises in the Gulf of Oman and northern Indian Ocean, such as the February three-day missile drill between the Iranian navy and IRGC aerospace force. Aimed at improving combat readiness, these exercises also demonstrate Tehran’s interest in intensifying military operations to reinforce deterrence and project power to both foreign and domestic audiences. This approach is especially evident during periods of heightened political or security pressure on the regime. Considering that it was Iran’s first drill after the 12-day conflict with Israel, the “Sustainable Power” missile exercise appears to follow this pattern.

Iran has been facing one of the most severe strategic setbacks in decades. Israel’s targeted strikes on Iran’s missile systems, strategic facilities, and senior figures in the nuclear and military establishment not only exposed significant gaps in the air defense architecture but also severely degraded its conventional retaliatory capabilities. More critical, the limited effectiveness of large-scale barrages against Israel and the rapid depletion of medium-range missile stockpiles sharply undercut Iran’s ballistic missile-based deterrence strategy against Israel.

Consequently, the decreasing value of its missile force as a viable counterforce to Israel’s capabilities, coupled with the reduced combat effectiveness of its proxy allies, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, intensified pressure on Iran to resort to alternative kinetic instruments to restore deterrence against Israel. Driving up the costs of Israeli military actions for Gulf Arab countries and the United States emerged as a calculated tactical and strategic response for the Iranian leadership.

This is exemplified by the June 23 ballistic missile strike on Al Udeid Air Base in Doha, which is home to the U.S. Central Command forward headquarters. While Iran officially framed it as retaliation for the United States’ strikes on Iranian nuclear sites, the attack was a symbolic, highly scripted, punitive demonstration offering Iran a strategic offramp to prevent the spiral into broader military escalation and reestablish its missile deterrent credibility, at least temporarily. This balancing act reflects Tehran’s broader dual messaging strategy: simultaneously showcasing the ability to regionalize the burden of what it routinely describes as Israel’s military adventurism while signaling restraint to avoid direct and uncontrollable escalation with the United States.

Similarly, the area of operations, assets involved, and capabilities demonstrated in the “Sustainable Power” exercise suggest its intended audience was less Israel than Iran’s Gulf Arab neighbors as well as U.S. military bases and assets stationed across the region.

First, the selection of the Gulf of Oman and northern Indian Ocean as a theater for “Sustainable Power” is not accidental. These waterways are critical shipping arteries sustaining trade and energy flows between Asia, Africa, and Europe. As Gulf economies grow increasingly dependent on maritime commercial routes, they have a low risk tolerance for severe maritime disruptions. Iran’s naval strategy purportedly leverages this fragility, as showcased by recent threats to close the Strait of Hormuz, the strategic chokepoint connecting the semi-enclosed Gulf waters to the open seas.

Still, these might be relatively empty threats. While Iran possesses the means to temporarily disrupt maritime traffic, it lacks the operational capabilities to enforce a sustained blockade. Moreover, the strait is a critical lifeline for Iran itself; any attempt to close it would risk further damaging its already battered economy.

Second, the Iranian navy, rather than the IRGC navy, took the helm in the drill. While this fits under the Iranian navy’s conventional mandate over this maritime region, the choice also serves a more strategic purpose. It projects resilience in Tehran’s regular armed forces, signaling that its conventional military capabilities are still effective, even though IRGC asymmetric warfare tools remain available.

Third, although the missiles and drones deployed during the naval exercise cannot reach Israel, they underscore a compelling threat vector to littoral countries and U.S. forward bases. Iran’s ability to harass commercial vessels and challenge coastal installations in the Gulf is the very core of its anti-access/area-denial posture. By operating in these maritime theaters, Iran signals that even limited-range missile systems can be strategically repurposed for exercising sustained coercive pressure closer to its shores rather than launching deep-range strategic strikes.

