• January 29: Economic newspaper Donya-ye Eqtesad reported on the latest round of diplomacy between Iran and the United States, concluding that it remains to be seen if another conflict can be averted:
  • “As the specter of war has spread over the region and U.S. threats continue alongside Tehran’s declared readiness to deliver a decisive response to any act of aggression, the volume of calls with Iranian political and diplomatic officials has intensified. From Turkey and Egypt to Qatar and Saudi Arabia, all are trying to steer Tehran and Washington away from the current path and bring them back to the negotiating table … Nevertheless, it remains to be seen whether diplomacy can overcome the high wall of war.”
• January 29: Admiral Ali Shamkhani, former Supreme National Security Council member, posted on X:
  • “A ‘limited strike’ is an illusion. Any military action by ‌#us—from any origin and at any level—will be considered the ‌#start_of_war, and its response will be immediate, ‌#all_out, and unprecedented, targeting heart of ‌#TelAviv and all those supporting the aggressor.”
• January 29: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-affiliated Javan sought to prepare the Iranian public for a potential U.S. naval blockade of Iran and warned Washington of countermeasures:
  • “Since the cost of direct confrontation with Iran is very high, it appears that alternative options have been put on the agenda. Accordingly, with the deployment of American naval vessels in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf, some unofficial sources have stated that Washington is seeking to implement a naval blockade of Iran to use economic pressure to force the Islamic Republic to make concessions.”
  • “Although officials in Washington rely on the power of their naval vessels in the Persian Gulf and believe they can force Iran to back down, Iran’s armed forces are not defenseless and have issued preliminary warnings ahead of any provocative action by U.S. ships to demonstrate their level of readiness. Some field sources revealed yesterday that between 300 and 400 Iranian fast boats approached the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln. Analysts say that something called a ‘limited’ or ‘low-intensity’ war has no meaning for Iran, and any aggression against Iranian territory – or even its interests in the region – would receive a ‘full-scale’ response.”
• January 29: Hard-line Kayhan threatened Iran will close the Strait of Hormuz in the case of military aggression:
  • “Washington must understand: If it strikes once, it will be hit 10 times in return. The era of passivity is over, and today is the age of ‘active resistance.’ The hands of Ruhollah’s sons are on the trigger. If any act of aggression occurs, the Strait of Hormuz will become the graveyard of the U.S. Fifth Fleet, and the fire of this game will reduce the White House to ashes.”
• January 29: Aref Dehghandar, an analyst writing in reformist Etemad, concluded:
  • “Relations between Iran and the United States are at a stage when uncertainty is the dominant feature. There is neither a clear sign of a decision to go to war nor a stable mechanism for moving past the tensions. What makes this situation dangerous is not the level of hostility but the fragility of the existing balance. Both sides are trying to pursue two conflicting objectives at the same time: increasing pressure on the other party while preventing the crisis from spiraling out of control. This very duality has made the decision-making environment highly complex.”

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• January 26: Ardeshir Pashang, a journalist and Iraq expert, wrote about Nuri al-Maliki’s likely return in economic newspaper Donya-ye Eqtesad:
  • “There was a time when Iraq’s central government was struggling to survive or consolidate its authority. That time has passed, and Iraq is now seeking to play a regional role.”
  • “Maliki will reduce tensions with Iran and the United States … and the United States, too, has a more realistic view of Iraq today. Over the past few months, the United States’ red line regarding Iraq was that members of the Popular Mobilization Forces or their affiliates should not hold any ministerial posts … This demand was moderated and clarified to specify that Popular Mobilization Forces members should not assume sensitive security positions, such as the ministries of interior and defense. Therefore, it appears that a kind of relative understanding has been reached between Baghdad and Washington, under which both the new Iraqi prime minister and the Shia ruling establishment are trying to avoid creating unnecessary tensions during Donald Trump’s presidency.”
  • “In the meantime, however, we must see what fate Iran’s role in Iraq has met. Despite the fact that figures close to the Islamic Republic wield greater power in the Iraqi Parliament, Iran’s influence in Iraq is declining, and the extent of Iran’s leverage and room to maneuver in the country has become far more limited than in the past. Moreover, under these circumstances, Iran does not want to take any action in its foreign policy that would distance it from Iraq.”
• January 26: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-affiliated Javan hailed the return of the “anti-American prime minister.”

