A Bumpy Couple of Decades

It has been a turbulent period for Qatari-Emirati relations. Post-Arab Spring, the states were on opposite sides of the defining debate that underpinned Arab politics: whether to accommodate or suppress Islamist movements. More than merely disagreeing philosophically, each side actively supported its own genre of proxy partner around the region. From Libya to Syria to Egypt, and more recently the Horn of Africa, Qatari and Emirati proxies frequently found themselves ranged against one another in a shadow competition for regional influence.

This divergence became acute when the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Egypt launched a boycott of Qatar in June 2017. The boycott severed land, sea, and air links, expelled Qatari nationals, and sought to economically strangle the small peninsular state. The measures disrupted everything from food supply chains to family connections across borders. When the boycott was lifted in January 2021 through the Al-Ula Declaration, it was difficult to see how Qatari leaders could readily forgive and forget.

Signals From DIMDEX

The context of the Barzan-EDGE announcement is itself instructive in this regard, however. DIMDEX 2026 featured a notably large Emirati presence, with EDGE Group occupying one of the exhibition’s more prominent pavilions. Beyond mere attendance, the UAE committed as a tier one sponsor – a significant financial and symbolic investment in a Qatari showcase. The signing ceremony was accorded prime billing on the first day: a choreographed moment, paid for, invested in, and honored by both parties. Such gestures carry weight in Gulf politics, where symbolism and protocol serve as a parallel language of statecraft. Whether this reflects genuine strategic alignment or carefully managed optics remains an open question, but the investment of prestige by both parties suggests at minimum a shared interest in demonstrating reconciliation.

The Logic of Collaboration

Beyond the symbolism, there are sound rationales for Qatari-Emirati defense cooperation. Given EDGE’s broader portfolio and more mature technological base, the Emirati firm would likely serve as the primary provider of technology and expertise, with Barzan contributing limited market access, perhaps facilities, and capital. For Qatar, such an arrangement offers an accelerated path to defense industrial capability – where indigenous development might take a decade or more, partnership with a more established regional player compresses timelines considerably. This represents a marriage of convenience, certainly, but also a pragmatic recognition that smaller states seeking world-class defense capabilities benefit from pooling resources rather than duplicating efforts in isolation.

The deeper significance of this joint venture may lie in what it suggests about evolving attitudes toward intra-Gulf competition. For decades, the Gulf states have pursued parallel development strategies characterized more by rivalry than coordination. Each has sought to build national champions across sectors from aviation to finance to defense, often duplicating investments and competing for the same markets, talent, and prestige.

This competitive dynamic has produced impressive individual achievements but at considerable collective cost. That the UAE successfully launched a mission to Mars years before a train link to any other Gulf capital speaks to the domestic focus at the expense of meaningful regional integration.

Smaller Gulf states, such as Qatar, Kuwait, and the UAE, can afford competitive inefficiency for decades yet. Hydrocarbon revenue, sovereign wealth, and relatively small populations provide ample buffers against the costs of duplication. The question is whether affordability is the same as wisdom. As these states pursue economic diversification and knowledge economies less dependent on resource extraction, the logic of competition becomes less compelling and the benefits of coordination more apparent. Defense industries, with their high fixed costs and long development cycles, are precisely the sector where the case for collaboration is strongest.

Trust, Time, and Tentative Steps

None of this is to suggest that the Barzan-EDGE joint venture represents a fundamental transformation of Gulf politics or that the wounds of the boycott have healed. Trust, once broken, rebuilds slowly. Qatari policymakers would be imprudent to assume that the interests that drove the boycott have disappeared entirely, and Emirati leaders presumably remain wary of a neighbor whose regional alignments and media influence they sought so dramatically to curtail.

What the joint venture does suggest is that both sides see value in building institutional frameworks that create shared interests. Defense industrial partnerships, once established, generate their own constituencies and path dependencies. Joint development programs create stakeholders on both sides invested in the relationship’s continuation. In this sense, the Barzan-EDGE venture may be less an expression of existing trust than an instrument for building it – a calculated bet that shared projects can forge connections that diplomatic rhetoric alone cannot.

Whether this bet pays off will depend on factors beyond the control of either defense conglomerate: the evolution of regional alignments, the management of future disagreements, and the depth of commitment on both sides to making the partnership succeed when political winds shift. The Gulf has witnessed rapprochements before that proved superficial when tested by competing interests.

For now, the joint venture stands as a notable marker on an uncertain path. In a region where trust is scarce and history casts long shadows, such investment is itself significant – even if the full measure of reconciliation remains to be seen.

The post A Tentative Trust: What the Barzan-EDGE Deal Reveals About Gulf Reconciliation appeared first on AGSI.

The UAE and Serbia’s distinctive partnership is marked by high-level ties, with UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan and Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic sharing a strong personal rapport bolstered by multiple visits in recent years. But bilateral ties have not always been warm. During the 1990s and 2000s, relations were significantly strained. Amid the breakup of Yugoslavia, the UAE supported Bosniak forces during the 1992-95 Bosnian war and was one of a few Arab states that backed NATO’s military campaign against Slobodan Milosevic’s regime in 1999. The Gulf country also contributed troops to NATO’s peacekeeping mission in Kosovo and was the first Arab state to recognize Kosovo in 2008.

