2021: A Bad Year for Gulf-Lebanese Relations

In 2021, Lebanon’s relations with the Gulf states spiraled. Hezbollah maintained its grip on Lebanese politics both through its mafia-like enforcement of order and its long-standing relationship with then-President Michel Aoun and his Christian party, the Free Patriotic Movement. This monopoly cast a large shadow over Lebanese politics and decision making, particularly as it pertained to Lebanon’s relationship with its neighbors.

George Kordahi, who served as Lebanon’s minister of information at the time, made disparaging comments about the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen, calling it “futile and pointless” and said that the Houthis were “defending themselves against an external aggression.” This came six months after then Lebanese Foreign Minister Charbel Wehbe used derogatory terms to describe the Saudis. Many Gulf Cooperation Council countries were convinced that Lebanon was pursuing a pro-Iran foreign policy that was intended to undermine the Gulf’s agenda.

Meanwhile, media accounts reported that Hezbollah was smuggling disassembled weapons into Yemen and conducting training for Yemen’s Houthi fighters. There have even been unconfirmed reports that Hezbollah’s leadership may have influenced Houthi financial and military operation decisions.

Moreover, in April 2021, Saudi authorities discovered a shipment of 5.3 million smuggled Captagon pills in pomegranate crates at the Jeddah airport. The Gulf states viewed Hezbollah’s sway in Lebanon, involvement in Yemen, and effort to corrupt Gulf society through the sale of drugs as a war being waged against them.

Lebanon’s Economic Crisis

In response, Saudi Arabia in October 2021 expelled Lebanon’s ambassador, banned all Lebanese imports, and recalled its ambassador to Lebanon. In solidarity, Bahrain, Kuwait, and the UAE recalled their ambassadors as well. (These Gulf ambassadors have since returned to Beirut). Then, in early 2022, Saad Hariri, Lebanon’s former prime minister and leader of the Sunni community in Lebanon, announced that he would suspend all his political activities in advance of that year’s parliamentary elections. The announcement was linked to tensions between the Saudi royal family and Hariri. Even the Emiratis, who agreed to host Hariri, emphasized to him that he would be allowed to conduct his business affairs in the UAE on the condition that he suspend his political activities.

As Lebanon’s relationship with the Gulf was deteriorating, it suffered the effects of one tragedy after another. In 2019, Lebanon endured a severe economic collapse, as its gross domestic product fell by nearly 40% in real terms, its currency lost 98% of its value, and depositors were not allowed to access their funds held at local banks. In August 2020, during the height of coronavirus pandemic restrictions, an estimated 2,750 tons of unsafely stored ammonium nitrate exploded at Beirut’s port causing the largest nonnuclear blast in modern history, resulting in hundreds of deaths, thousands of injuries, and billions of dollars in damage.

Rather than bringing relief from such tragedies, Iran’s support to Hezbollah has only added to the suffering of the Lebanese people, including the largely pro-Hezbollah Shia population in the south. Hezbollah used its sway to block for more than two years the election of a president that it viewed unfriendly to the group’s agenda, leading to political gridlock and paralysis. It was not until Israel’s attacks in 2024 in southern Lebanon, weakening Hezbollah, that the group realized it could no longer stand in the way of electing the president. And with Joseph Aoun’s election as president in January, the gridlock ended.

What Does Lebanon Need To Do?

In June 2023, the International Monetary Fund issued a report with economic reform recommendations to stabilize the Lebanese economy. The reforms included enhanced governance transparency, a strengthened anticorruption framework, improved performance among state owned enterprises, debt restructuring, a unified exchange rate, and protection for small depositors. It is generally accepted within Lebanon and among international observers that the country’s political elite are deliberately blocking much-needed reforms to protect their financial interests.

Between 1963 and 2022, Gulf states gave Lebanon an estimated $9 billion in grants, excluding loans and investments. But they have stressed that that era is over. Gulf capitals have linked any new financial packages to reforms, such as combatting corruption and restoring confidence in the banking system as proposed by the IMF, and, crucially, disarming Hezbollah. Saudi commentator Ali Shihabi said that Saudi Arabia “does not want to invest in a black hole.”