The post Iran’s State-Censored Media Reacts to Maliki’s Return to Power in Iraq appeared first on AGSI.

• January 21: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-affiliated Tasnim News Agency reposted a statement from the Supreme National Security Council on its Telegram channel. According to the statement, 3,117 people were killed in the protests, 2,427 of whom were “martyrs,” meaning they were either members of the security forces or have been characterized as regime supporters.
• January 21: The Martyr Foundation, quoted on Tasnim’s website, confirmed the Supreme National Security Council’s data.

The post Government Claims 3,117 Dead in Iran Protests appeared first on AGSI.

• January 17: During his second public commentary since the beginning of protests in late December 2025, in comments published on his website (one of the few websites connected to the internet in Iran), Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said:
  • “Sedition occurred; it caused some distress among the people, harmed them, and inflicted damage on the country – after all, it was sedition. Then, by divine grace, through the hands of the people and the timely and capable actions of the responsible officials and agents, praise be to God, this sedition was extinguished.”
  • “This was American sedition. It was obvious; the Americans planned it and carried it out. And the Americans’ objective – as I state decisively and explicitly, based on more than 40 years of experience in the Islamic Republic – is to swallow Iran … The president of the United States himself – personally – intervened: He spoke, made statements, issued threats, and encouraged the agitators. Messages were sent from the United States to those individuals – I will explain later who they were – telling them to move forward and not be afraid. He said, ‘We support you; we will provide military support.’ That is, the president of the United States himself entered this sedition and is part of it.”
  • Next, Khamenei turned to the people involved in the “sedition”:
    • “They fell into two groups. One group consisted of individuals whom the American and Israeli intelligence services had carefully selected and identified; most of them had been taken abroad, and some had also been trained right here – trained how to move, set fires, create fear, and evade the police. They had also been given substantial funding. These were the ones who were the ringleaders of the crowd; they themselves refer to themselves as ‘leaders’ – ‘we are the leaders of this group.’ These were the ringleaders; one group consisted of them. Praise be to God, a large number of these individuals were arrested and detained.”
    • “The second group had no connection with the Zionist regime or with any particular intelligence service. They were naive adolescents – people would talk to them, influence them, stir excitement in them … These were the foot soldiers; their mission was to go and attack a place: a police post, a house, an office, a bank, an industrial center, a power facility. That was their mission. The ringleaders gathered them together – each ringleader assembled 10, 20, 50 people – and directed them.”
  • In response to President Donald J. Trump, who threatened the Islamic Republic with war if authorities executed protesters, Khamenei said: “We are not taking the country toward war; we have no intention of pushing the country into war. But we will not let domestic criminals go free either. Worse than domestic criminals are international criminals; we will not let them go free either. This must be pursued in its proper manner, with the correct methods, and – by divine grace – the Iranian nation, just as it broke the backbone of the sedition, must also break the backbone of the seditionists.”
  • In the final part of his speech, Khamenei addressed the main reason for the protests: “Of course, the economic situation is not a good one; people’s livelihoods are truly facing difficulties – I am aware of this. Those responsible must therefore work twice as hard in these areas. For essential goods, livestock feed, basic foodstuffs, and the general needs of the people, government officials must work twice as hard as usual; they must work with greater seriousness – there is no doubt about this. They have duties, and we, the people, also have duties; we must fulfill our responsibilities. If we fulfill our duties, Almighty God will bless our efforts.”

The post Defiant Khamenei Blames Trump for the Protests appeared first on AGSI.

• January 12: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-affiliated Fars News Agency’s Telegram channel posted photos of pro-regime rallies in Tehran and other locations.
• January 12: Fars News Agency’s Telegram channel released a video of Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani participating in the rally in Tehran. In a brief comment, Larijani said the people have taken to the streets of Tehran in a display of unity to declare support to the regime and to “settle scores with America and Israel.”
• January 12: Fars News Agency released a message of thanks from Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to Iranians who participated in pro-regime rallies.

The post Decoupled From the Internet, IRGC Media Talks of Unity appeared first on AGSI.