The relationship began to evolve in the late 2000s and early 2010s, as Serbia, while reeling from the 2008-09 global financial crisis, sought urgently needed foreign direct investment, making the Gulf an increasingly important region for Belgrade to cultivate closer ties. From 2010-19, the UAE became Serbia’s fourth-largest foreign direct investor – trailing only the European Union, Russia, and China. In 2025, a comprehensive economic partnership agreement between the UAE and Serbia came into effect, designed to enhance bilateral trade, investment, and private sector cooperation across key sectors, such as renewable energy, agriculture, logistics, and technology. By reducing or eliminating duties on more than 96% of tariff lines, the agreement is expected to significantly boost trade between Serbia and its leading Gulf Cooperation Council trading partner. Notably, this comprehensive economic partnership agreement with Serbia became the UAE’s 10th to come into force.

Beyond the economic benefits of bilateral ties, relations with the UAE and other Middle Eastern countries have enabled the Vucic government to frame Belgrade’s ties with the Islamic world in markedly positive terms, emphasizing cooperation, stability, and economic partnerships – language that contrasts sharply with Serbia’s pariah status and the Islamophobic rhetoric of the 1990s, when Vucic and other officials in the Milosevic regime were associated with nationalist anti-Muslim discourse.

Over the years, the UAE has come to view Serbia as a strategically attractive destination for investment, owing to its geographic position at the crossroads of Central Europe and the Balkan Peninsula and between the European Union and Middle East. Serbia has also been particularly important to the UAE for food security. With the desert country heavily reliant on food imports, Emirati entities, such as the UAE Development Fund and Al Dahra agriculture company, have invested heavily in Serbia’s agricultural sector.

The UAE’s overseas investment approach, with investments typically state coordinated, politically supported, and negotiated at the government-to-government level rather than on purely commercial terms, has proved particularly appealing to the Vucic government. It has also likely functioned more smoothly within Serbia’s political and institutional environment than it would in a European Union member state, where transparency requirements, rule-of-law standards, and anti-corruption regulations are far more stringent than in a Balkan country outside the bloc.

Belgrade Waterfront: Flagship Investment

The most high-profile Emirati investments in Serbia have come from UAE-based developer Eagle Hills. Since 2015, Eagle Hills has been playing a major role in the financing and construction of the Belgrade Waterfront – a vast mixed-use development project promised to attract 3.5 billion euros (approximately $4.1 billion) in investments along the Sava River. The project has played a significant role in reshaping Belgrade’s skyline, lending it a distinctly Dubai-inspired profile, and positioning the city as an emerging European capital seeking to narrow the gap with its Western European counterparts. Its realization has been heavily facilitated by close coordination at the highest levels of leadership in the UAE and Serbia, firmly rooted in broader diplomatic ties.

At the same time, Eagle Hills’ involvement in the Belgrade Waterfront has not been without controversy. Allegations of corruption, deaths of construction workers, and illegal demolitions to expedite construction, alongside environmental concerns and limited transparency, have generated substantial criticism and public discontent within segments of Serbian society.

Aviation Ties and Strategic Connectivity

In 2013, Etihad Airways acquired a 49% stake in Serbia’s national carrier, Air Serbia, playing a central role in the rebranding and management of the former Jat Airways. In 2020, Etihad reduced its ownership stake to 18% as the Serbian government recapitalized the airline to help it during the coronavirus pandemic crisis. Despite this substantial divestment, the partnership proved instrumental in strengthening Belgrade’s air connectivity not only with the UAE but also with the wider Gulf region. By 2023, Air Serbia had returned to full state ownership. Nevertheless, bilateral cooperation in the aviation sector endured, including a codeshare agreement concluded between Etihad Airways and Air Serbia in 2024.

Defense and Arms Cooperation

The arms trade is a key pillar of Emirati-Serbian relations. In 2013, Serbia and the UAE announced their first arms deal, estimated at $214 million. The partnership has continued through ammunition sales and joint projects. It offers Serbia access to lucrative Middle Eastern arms markets, as it seeks to expand its presence as a global arms supplier and provides the UAE with a dependable supply of weapons and the means to distribute them to its regional partners.

In the lead-up to Belgrade’s September 2025 “Unity of Strength” military parade, the Serbian armed forces conducted exercises with UAE-developed Shadow 25 and Shadow 50 one-way attack drones. This was the first time these systems had been seen publicly in Europe. Developed by Abu Dhabi-based advanced technology and defense conglomerate EDGE Group, the drones differ in speed and payload yet share mobile launch capabilities. Their public display came on the heels of recent EDGE agreements to broaden defense cooperation and promote these systems across Europe. While Serbian officials have not formally confirmed the acquisition, the drones’ presence signals deepening defense ties with the UAE and underscores Serbia’s growing interest in loitering munitions amid escalating regional security concerns.