Like other Gulf states, Saudi Arabia generally frames its position on Hezbollah’s disarmament in terms of support for state control of weapons and in the context of adherence to relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions (which include provisions on disarmament). How a relatively weak Lebanese central government, with armed forces outgunned for decades by Hezbollah, would accomplish such disarmament without prompting significant internal instability remains unclear. However, as the Lebanese government and the international community continue to make progress on the question of Hezbollah’s weapons, it is widely expected that the mafia state created by the militia will no longer be able to survive, and the much needed and long-awaited economic reforms called for by the Gulf states and others will finally be enacted.

In August, U.S. Special Envoy for Syria – and U.S. Ambassador to Turkey – Thomas Barrack announced a plan to disarm Hezbollah by the end of 2025. It outlines an economic strategy for Lebanon that combines regional investment with security reforms. This plan also includes Saudi Arabia and Qatar investing in an economic zone in southern Lebanon to create job opportunities for former Hezbollah members who agree to lay down their weapons. Media accounts indicate that the plan for disarming Hezbollah will rely on persistent Israeli military pressure on the group, which could prolong the depopulation of some border villages and lead to a more militarized southern Lebanon.

Prospects for Gulf-Lebanon Ties

Given the key to any Gulf-Lebanon rapprochement is Hezbollah surrendering its weapons, the path to get there is going to be filled with landmines both figurative and literal. This does not mean that steps can’t be taken to move toward this goal. The first big hurdle was the election of Aoun and the appointment of Prime Minister Nawaf Salam. Lebanon now has a leadership that seems ready to bring the country back into the Arab and Western fold.

In March, Aoun was the first Lebanese head of state in eight years to visit Saudi Arabia, where he met Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. During the visit, the two leaders discussed taking steps to resume Lebanese exports to Saudi Arabia and have Saudi citizens once again travel to Lebanon, according to the Office of the Presidency. In the months that followed, Aoun also visited Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE to present Lebanon as “open for business.” Saudi Arabia has responded positively and, in November, announced plans to boost commercial ties to Lebanon after reports that “the Lebanese government and security forces demonstrated efficacy in curbing drug exports over recent months,” according to a senior Saudi official.

Accounting for more than 19% of GDP prior to the economic collapse in 2019, tourism has emerged as the fastest route toward restoring ties to Gulf countries and reviving the economy. “Tourism is a big catalyst, and so it’s very important that the bans get lifted,” said Laura Khazen Lahoud, Lebanon’s tourism minister. Shortly after Aoun’s visit, the UAE officially lifted its travel ban on UAE nationals visiting Lebanon, according to the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia are considering similar moves. Qatar never imposed a travel ban, so Qatari nationals have continued to travel to Lebanon.

Emirati and Gulf interests in Lebanon are likely to include investments in the energy sector and development of the gas fields in the eastern Mediterranean. The UAE may also be willing to contribute by providing equipment and training to universities and hospitals and by rehabilitating key infrastructure, particularly the Beirut port and the country’s road and bridge networks.

Remittances in Lebanon in 2025 are expected to reach $7.31 billion, with an annual growth rate of 4.5% over the next several years. Before the rupture with the Gulf, the majority of Lebanese expatriates in the Gulf were in Saudi Arabia with more than 300,000, the UAE was close behind with nearly 200,000, and Kuwait had around 42,000. From 2020-22 alone, more than 80,000 Lebanese moved to the Gulf in search of jobs. Remittances from the Gulf remain a critical component of the Lebanese economy.

Approaching the end of the year, Saudi Arabia has already made another strong gesture of support to the Lebanese government. Along with the United States and France, Saudi Arabia announced on December 18 that it will host an international conference early in 2026 in support of the Lebanese army. Aoun expressed his heartfelt gratitude and emphasized his commitment to ensuring that the money will be used in a transparent and responsible manner to help Lebanon resume its rightful place as a member of the Arab nations.