The Perils of Ambiguity

In the face of the fragile Iran-Israel cease-fire announced by President Donald J. Trump, Tehran is likely to maintain its dual messaging approach: continuing to display deterrent capabilities tailored to target – however gingerly – the regional interests of its Gulf neighbors and the United States while avoiding entanglement in head-on military confrontations with the United States and Israel. However, this calibrated exercise of moderate coercive diplomacy carries risks.

Chief among these are jeopardizing the fragile detente carefully built with the Gulf Arab countries over the past five years and fueling misinterpretations about Iran’s long-term strategic intentions. Indeed, if it is true that Iran carefully framed the missile attack on the Al Udeid Air Base uniquely as a retaliatory action for the U.S. strikes on its nuclear facilities rather than an attack on Qatar’s sovereignty, the barrage of ballistic missiles also showcased Tehran’s resolve to regionalize the costs of Israel’s military campaigns. Similarly, the “Sustainable Power” exercise feeds into Iran’s dual messaging approach.

However, the overall impact of Iranian naval drills on the threat perceptions of Gulf capitals can be mitigated, at least partially, through high-level consultations between defense officials. Although it is unlikely that Iranian military planners informed their Gulf counterparts in advance about the nature of the drill, Tehran has simultaneously doubled down on diplomacy with its neighbors, as showcased by the recent meetings between Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and top Saudi leaders. Such engagements can help clarify Iran’s long-term intentions, reduce the scope for misinterpretation surrounding its military activities, and signal its interest in sustaining dialogue with neighbors despite episodes of coercive signaling.

Yet, whether such diplomacy can offset the mistrust generated by the June 23 missile barrage, highly visible displays of military power, and decades of Gulf states’ concern about Iranian threats remains uncertain. From a Gulf Arab standpoint, the juxtaposition of conciliatory outreach and assertive military posturing underscores the enduring ambiguity of Iran’s regional strategy.

In the current security context, Iran has shown little appetite for a full-scale regional military confrontation, suggesting a preference for pragmatic, rational adjustments over open-ended escalation in an uncertain threat environment. Yet, with the cease-fire with Israel unlikely to endure and nuclear negotiations growing more tense, this calibrated posture may shift, pushing Tehran toward a more confrontational strategy.

Should this occur, likely courses of action for Iran could include intensifying the frequency and scale of military exercises, leveraging its broad repertoire of asymmetric tools – from sabotage operations to merchant vessel seizures and targeted proxy attacks – and issuing more direct threats to the strategic interests of Gulf capitals.

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On August 5, President Masoud Pezeshkian appointed Ali Larijani secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, a role he previously held from 2005-07. This time, he returns to an institutionally altered system and a strategically transformed landscape.

With Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei aging, under threat of assassination, and largely withdrawn from day-to-day command, strategic decisions increasingly emerge from a de facto collective leadership composed of the heads of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches alongside representatives of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the army. Regionally, Israel’s September 17, 2024 electronic attacks that neutralized Hezbollah’s networks, the collapse of the regime of President Bashar al-Assad in Syria, and the exposure of Iranian missile and drone vulnerabilities during the June conflict between Israel and Iran have eroded two pillars of Tehran’s deterrence – proxies and missiles – leaving the nuclear program the principal remaining lever to restore balance. Domestically, the state braces for renewed unrest driven by electricity shortages, water scarcity, sanctions, and inflation.

An Iraqi-born native of Najaf but an unmistakably Iranian nationalist, Larijani is expected to leverage his record of bureaucratic competence and global fluency to coordinate Iran’s security bureaucracy. Yet strategic coherence is far from assured. As with his predecessors, entrenched factionalism, institutional rivalries, and Khamenei’s habit of nurturing parallel command structures are likely to constrain his room for maneuver and complicate interagency discipline. A calculating hard-liner, with equal measures of opportunism, pragmatism, and Iranian nationalism shaping his political decision making, he is likely to be a wily operator.  While these traits may prove woefully inadequate in allowing him to effectively steer Iran’s national security establishment at perhaps its most critical moment since the revolution, he also seems the best talent this regime could identify from its thinning bench.