Artificial Intelligence and Digital Statecraft

In February 2024, at the World Government Summit in Dubai, Serbia and the UAE signed a memorandum of understanding to advance cooperation in artificial intelligence, aiming to deepen collaboration on AI development and its practical applications. According to Serbian officials, the agreement enables Serbian scientific institutes, startups, and other entities to use a UAE-developed large language model, described as practically equivalent to ChatGPT, to support their AI projects. It builds on a series of prior AI- and technology-focused partnerships, including the establishment with Emirati support of smart police stations in Serbia, Serbian collaboration with Abu Dhabi-based AI firm G42, and joint initiatives in health care, biotechnology, and digital infrastructure.

Serbia is also part of the UAE’s broader strategy to expand its global AI and digital footprint. Belgrade signed an agreement with technology group e& enterprise to triple Serbia’s data center capacity to 40 megawatts, complementing similar UAE-backed projects across Europe.

Belgrade’s Multipolar Foreign Policy

Rooted in the nonaligned foreign policy tradition of Yugoslavia under Josip Broz Tito, the Vucic government has long sought to navigate competing geopolitical currents to safeguard Serbia’s autonomy. Constantly striving to keep multiple options open, Belgrade deliberately avoids overly deep alignment with any single bloc at the expense of others. While seeking to carefully balance relations between East and West, Serbia has also consistently pursued stronger ties with influential states in the Global South, including across the Arab world, and the UAE has become the most consequential Arab state in this strategy.

The deepening UAE-Serbia partnership reflects more than opportunistic dealmaking amid geopolitical strain. It also illustrates how two states with distinct but complementary strategic objectives have identified enduring value in one another. For Belgrade, Abu Dhabi offers a rare combination of capital, political backing, and geopolitical flexibility at a time of mounting pressure from broadly gauged Western sanctions focused on Russia, regional insecurity, and economic vulnerability. For the UAE, Serbia represents a receptive gateway into Europe, expanding Abu Dhabi’s geostrategic reach and influence across emerging markets and offering economic diversification opportunities.

A Strategic Foothold in the Western Balkans

Yet this relationship is neither cost free nor necessarily assured for the long term. Emirati investments and defense cooperation have been enabled by highly centralized decision making and strong personal ties between leaders, a dynamic that has facilitated speed and scale but also generated controversy surrounding transparency, governance, and public accountability. As Serbia faces growing domestic unrest and the eventual transition to a post-Vucic political landscape, the sustainability of this model may be increasingly tested.

The UAE-Serbia relationship appears resilient but contingent. Its future will depend not only on broader regional and global shifts but also on whether bilateral cooperation becomes more institutionalized and transparent or remains heavily personalized and transactional. What is clear, however, is that the UAE has secured a lasting strategic foothold in the Western Balkans, and Serbia has gained an influential Arab partner that is likely to remain central to Belgrade’s multipolar foreign policy calculus.

The post How the UAE Became Serbia’s Most Important Arab Partner appeared first on AGSI.

The STC’s December gamble, at least on the surface, made a lot of sense. The Presidential Leadership Council, the eight-member body that represents what passes for Yemen’s internationally recognized government, was in disarray and riven with infighting. The economic situation in the South was a disaster and looked to be growing worse. Plus, the STC seemed to have the acquiescence if not the active encouragement of the UAE. The STC was formed in 2017 with the explicit goal of forming an independent Southern state in Yemen. By late November and early December 2025, all it needed was a spark, which it got when a local commander in Hadramout deployed troops around an oil field in an attempt to secure more revenue. The STC responded with a military offensive, quickly taking much of the oil-rich governorate of Hadramout as well as Mahra, Yemen’s easternmost governorate on the border with Oman. Within days the STC had control of much of Southern Yemen, and it looked as if all that was missing was an official declaration of independence.

On December 26, Rashad al-Alimi, the head of the Presidential Leadership Council, called on Saudi Arabia to intervene militarily in Yemen to reverse the STC’s military gains. For many, Alimi’s request echoed the one made a decade earlier by then Yemeni President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi, who called on Saudi Arabia and the UAE to use military force in Yemen to expel the Houthis from Sanaa. That intervention exacerbated a conflict in Yemen that still hasn’t ended.

Despite that history, however, Saudi Arabia quickly signaled that it was willing to intervene militarily in Yemen, even against ostensible allies. This is likely because, as analyst Maysaa Shuja al-Deen pointed out, the STC offensive upended the “implicit power-sharing arrangement” that had held for much of the past several years. “UAE backed forces dominate coastal areas and islands and maintain strong influence in Aden, while Saudi-backed forces control land borders and oil facilities.”

The day after Alimi’s request, Saudi Minister of Defense Khalid bin Salman posted a statement on X calling for the STC to withdraw. When that didn’t work, Saudi Arabia carried out an airstrike on an Emirati shipment of arms and vehicles that was destined for the STC, though the UAE denied the shipment included weapons. Worried about the implications of a Saudi-Emirati conflict in Yemen, the UAE announced that it was withdrawing all of its remaining forces from Yemen, which effectively left the STC exposed without air cover. After that, Saudi Arabia and its allies on the ground made quick work of the STC, carrying out a few airstrikes and forcing the units that had advanced with such optimism a month earlier to retreat. In some cases, STC fighters were forced to flee the area in buses after their military vehicles were destroyed.