Iranian authorities undoubtedly benefit from invoking the specter of separatism and risk of civil war to generate a rally-around-the-flag effect. And they may seek to externalize internal political and economic pressures by threatening or conducting strikes against targets in Iraq’s Kurdistan region. However, Iran’s troubled history with separatist movements in its peripheral regions suggests the prospect of escalation and internal conflict is nonetheless a legitimate concern.

• January 8: Tasnim News Agency reported on “the entry of separatist groups into the operational phase of the unrest”:
  • “Based on field evidence, militant groups based in northern Iraq have moved beyond the stage of psychological warfare and media operations and have entered an operational phase on the ground – a development for which examples have been observed in the provinces of Ilam and Kermanshah. This comes despite the Iran-Iraq security agreement, to which the Kurdistan region of Iraq is also committed, under which even the display and dissemination of images of weapons by these groups had been prohibited.”
  • “The serious question now being raised is how these groups, in clear violation of their security commitments, have advanced to the point of attempting attacks on military and security centers and ammunition depots. Accordingly, many experts believe that the time has come for the headquarters and active elements of these groups to be directly targeted within the framework of the security agreement and in light of the commitments that have been violated.”
  • “Meanwhile, the coordinated and purpose-driven performance of media outlets affiliated with the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iraq in intensifying tensions and steering the social environment toward instability goes beyond a mere media approach and is assessed as part of a defined security puzzle.”
  • “Under such circumstances, it is expected that the authorities of the Kurdistan region of Iraq, fully aware of the consequences of the continuation of this trend, will immediately prevent their territory from becoming a platform for threats to Iran’s national security. It is also expected that officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran will not remain indifferent and will respond with precision and resolve to the media misconduct and violations of security commitments by the Kurdistan region of Iraq.”
  • “These developments are not a temporary episode of unrest but rather part of a directed operation within the framework of hybrid warfare and a continuation of the 12-day war against Iran. It is self-evident that should this trend persist or escalate, the Islamic Republic of Iran’s response will be decisive, deterrent, and beyond conventional diplomatic considerations, and responsibility for the consequences will rest directly with the supporters and facilitators of these anti-security and terrorist actions.”

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• January 3: Addressing the public on the anniversary of the assassination of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force commander, Qassim Suleimani, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei discussed the protests in comments transcribed on his official website:
  • “Yes, these gatherings were mostly organized by the bazaar merchants, and what they were saying was correct … When a merchant looks at the country’s monetary situation – the decline in the value of the national currency … it causes instability in the business environment … The officials of the country recognize this, and I know that the honorable president and other senior officials are trying to resolve this problem.”
  • He noted, though, that the current state of Iran’s economy “is not natural; this is the enemy’s doing.”
  • Turning to protesters who chant slogans against the regime, Khamenei said: “When a group of incited, hired agents of the enemy stand behind the merchants and chant slogans against Islam, Iran, and the Islamic Republic – that is what matters. Protest is justified, but protest is different from rioting. We speak with protesters; officials must speak with protesters. But speaking with rioters is useless – rioters must be dealt with accordingly.”

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• December 17: Reformist Shargh featured an article by Mohsen Hashemi Rafsanjani prominently on its front page: 

• • “Today’s reality in Iran can be described as a state of strategic suspension: a condition in which neither clear, trouble-free progress is possible nor low-cost retreat feasible. This suspension has effectively confined the management of the country to the constant shadow of threat and the possibility of war, causing investment, social stability, and economic decision making to come almost to a halt. This stagnation has intensified economic and livelihood pressures and can, in turn, provide the ground for social discontent and the escalation of social crises. If we assume that a scenario involving the imposition of a 12-day war with the aim of triggering internal unrest is plausible, this suggests that, in the enemy’s view, another war could occur following the creation of social instability. Improving economic conditions and organizing livelihoods will be difficult without effective cooperation with external actors, especially China and Russia. These countries are willing to cooperate, but, without taking into account their competitive considerations vis-à-vis the United States, they cannot offer unconditional assistance to Iran.” 

• • “Cooperation with China and Russia can reduce economic pressure and its social consequences, but on its own it is not capable of resolving deep structural economic imbalances. This reality shows that a smart, balanced foreign policy pursued alongside domestic development is a necessary condition for reducing pressure and increasing resilience.” 