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Iran is looking to capitalize on this diminishing confidence in the United States as a security guarantor. Tehran is now seeking to draw Doha and other regional capitals closer while rallying broader opposition to the U.S.-Israeli alliance across the Muslim world. Yet, despite its rhetorical positioning and symbolic gestures, Tehran’s ability to bring Qatar and other Gulf states into its sphere of influence remains significantly limited.

Tehran’s Narrative Strategy in the Gulf

Since its establishment in 1979, the Islamic Republic of Iran has consistently framed the United States as a destabilizing force in the Gulf. Tehran has spent decades, to little effect, urging the Western-aligned Gulf Arab states to abandon their reliance on Washington for security, arguing instead that local actors themselves are best positioned to safeguard regional stability.

In 2019, Iran advanced this position with the launch of the Hormuz Peace Endeavor – an initiative calling for GCC members and Iran to jointly assume responsibility for the region’s security, free from foreign intervention. Long portraying the United States as an opportunistic power serving its own hegemonic interests, Tehran has warned that dependence on U.S. protection exposes GCC states to profound vulnerabilities.

Iran cites events including the September 2019 attacks on Saudi Aramco facilities (which U.S. authorities found evidence that Iran was behind despite initial claims of responsibility from Yemen’s Houthis) and NATO’s chaotic and botched withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021 as evidence of the failures of U.S.-centric security arrangements. While Iran’s messaging about the withdrawal from Afghanistan resonated for a period and fed into Gulf concerns about reduced U.S. security focus, efforts to message the Aramco attacks never got traction because of strong Gulf conviction about Iranian involvement. Tehran has also appealed to shared religious and cultural identities to foster solidarity with GCC members, framing their close ties with Washington as a betrayal of regional independence and pan-Islamic unity. While Iran’s efforts to position itself as a credible alternative to Western security guarantees have met with little practical success, this narrative remains a central theme in its diplomatic outreach to neighboring Arab states.

Despite Iran’s own late-June missile attack on Qatar, Tehran views Israel’s September 9 strike as an event that can breathe new life into its long-standing message that Gulf Arab states should reduce their dependence on U.S. security guarantees. While Washington’s actions over the past two decades – from the 2003 invasion of Iraq to the signing of the Iran nuclear deal in 2015 and the U.S.-British airstrikes on Houthi targets in Yemen in 2024 – unsettled GCC capitals, those episodes were largely seen as examples of flawed or destabilizing U.S. policy. Similarly, Gulf states’ frustration with U.S. (in)action during key moments – such as the fallout from the Arab Spring uprisings, the 2019 Aramco attacks, and the 2022 Houthi strikes on Abu Dhabi – fueled doubts about Washington’s reliability. Yet none of these incidents involved the United States enabling a hostile power to attack a GCC state. The Israeli operation against Qatar – trailed by media accounts accusing the United States of advanced knowledge and even complicity – has introduced an unprecedented breach of trust. In this context, Gulf states are reassessing their security strategies, underscored by Saudi Arabia’s decision to sign a defense pact with nuclear-armed Pakistan just eight days after the strike on Qatar. While these negotiations predated the Israeli attack and fit within a decades-old Saudi-Pakistani security relationship, Riyadh’s and Islamabad’s messaging regarding the pact, with a focus on Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities and its willingness to share all its defense capabilities with its Gulf partner, seemed clearly and pointedly shaped by the Israeli attack on Qatar.

Gulf Responses and Strategic Calculations

In a September 15 address to the joint Arab-Islamic summit in Doha, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian called for Islamic unity in the face of Israel’s “war against the sovereignty, dignity, and future of Muslim nations” and the threat of “Zionist dominance.” In Iran, some media narratives have portrayed the Israeli strike on Qatar as a potential catalyst for a realignment of GCC states toward closer ties with Tehran at the expense of their traditional security relationships with Washington. However, others have expressed skepticism, arguing that unless GCC states move to expel U.S. military forces from their territories, the summit’s outcomes will amount to little more than symbolic rhetoric with no substantive shift in regional power dynamics.