On January 2, Aidarous al-Zubaidi, the head of the STC and a member of the Presidential Leadership Council, attempted to save face by announcing what he termed a “constitutional declaration,” basically laying out a two-year transitional period for an independent Southern state. Saudi Arabia responded by summoning several members of the STC, who also sit on the Presidential Leadership Council, in an apparent attempt to divide the movement from within.

What comes next in Yemen is likely to be messy and chaotic. Already there has been looting in Hadramout and Mahra as well as calls for reform and transition within the STC. Whether it survives in its current form or is able to implement its two-year constitutional transition toward independence are both open questions as is what role the UAE will play in Yemen moving forward. Will it continue to support the STC to the degree it did before, or will it look to diversify and increase support to other proxies, such as Tariq Saleh, who are not tied to dreams of Southern independence? One thing is certain, the withdrawal of UAE troops from Yemen does not mean the end of the UAE in Yemen.

Beyond the immediate implications for the STC, however, are broader ones for Yemen. After nearly 15 years of protest, revolution, chaos, uncertainty, and war, the country seems more divided than ever. The STC, despite its vision of an independent Southern state, never had the type of popular support across the South that could make that dream a reality. Instead, it is and was largely a regional movement, with much of its leadership and backing coming from Dhala and Lahj, which are close to Aden but far from Hadramout, where the STC was pushing to take over. Meanwhile, Hadramis prize their own regional identity, and even a few independent Hadrami state flags have popped up on X recently. The same could be said about Mahra and Socotra, both of which have distinct languages, although neither has the economic resources of Hadramout. Local allegiances over a national identity, a handful of competing militias none of which are strong enough to compel others to bend to their will, and meddling outside powers, taken together, constitute a recipe for continued conflict.

The STC’s failed attempt at independence likely means that Yemen won’t split along North and South lines. There will be no return to pre-1990 borders, at least not anytime soon. Instead, Yemen appears headed for a future in which no one party will manage to achieve superiority. The country will be divided along regional lines with local warlords, backed by outside powers, seizing as much territory as they can hold and administering as they see fit. There may be a veneer of national government, but its power won’t stretch much beyond the capital. Such a country will continue to spread insecurity – from Houthi threats to Red Sea shipping and a still active al-Qaeda threat to drug smuggling and a refugee problem, Yemen’s challenge to the region is only going to grow.

The post Yemen’s Continuing Crack-Up appeared first on AGSI.

The new museums, cultural districts, and citywide events are part of Abu Dhabi’s strategic long-term investment to bolster its cultural offerings. In 2021, Abu Dhabi announced a five-year $6 billion plan for its culture and creative sector, building on the prior investment of $2.3 billion, to make culture a major economic driver for growth in the emirate.

Opening night of Abu Dhabi Art. (Image courtesy of Sutton)

“Economic exchange brings about cultural exchange, the exchange of ideas,” said Dyala Nusseibeh, director of Abu Dhabi Art Fair. She noted how the fair is “a marketplace but also a space where ideas are exchanged, discussed, and thought about.” For over a decade, Nusseibeh emphasized, curators and researchers at institutions such as the Guggenheim Abu Dhabi (due to open in 2026) and the Louvre Abu Dhabi have been researching the art histories of the Gulf. “Collectively, we’re all working toward the growth and centering of Abu Dhabi as a cultural hub,” added Nusseibeh. “And at the same time, all of this has come about because of the government’s decision quite a long time ago to invest seriously in culture and think about culture as essential for the future growth of the country.”

This cultural vision is spearheaded by Mohamed Khalifa Al Mubarak, the chair of the Department of Culture and Tourism. He has said that culture is an engine that not only offers an expression of identity but also fuels economic growth, innovation, job creation, and sustainable development and contributes to Abu Dhabi’s aggressive goal to diversify its economy away from oil.

The growth of Abu Dhabi’s cultural ecosystem is taking place alongside the city’s rise as a global financial hub. Abu Dhabi Finance Week, which held its fourth annual summit from December 8-11, was dubbed by some as the “real ‘Davos in the Desert’” as Indian-born strategy advisor and author Parag Khanna stated. In recent years, Abu Dhabi has attracted to its financial hub, Abu Dhabi Global Market, many of the world’s biggest financial firms and thousands of professionals, including BlackRock, Rothschild & Co, Bitcoin Suisse, and Millenium Management. In early December, Mubadala Investment Company and Aldar, the emirate’s largest developer, announced a landmark $16.3 billion expansion of Abu Dhabi’s Al Maryah Island financial district.

“I believe that our government in Abu Dhabi is continuing to make sound decisions in their approach to art and culture,” said Maryam Al Falasi, an Emirati Abu Dhabi-based art dealer who opened her gallery within the Madar_39 creative hub in the Mina Zayed cultural neighborhood in November 2024. “They have been consistently investing in the ecosystem, which has contributed to this rise, because a true cultural city needs a number of factors to succeed. It’s not enough to have collectors or galleries or institutions, but it needs to have all of these to form a true ecosystem.”