• • “Domestically, although coordination among the three branches of government has been acceptable, the government’s shift from efficiency to an emphasis on ‘consensus’ provides the Parliament with a pretext to use impeachment tools, and signs of this approach have already emerged. In the international arena as well, reliance on a policy of strategic patience or waiting for a change in the U.S. administration offers no guarantee of improvement. Iran must strengthen its managerial, economic, and industrial capacities so that time does not turn from a potential opportunity into a negative factor. Iran’s defensive power, though vital, is not sufficient on its own to establish a security balance, especially under conditions in which Israeli activities and regional pressures continue with intensity. In this context, utilizing Iran’s maritime infrastructure and capabilities – due to their strategic characteristics – can, at the economic level, partially shift the balance in the country’s favor and also provide the necessary platform for bargaining and bringing regional countries on board in managing tensions.” 

• • “However, expecting China or Russia to intervene directly and in a balance-shaping manner in this domain is unrealistic, as neither the technical capacity nor strong political will for such action exists. The use of the axis of resistance’s capacities also faces serious limitations for various reasons, particularly the sensitive conditions of Hezbollah in Lebanon. Under such circumstances, preserving Hezbollah’s political position through diplomatic initiatives is essential, because any damage to the axis of resistance within the Islamic world against the Zionist regime could reinforce the narrative of a weak Iran. Inaction in this area could also expose the country to unpredictable consequences. To exit the state of suspension, Iran must simultaneously pursue a three-pillar plan: first, increasing economic and social resilience; second, lifting sanctions while maintaining economic relations with China and East Asia and, at the same time, reducing tensions with the West and avoiding the creation of economic interests for those who profit from sanctions; and third, strengthening defensive capabilities based on smart political and operational approaches.”  

• • “To move beyond the current situation, five fundamental actions must be pursued simultaneously. First, enhance social capital by strengthening cohesion through the acceptance of cultural and social diversity, de-securitizing, empowering society, and creating hope and a clear outlook for the people. Second, revise institutional efficiency by using domestic and foreign experts, reforming the appointments system, promoting meritocracy, and opening the doors of governance to capable forces. Third, make serious investments in infrastructure, removing obstacles to foreign investment, realistically aligning revenue and expenditure in the energy sector, and paying effective attention to environmental issues. Fourth, reduce international tensions, defining win-win interests with Eastern partners, strengthening regional cooperation, and expanding relations with Persian Gulf countries. Fifth, advance genuine welfare and economic policies, including improving education, health care, and insurance, setting wages in line with inflation, supporting domestic production, creating job opportunities, and enabling the broad participation of educated women in the economy. The implementation of these measures will be effective only if they proceed simultaneously and in a coordinated manner.” 

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• December 13: Aklitha, which specializes in Iran’s ethnic and religious minorities, ran a background article on the groups composing the newly established Popular Resistance Front:
  • “According to reports by state media, this merger includes several smaller groups, such as Pada Baluch, the Nasr Movement of Baluchistan, and the Mohammad Rasulallah group – marginal factions that have not recently been particularly active in clashes along the Iran-Pakistan border. However, initial evidence indicates that the core of the new front is Jaish al-Adl, the most prominent Sunni Baluch militant group, which has carried out deadly attacks inside Iran for years.”
  • “The spokesperson of this front, introduced only by the name Mohammad Baluch, delivered a speech in Persian from an official platform and stated that the ‘Popular Resistance Front’ represents the ‘single voice’ of the various factions.”
  • “The announcement of the new front and the change in its slogans represent an important step in the evolution of Baluch militant groups. The signs point to a shift away from the traditional focus on Sunni identity, jihad, and Baluch-specific demands toward a broader political discourse that encompasses all of Iran’s minorities. This discourse includes an appeal to Kurds, Arabs, Turks, Turkmen, Gilaks, and ‘followers of all sects and religions’ to join the ranks of the front, indicating a clear ambition to expand the front’s membership and political message beyond traditional geographic and ethnic boundaries.”
  • “Observers believe this shift reflects the Baluch militants’ awareness of the limitations associated with a geographically confined ethnic insurgency in Sistan and Baluchistan province, one of Iran’s poorest regions. Through this new discourse, the front is seeking to enhance its legitimacy domestically and internationally and create new opportunities for recruitment and funding beyond the traditional base of Baluch armed groups.”
• December 14: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-affiliated Tasnim News published an article on the new coalition, writing:
  • “In a video statement released by Jaish al-Adl on November 29, an unnamed spokesperson announced that it has joined a coalition called the ‘Popular Resistance Front.’ The group, while referring to its support for the rights of the Baluch minority, stated that within the framework of this coalition it seeks to expand the scope of its struggle beyond regional issues. The new coalition is, in fact, a cover for the internal merger of the same scattered elements of Jaish al-Zolm,” or Army of Injustice, the term Iranian official sources use to refer to the group. “The new face of this coalition makes no reference to separatism, and the change in tone of the group’s new outer shell indicates an attempt at new branding – or, in other words, rebranding.”
  • “The new move by Jaish al-Zolm has, in practice, failed to change the anti-human nature of this group. This newly formed coalition is effectively a combination of the same old elements and lacks any popular base, and so far it has not brought about any meaningful change in the group’s operational capabilities. By contrast, Iran’s armed forces, with full intelligence dominance, are monitoring even the slightest movement by members of this coalition.”