Although the unprecedented Israeli strike on Qatar gives Tehran a unique opportunity to amplify its message urging Gulf states to reconsider reliance on the United States, it is extremely unlikely to lead to a severing of GCC-U.S. defense cooperation. Moreover, while Gulf states’ confidence in the U.S. security umbrella continues to significantly erode, Pakistan and Turkey – far more than Iran – seem poised to play a growing role in Gulf security strategies. Deep-rooted mistrust, divergent strategic interests, and the enduring institutional ties between Gulf states and Washington all severely dim the prospects for a decisive GCC-wide pivot toward Iran as a security partner.

Despite a growing perception in the Gulf that Israel now represents the region’s primary destabilizing force, the GCC states, to varying degrees, continue to hold security concerns about Iran. Although Qatar has maintained a mostly pragmatic and cooperative relationship with Tehran since the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988, officials in Doha remember the Iranian strike on Al Udeid Air Base just two and a half months before Israel’s attack on the Qatari capital. As long as Qatar hosts CENTCOM’s forward headquarters, policymakers in Doha and other Gulf capitals are likely to remain wary of the potential for future Iranian targeting of the base – and possibly other military installations in GCC states hosting U.S. forces – especially if hostilities between Iran and Israel reignite, possibly leading Tehran to reconsider its strategy of rapprochement and de-escalation with Gulf states. Some analysts insist the best leverage Iran has to push Washington to restrain Israel would be Iranian attacks on Gulf oil targets, causing spikes in oil prices that would worry the administration of President Donald J. Trump.

Even if it is unable to change Gulf states’ calculations regarding U.S. military installations, Iran may benefit from the fallout of Israel’s military operation in Qatar through its impact on Arab-Israeli normalization processes. While neither the United Arab Emirates nor Bahrain has withdrawn from the Abraham Accords in response to the Israeli strike on Qatar, both face mounting pressure to distance themselves from Israel. Given Iran’s perception of Gulf-Israel cooperation as a “strategic nightmare,” any shift that compels Abu Dhabi and Manama to reconsider the depth of their engagement with Israel – or deters other states, such as Saudi Arabia, from considering normalizing ties with Israel – is welcomed by Iran.

Ultimately, although the Israeli strike on Qatar has exposed new fault lines in the Gulf’s security landscape and created space for Iran to amplify its anti-American and anti-Israeli narratives, Tehran’s strategic position remains fundamentally constrained. Deep-seated mistrust between Iran and Western-backed Gulf Arab states and entrenched defense ties between GCC members and the United States limit Iran’s ability to translate rhetorical gains into meaningful geopolitical shifts. Still, the fallout from the attack has introduced greater fluidity into regional alignments, pressuring some Arab states to reassess the costs of close ties with Israel and dependence on an increasingly unreliable Washington. All this has fed Gulf nervousness about Washington and Israel. For Iran, this moment presents an opportunity to advance its narrative and diplomatic aims, even as enduring structural constraints continue to impede its efforts to reshape the Gulf’s security architecture in its favor.

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Since Israel and Iran, under U.S. pressure, agreed to a cease-fire on June 24, most Iranian analysts have anticipated a resumption of hostilities. In their view, Israel pursued not only the destruction of Iran’s nuclear program but also regime change in Tehran and, perhaps, even the country’s partition through civil war. Although Israel and the United States succeeded in destroying most of Iran’s nuclear capabilities, the regime’s political leadership remains intact, and the decentralized Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ collective command structure secured both the organization’s survival and, by extension, the regime’s, despite the top-level decapitations on day one of the war.