The Zayed National Museum was the fifth new museum, and undoubtedly the most monumental, to open in Abu Dhabi in 2025, signifying the city’s evolving role as a regional and global capital for culture. In April, teamLab Phenomena Abu Dhabi, developed in collaboration with Tokyo-based art collective teamLab, began offering its immersive digital art experience to visitors to the UAE capital. Also located in Saadiyat Cultural District, it joined the Louvre Abu Dhabi, which opened in 2017 and Manarat Al Saadiyat, a dynamic arts and culture center. Also in April, the restored Al Maqtaa Fort, now renamed the Al Maqtaa Museum, opened, offering insights into Abu Dhabi’s early years as a trading post and border checkpoint. In October, the Al Ain Museum, the country’s oldest museum, first opened in 1971, reopened after a major restoration, including new exhibition spaces to showcase the region’s ancient desert settlements and early Bedouin life alongside displays on the legacy of the UAE’s founder, who was born in Al Ain. A few weeks prior to the Zayed National Museum opening, the Natural History Museum Abu Dhabi opened its doors. It is the largest institution of its kind in the region and showcases 13.8 billion years of natural history in the region.

“It’s not just about thinking critically about our national identity, but it’s about bringing those perspectives to bear on global conversations,” Nusseibeh highlighted. “That’s also the role that culture has in ensuring that the region is talking about itself from the region and that you’re not relying on people from outside who haven’t spent serious amounts of time in the region to describe it or to frame it or narrate it. In fact, you have artists from the region who are doing that critical work directly, and this is important.”

Abu Dhabi’s numerous museum openings have brought the UAE capital much regional and international attention. This has been bolstered by the recent announcement that leading global contemporary art fair group Frieze will transform the existing Abu Dhabi Art Fair into Frieze Abu Dhabi in November 2026. Each year Abu Dhabi’s state-led cultural programming has become more robust and extensive. In 2024, the first Public Art Abu Dhabi Biennial, with local, Middle Eastern, and international commissioned works of art displayed at various locations throughout the city, transformed Abu Dhabi into a citywide outdoor art gallery. In November, the second Manar Abu Dhabi opened. The light art festival presents works by local Emirati artists, such as Shaikha Al Mazrou, known for her sculptural abstract works, alongside the vibrant Pop Art works of globally renowned American artist KAWS.

“Contingent Object,” 2025 by Shaikha Al Mazrou, Manar Abu Dhabi 2025. (Image courtesy of Department of Culture and Tourism Abu Dhabi & Public Art Abu Dhabi. Photo by Lance Gerber.)

Reem Fadda, a renowned curator and art historian and now the director of Abu Dhabi Culture Programming called this moment in Abu Dhabi’s history “a homecoming.” She said, “It’s been years in the making,” emphasizing her involvement since 2009 with the Guggenheim Abu Dhabi. “I am very aware of the seriousness, the efforts, the depth of how much institutional foundational work has been put through in Abu Dhabi to make this happen and to arrive at this moment. I think the world has not paid enough attention, but now we’re getting full lights on all the aspects.”

Fadda has been involved in creating a strategy for public art in the capital. Alongside the museums and institutions, events such as the Public Art Biennial and Manar Abu Dhabi seek to create, as she says, “historic moments of art that people can engage with and remember, and it becomes part of the city’s experience and fabric.”

The Saadiyat Cultural District is nearing its completion. When finished, it will be home to seven museums and cultural institutions, promoting interfaith dialogue, through the Abrahamic Center, and cultural exchange.

Not so far away in the heart of Abu Dhabi’s historic port of Mina Zayed another cultural district is also rapidly taking shape. Established amid Mina Zayed’s other attractions, such as the bustling Madinat Zayed Gold Center, the MiZa cultural district is becoming a host for private cultural entities. 421 Arts Campus, a multifunctional arts center dedicated to emerging artists in the UAE, is also located here. Comprising exhibition spaces, studios, and workshops, and supported and operated by the Salama Bint Hamdan Al Nahyan Foundation, 421 Arts Campus celebrated its 10th anniversary in November. Serving as a catalyst for creative practitioners in the UAE, South Asia, and North Africa, according to the organization, it has supported over 1,500 creative practitioners, delivered 2,000 programs from residencies to grants, exhibitions, and public programs, and commissioned hundreds of new works.

“When we first opened 10 years ago, we were alone here in Mina Zayed alongside maybe two or three other places you could visit to get an understanding of what’s happening in the city,” said 421 Arts Campus Director Faisal Al Hassan. “Today it’s overwhelming to see what’s happening. The accelerated growth over the past 10 years is exceptional and not necessarily just in visual arts. You are seeing a lot of commitment toward design, performance, music, other creative disciplines – means of focusing on the creative economy in general, and that is where you can really see a shift and a change in the thinking of how we bring in more creative voices into the city.”

421 Arts Campus is presenting “Rays, Ripples, Residue,” an exhibition running until April 26, 2026. It showcases multidisciplinary works of art by artists from and based in the UAE to reflect the evolution of creative practice and exhibition in the Gulf state over the past 10 years.

“The government has also been investing in their own corporate collections and supporting local artists in this manner,” Falasi, who works with several government entities on growing their corporate collections, noted. Mubadala Investment Company is also establishing its Mubadala Corporate Collections – another sign of the support corporate entities are giving art in the UAE capital.

Some critics have mused over the still small pool of private collectors. But as Nusseibeh and others have noted, that is changing with the influx of new residents and new wealth to the capital. In June, data from the Statistics Center in Abu Dhabi indicated that the city’s population crossed four million for the first time after a 7.5% surge in 2024, meaning that the emirate’s population has increased by over 50% in the last decade.