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• December 6: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-affiliated Mashregh News compared the U.S. National Security Strategy document with the first administration of President Donald J. Trump’s National Security Strategy document, released in December 2017:
  • “The previous version was drafted using a combined diplomacy-military model in which diplomacy accounted for roughly 60% of the weight, whereas, in the new document, the military component rises to about 70%. Moreover, in the earlier document, Iran was depicted as a medium-level challenger to the United States, while in the new one this threat has been downgraded, though the focus remains on the nuclear file.”
• December 7: Amir Ali Abolfath, an expert in American studies, was quoted in economic newspaper Donya-ye Eqtesad:
  • “In the 2025 document, Iran is no longer considered a strategic threat to the United States, nor is it placed among the rogue states, because – according to the authors of the 2025 document – Iran is in decline.”
  • As for expected implications for U.S. policy toward Iran, Abolfath wrote: “From the American perspective the nuclear issue is considered resolved, and therefore there is no reason to negotiate over Iran’s nuclear program … Furthermore, the United States is not seeking regime change … The 2025 document likewise states that if the Abraham Accords expand, Iran will become isolated, and to further isolate Iran it recommends expanding these accords. Military intervention in west Asia is not something they are contemplating … They believe that the Iran-Israel issue is not over, and that the conflict may continue in other forms. But for now, the Americans themselves do not intend to take the initiative in launching an attack against Iran.”
• December 7: Technocratic Sazandegi published an article asserting:
  • “This is an approach in which Washington has replaced direct intervention with remote management: Iran is no longer viewed as an enemy to be confronted militarily but as a target for smart containment, and the Middle East has ceased to be the center of gravity in U.S. foreign policy. In this context, Tom Barrack’s remarks are more than a personal analysis; they reflect an official orientation – no to regime change and yes to managed coexistence – toward a region that is no longer the top priority yet remains vital for energy security and for Israel.”
• December 7: Rahman Qahremanpour, a foreign policy analyst, wrote in Cabinet mouthpiece Iran:
  • While the Middle East no longer appears to be a strategic priority, “if regional security is threatened, the document makes clear that the United States will act without delay. The reference in the document to keeping strategic straits open most likely points to the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb. The purpose of this emphasis is to signal that, in the new order the United States envisions for the Middle East, Iran must not pose a threat to American interests in the region.”
• December 8: Foreign Ministry Spokesman Esmaeil Baqaei was quoted in hard-line Kayhan:
  • “This document is less a U.S. national security strategy and, at least regarding west Asia, more a national security strategy for the Zionist regime. All of the United States’ focus is on enforcing the Zionist regime’s dominance over the region, which in itself amounts to American complicity in the continuation of the crimes committed by that regime.”
• December 8: IRGC-affiliated Javan published an article comparing the new national security strategy to previous documents:
  • “While the 2025 document mentions Iran only three times, the 2022 document referred to Iran seven times, and the 2017 document addressed the Iran issue 17 times. Thus, one can say that this document exhibits a kind of disregard and denial of Iran that is almost unprecedented.”
  • “The reference to energy routes as a red line – specifically the Strait of Hormuz – shows that, although the United States is compelled to shift its focus from west to east Asia, it nevertheless recognizes that threats to U.S. interests in west Asia persist, and that, despite its claims, it has not been able to resolve its problems in the Middle East.”

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