Should the Israeli leadership resume the war to pursue its unmet objectives, it is unlikely to face significant deterrence. Hezbollah is fighting for its survival as an armed force in Lebanon, and other Iranian proxies and allies, such as Yemen’s Houthis, do not pose a strategic threat to Israel. Iran lacks robust air-defense systems, leaving its skies vulnerable to the Israeli air force. Iranian missiles struggle to penetrate multilayered Israeli and allied air-defense networks. And, following Israel’s bombardment of Iran’s defense industries, the IRGC is likely struggling to replenish its missile stockpiles, particularly hypersonic missiles.

Khamenei himself recognizes the dangers of the limbo in which Iran remains, neither at war nor at peace, yet his recommendations increasingly resemble sermons rather than actionable policy. Meanwhile, the collective leadership’s choices appear confined to three equally unattractive options, as outlined by the Supreme National Security Council-affiliated Nour News Agency: “unconditional surrender,” as demanded but left undefined by President Donald J. Trump; a middle course that buys the regime time to weigh its options; and, if technically feasible, “leaving the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty,” or a dash for a nuclear weapon.

Of the three options, the first seems least likely: No one, perhaps not even Trump, clearly knows what he means by “unconditional surrender.” Does he envisage the capitulations of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan in 1945, or something narrower, such as Iran’s renunciation of uranium enrichment on its own soil? What, in exchange, could the regime expect from Washington, and why should Iranian leaders trust the United States to honor any such accord? What shields Iran’s leaders from the fate that befell Libyan dictator Muammar Qaddafi? Separately, regardless of the U.S. position, why would Israel accept anything short of regime change and the partition of Iran?

Iran’s collective leadership may instead pursue a middle course designed to buy time while it weighs its options. Under this scenario, Tehran would continue tactical negotiations with the United States and European powers while simultaneously employing the Houthis to launch – or threaten to launch – limited attacks on Saudi or Emirati oil infrastructure and shipping, given the right pretexts. The expectation would be that oil producers and importers, fearful of disruption, would pressure Israel to honor the current cease-fire and thereby prevent or stop any further attacks on Gulf energy producers. Yet this strategy carries considerable risks and uncertainties: What if Israel or the Arab states retaliate by striking Iran’s own oil facilities, assets the regime can scarcely afford to rebuild? And is Tehran truly prepared to jeopardize the diplomatic gains it has secured with restoration of relations with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi for the sake of such a gamble? While IRGC analysts argue that Iran has not significantly benefitted from the detente with the Arab states and appear willing to run these risks, civilian politicians and some IRGC power brokers are more cautious, fearing that such actions could accelerate the regime’s isolation and vulnerability. Any eventual move in this direction would be a clear indication the regime feels its survival is at risk, the only eventuality that could justify such a risky strategy.

If technically feasible, a dash for the bomb could also tempt Iranian decision makers eager to restore the “balance of terror” with Israel. On September 3, Reuters, citing a confidential International Atomic Energy Agency report, revealed that on June 13, the day Israel launched its preemptive strikes, Iran possessed 440.9 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60%, close to weapons grade. If taken to higher levels, this stockpile could provide enough fissile material for roughly 10 nuclear weapons. Whether Iran managed to remove the enriched uranium from its facilities before the Israeli and U.S. bombardment remains uncertain as does the timeline for Tehran to covertly build and operate centrifuges capable of producing weapons-grade uranium. Such a course of action would entail significant risks, above all detection by Israel and the United States and the likelihood of further military strikes. This scenario, too, is likely to be backed by some in the IRGC leadership, with civilian politicians’ support depending on their assessment of the regime’s immediate risks.

In the face of these unenviable choices, Iran’s collective leadership appears paralyzed, unwilling to accept responsibility, and eager to avoid blame. It is hemmed in not just by the daunting external threats but by the regime’s long years in power and steady drain in public support and legitimacy. Yet indecision is itself a decision, and one with potentially perilous consequences.

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