“It’s up to us as gallerists and art dealers to also build on this momentum and play our part in contributing toward this rise,” Falasi said. “This will also contribute to a growing scene through a rise in audiences, and this synergistic approach will bolster Abu Dhabi as a true cultural city.”

The post Abu Dhabi’s Big Bid on Culture appeared first on AGSI.

2021: A Bad Year for Gulf-Lebanese Relations

In 2021, Lebanon’s relations with the Gulf states spiraled. Hezbollah maintained its grip on Lebanese politics both through its mafia-like enforcement of order and its long-standing relationship with then-President Michel Aoun and his Christian party, the Free Patriotic Movement. This monopoly cast a large shadow over Lebanese politics and decision making, particularly as it pertained to Lebanon’s relationship with its neighbors.

George Kordahi, who served as Lebanon’s minister of information at the time, made disparaging comments about the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen, calling it “futile and pointless” and said that the Houthis were “defending themselves against an external aggression.” This came six months after then Lebanese Foreign Minister Charbel Wehbe used derogatory terms to describe the Saudis. Many Gulf Cooperation Council countries were convinced that Lebanon was pursuing a pro-Iran foreign policy that was intended to undermine the Gulf’s agenda.

Meanwhile, media accounts reported that Hezbollah was smuggling disassembled weapons into Yemen and conducting training for Yemen’s Houthi fighters. There have even been unconfirmed reports that Hezbollah’s leadership may have influenced Houthi financial and military operation decisions.

Moreover, in April 2021, Saudi authorities discovered a shipment of 5.3 million smuggled Captagon pills in pomegranate crates at the Jeddah airport. The Gulf states viewed Hezbollah’s sway in Lebanon, involvement in Yemen, and effort to corrupt Gulf society through the sale of drugs as a war being waged against them.

Lebanon’s Economic Crisis

In response, Saudi Arabia in October 2021 expelled Lebanon’s ambassador, banned all Lebanese imports, and recalled its ambassador to Lebanon. In solidarity, Bahrain, Kuwait, and the UAE recalled their ambassadors as well. (These Gulf ambassadors have since returned to Beirut). Then, in early 2022, Saad Hariri, Lebanon’s former prime minister and leader of the Sunni community in Lebanon, announced that he would suspend all his political activities in advance of that year’s parliamentary elections. The announcement was linked to tensions between the Saudi royal family and Hariri. Even the Emiratis, who agreed to host Hariri, emphasized to him that he would be allowed to conduct his business affairs in the UAE on the condition that he suspend his political activities.

As Lebanon’s relationship with the Gulf was deteriorating, it suffered the effects of one tragedy after another. In 2019, Lebanon endured a severe economic collapse, as its gross domestic product fell by nearly 40% in real terms, its currency lost 98% of its value, and depositors were not allowed to access their funds held at local banks. In August 2020, during the height of coronavirus pandemic restrictions, an estimated 2,750 tons of unsafely stored ammonium nitrate exploded at Beirut’s port causing the largest nonnuclear blast in modern history, resulting in hundreds of deaths, thousands of injuries, and billions of dollars in damage.

Rather than bringing relief from such tragedies, Iran’s support to Hezbollah has only added to the suffering of the Lebanese people, including the largely pro-Hezbollah Shia population in the south. Hezbollah used its sway to block for more than two years the election of a president that it viewed unfriendly to the group’s agenda, leading to political gridlock and paralysis. It was not until Israel’s attacks in 2024 in southern Lebanon, weakening Hezbollah, that the group realized it could no longer stand in the way of electing the president. And with Joseph Aoun’s election as president in January, the gridlock ended.

What Does Lebanon Need To Do?

In June 2023, the International Monetary Fund issued a report with economic reform recommendations to stabilize the Lebanese economy. The reforms included enhanced governance transparency, a strengthened anticorruption framework, improved performance among state owned enterprises, debt restructuring, a unified exchange rate, and protection for small depositors. It is generally accepted within Lebanon and among international observers that the country’s political elite are deliberately blocking much-needed reforms to protect their financial interests.

Between 1963 and 2022, Gulf states gave Lebanon an estimated $9 billion in grants, excluding loans and investments. But they have stressed that that era is over. Gulf capitals have linked any new financial packages to reforms, such as combatting corruption and restoring confidence in the banking system as proposed by the IMF, and, crucially, disarming Hezbollah. Saudi commentator Ali Shihabi said that Saudi Arabia “does not want to invest in a black hole.”

Like other Gulf states, Saudi Arabia generally frames its position on Hezbollah’s disarmament in terms of support for state control of weapons and in the context of adherence to relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions (which include provisions on disarmament). How a relatively weak Lebanese central government, with armed forces outgunned for decades by Hezbollah, would accomplish such disarmament without prompting significant internal instability remains unclear. However, as the Lebanese government and the international community continue to make progress on the question of Hezbollah’s weapons, it is widely expected that the mafia state created by the militia will no longer be able to survive, and the much needed and long-awaited economic reforms called for by the Gulf states and others will finally be enacted.

In August, U.S. Special Envoy for Syria – and U.S. Ambassador to Turkey – Thomas Barrack announced a plan to disarm Hezbollah by the end of 2025. It outlines an economic strategy for Lebanon that combines regional investment with security reforms. This plan also includes Saudi Arabia and Qatar investing in an economic zone in southern Lebanon to create job opportunities for former Hezbollah members who agree to lay down their weapons. Media accounts indicate that the plan for disarming Hezbollah will rely on persistent Israeli military pressure on the group, which could prolong the depopulation of some border villages and lead to a more militarized southern Lebanon.

Prospects for Gulf-Lebanon Ties

Given the key to any Gulf-Lebanon rapprochement is Hezbollah surrendering its weapons, the path to get there is going to be filled with landmines both figurative and literal. This does not mean that steps can’t be taken to move toward this goal. The first big hurdle was the election of Aoun and the appointment of Prime Minister Nawaf Salam. Lebanon now has a leadership that seems ready to bring the country back into the Arab and Western fold.

In March, Aoun was the first Lebanese head of state in eight years to visit Saudi Arabia, where he met Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. During the visit, the two leaders discussed taking steps to resume Lebanese exports to Saudi Arabia and have Saudi citizens once again travel to Lebanon, according to the Office of the Presidency. In the months that followed, Aoun also visited Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE to present Lebanon as “open for business.” Saudi Arabia has responded positively and, in November, announced plans to boost commercial ties to Lebanon after reports that “the Lebanese government and security forces demonstrated efficacy in curbing drug exports over recent months,” according to a senior Saudi official.

Accounting for more than 19% of GDP prior to the economic collapse in 2019, tourism has emerged as the fastest route toward restoring ties to Gulf countries and reviving the economy. “Tourism is a big catalyst, and so it’s very important that the bans get lifted,” said Laura Khazen Lahoud, Lebanon’s tourism minister. Shortly after Aoun’s visit, the UAE officially lifted its travel ban on UAE nationals visiting Lebanon, according to the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia are considering similar moves. Qatar never imposed a travel ban, so Qatari nationals have continued to travel to Lebanon.

Emirati and Gulf interests in Lebanon are likely to include investments in the energy sector and development of the gas fields in the eastern Mediterranean. The UAE may also be willing to contribute by providing equipment and training to universities and hospitals and by rehabilitating key infrastructure, particularly the Beirut port and the country’s road and bridge networks.

Remittances in Lebanon in 2025 are expected to reach $7.31 billion, with an annual growth rate of 4.5% over the next several years. Before the rupture with the Gulf, the majority of Lebanese expatriates in the Gulf were in Saudi Arabia with more than 300,000, the UAE was close behind with nearly 200,000, and Kuwait had around 42,000. From 2020-22 alone, more than 80,000 Lebanese moved to the Gulf in search of jobs. Remittances from the Gulf remain a critical component of the Lebanese economy.

Approaching the end of the year, Saudi Arabia has already made another strong gesture of support to the Lebanese government. Along with the United States and France, Saudi Arabia announced on December 18 that it will host an international conference early in 2026 in support of the Lebanese army. Aoun expressed his heartfelt gratitude and emphasized his commitment to ensuring that the money will be used in a transparent and responsible manner to help Lebanon resume its rightful place as a member of the Arab nations.

The post The Gulf’s Return to Lebanon? appeared first on AGSI.

The post Outlook 2026: Prospects and Priorities for U.S.-Gulf Relations in the Year Ahead appeared first on AGSI.

Rare earth minerals, along with other metals, such as lithium, copper, cobalt, and nickel, are critical for the technologies driving the global transition to clean energy. They serve as core components in everything from electric vehicle batteries and wind turbines to advanced electronics and defense systems. As demand accelerates, securing reliable supply chains for critical minerals has become a top priority for countries worldwide.

In recent years, Gulf states have become increasingly focused on critical minerals as part of their economic diversification efforts, with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates playing leading roles. These states’ strategies, however, differ significantly: Saudi Arabia is building an integrated mining sector, while the UAE, Qatar, Oman, and Bahrain are adopting more selective investment approaches. These differences reflect each state’s distinct national priorities and capacities within the global critical mineral landscape.

Saudi Arabia’s Integrated Mining Sector

Mining is the “third pillar” of Saudi Arabia’s national economy under Vision 2030, playing a crucial role the kingdom’s efforts to diversify away from fossil fuels. With Saudi Arabia’s untapped mineral and mining resources valued at an estimated $2.5 trillion, the kingdom has the capacity to develop an integrated mining ecosystem by leveraging its vast domestic deposits while also using its substantial capital to expand investments in global supply chains. This ability to build a strong domestic mining base and pursue strategic opportunities abroad is what distinguishes Saudi Arabia from other Gulf states when it comes to critical minerals.

Domestically, Saudi Arabia has accelerated efforts in recent years to develop its mining sector through regulatory reforms, expanded geological surveying, and partnering with various global entities. In 2021, the kingdom passed the “Mining Investment Law” to make investment processes more efficient and investor friendly. In parallel, the Saudi Geological Survey, the country’s national geological authority, launched the “Regional Geological Survey Program” in late 2020, working with both local and foreign partners to map 230,000 square miles of the Arabian Shield to identify mineral resources and attract greater foreign participation.

These efforts have already produced tangible results. Saudi Arabia’s estimated mineral wealth rose from $1.3 trillion in 2016 to roughly $2.5 trillion in 2024, reflecting new discoveries and improved mapping techniques. Exploration activity has also expanded significantly, with investments in exploration growing from $28.4 million in 2019 to $140 million in 2024. Additionally, by 2025, foreign mining investors accounted for two thirds of the total license bidders in the country. The kingdom has further sought to capitalize on its domestic critical mineral potential through strategic partnerships with international entities, notably signing nine mineral deals, valued at $9.3 billion, in late 2024 with companies including India’s Vedanta Resources and China’s Zijin Mining Group, and, more recently, establishing a joint venture between Maaden and MP Materials to build a rare earth refinery in Saudi Arabia.

Through Manara Minerals, a joint venture between Maaden and the Public Investment Fund, Saudi Arabia has been acquiring stakes in major global mining entities. In 2023, Manara Minerals invested $2.6 billion to acquire a 10% stake in Brazil’s Vale Base Metals. In 2024, it expressed interest in investing at least $1 billion in Pakistan’s Reko Diq copper and gold project as well as up to $2 billion in First Quantum Minerals’ copper and nickel assets in Zambia, extending the kingdom’s reach across global critical mineral supply chains.

The UAE’s Global Reach

Unlike Saudi Arabia’s resource-rich landscape, the UAE has limited domestic critical mineral reserves. So, Abu Dhabi has centered its strategy on investing in critical mineral projects globally, notably in Africa. In 2023, the UAE, through International Resources Holding, invested $1.1 billion to acquire a 51% stake in Mopani Copper Mines in Zambia. Most recently, International Resources Holding acquired a 56% majority stake in Alphamin Resources for $366 million, giving it access to the Bisie tin complex in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Additionally, in 2024, International Resources Holding formed joint ventures for iron ore mining in Angola and announced that it was in advanced talks to potentially acquire mines in Burundi, Kenya, and Tanzania.

Beyond Africa, the UAE is expanding its global footprint through various large-scale partnerships, namely with the United States. In January, Abu Dhabi’s ADQ, with Orion Resource Partners, a U.S.-based global investment firm specializing in metals and materials, created a 50/50 joint venture based in Abu Dhabi with a $1.2 billion commitment to invest in mining companies in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Additionally, in October, a broader fund, Orion Critical Mineral Consortium, was established by the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, Orion Resource Partners, and ADQ with an initial funding commitment of $1.8 billion and a plan to expand to $5 billion. The consortium’s goal is to invest in existing or near-term producing assets, further underscoring the UAE’s emphasis on gaining strategic exposure to global critical mineral assets.

Qatar, Oman, and Bahrain

Qatar’s distinct critical mineral investment strategy is more conservative than that of the UAE. Through its sovereign wealth fund, the Qatar Investment Authority, Qatar’s approach is focused on gaining financial exposure by acquiring stakes in well-established critical mineral companies rather than investing directly in mines. In 2024, QIA invested $180 million in Dublin-based TechMet, and, more recently, it invested $500 million in Canada’s Ivanhoe Mines through a private placement. This targeted approach gives Qatar exposure to the critical mineral sector while avoiding the operational risks associated with running mining projects.

In Oman, mining has been designated a strategic sector under Oman Vision 2040. Oman’s investment strategy in critical minerals is grounded in domestic development but at a much smaller scale than Saudi Arabia’s, given its smaller resource base. The country advances its exploration and investment agenda through the Ministry of Energy and Minerals and state-backed Minerals Development Oman.

Oman’s ophiolite-rich mountains are believed to host a wide range of metals, including chromite, cobalt, copper, and nickel. The country was also the first in the Gulf to produce and export ferrochrome. In 2023, the Ministry of Energy and Minerals signed an agreement with United Kingdom-based Knights Bay to extract nickel, Oman’s first mining agreement with a foreign investor. In January, Minerals Development Oman exported copper concentrates from its Lasail mine for the first time and plans to start production at Al Baydha copper mine in the years ahead. More recently, the Ministry of Energy and Minerals signed three mining exploration agreements valued at $500 million and signed a memorandum of understanding with Turkey’s Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources to enhance cooperation on critical mineral exploration.

Bahrain has also been trying to enter the critical mineral space, despite its small size and limited resource base. In September, Bahrain became the first Middle Eastern country to sponsor a deep-sea mining permit after backing California-based Impossible Metals’ bid to explore part of the Pacific Ocean. Although Bahrain has not made any financial commitments, Impossible Metals CEO Oliver Gunasekara noted that Bahrain could potentially fund a refinery in the future. While Bahrain’s initiatives remain extremely limited compared to those of other Gulf states, recent moves suggest a desire not to be left behind in the global critical mineral race.

The Gulf states are increasingly active in critical minerals, hoping to capitalize on their resources and strategic investments to prepare for a post-hydrocarbon economy. However, their different approaches reflect each state’s distinct resource capacities, national priorities, and ambitions.

The post Diverging Paths: Gulf Critical Mineral Strategies appeared first on AGSI.