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As the protests spread nationally, the list of demands grew. Economic demands were high on the list – with the youth unemployment rate topping 35%, protesters called for more jobs as well as higher wages and lower prices and higher subsidies for basic goods. At the same time, they called for lower expenditures on the 2025 Africa Cup and 2030 World Cup. They demanded improvements in education, health care, housing, and public transit. They called for the release of detained protesters and effective measures against corruption, including the removal of corrupt political parties from the governing coalition. Interestingly, they also called for the adoption of English over French as Morocco’s second national language after Arabic, and, notably, most protest signs were in English – relatively few were in Arabic, with almost none in French. Increasing numbers of young Moroccans prefer English over French, replacing “colonial” French with the preferred language of international commerce and communications.

The protests brought to mind the Arab Spring protests of 2011, which resulted in significant political changes in Morocco. The resonance with the earlier protests was enough to spark a reaction and support, albeit modest, from fellow monarchies in the Gulf. Moroccan King Mohammed VI’s regularly scheduled address to the Parliament on October 10 signaled his refusal to accede to the most forceful demands, notably the removal of the prime minister. Still, the protests have been a reminder both that ties among fellow monarchs persist and that youth ambitions in the region have not been fully met. Typically, protests in Morocco trigger cabinet reshuffles and, at times, prime minister replacements, institutional mechanisms that insulate to some degree but also serve as a proxy for direct criticism of the monarch.

Morocco in the Gen Z Protest Wave

Morocco was the 22nd country swept up in a global wave of protests that peaked in September following well-publicized Gen Z protests in Nepal and Madagascar. Previously referred to as the “Asian spring,” worldwide Gen Z protests began earlier in Sri Lanka and Iran (following the death of Mahsa Amini) in 2022; continued in 2024 in Kenya, Bangladesh, Mozambique, and South Korea; and, in 2025, spread to Turkey, Mongolia, Nepal, Timor-Leste, Madagascar, Serbia, Indonesia, Togo, the Philippines, France, Italy, Switzerland, San Marino, the Maldives, Peru, Paraguay, and Morocco.

What ties these global youth protest movements together, other than the ubiquitous skull and crossbones flag and meme (from the Japanese manga series “One Piece”), are concerns over inequality, reductions in standards of living, corruption, democratic backsliding, and increasing authoritarianism. Another common thread has been the important roles of rappers, both in providing protest anthems and as “martyrs” when arrested. Morocco was no exception. Prominent Moroccan rappers in the movement included Don Bigg, Dizzy DROS, ElGrande Toto, and Khtek, and the movement also spawned the viral rap freestyle challenge #FreeKoulchi (Free Everyone).

While some of these protests have toppled governments – for example in Nepal and Bangladesh – others have been more reformist in nature, such as those in Turkey, Indonesia, and Morocco. Young Moroccans presented their demands to Mohammed VI in an October 2 letter that called for the removal of the prime minister, the dismissal of the government, and a plethora of reforms and new policies. A second letter by 60 prominent artists and intellectuals condemned the government’s initial lack of concessions and called for the same reforms and the release of those in detention.

Solidarity From the Gulf States

The Moroccan state’s predicament prompted a series of gestures of support by Gulf Cooperation Council countries. Saudi Prince Turki bin Mohammed bin Fahd bin Abdulaziz, minister of state and member of the Council of Ministers, personally delivered a message to Mohammed VI on October 6 on behalf of Saudi King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. On the same day, the Saudi crown prince’s plane was spotted in Marrakesh, prompting unsubstantiated media reports that Mohammed bin Salman personally participated in the Saudi show of solidarity. In addition, a high-level Saudi delegation visited the capital, Rabat, to discuss increasing cooperation in a wide range of strategic sectors, including bilateral efforts to boost employment. Anwar Gargash, advisor to the president of the United Arab Emirates, issued a statement of solidarity. Al Jazeera covered the protests but significantly softened its tone relative to its coverage of the 2011 Arab Spring protests in Morocco, amid a widely reported reorganization of its senior staff and concomitant shifts in its editorial line.

Morocco and the GCC states have a long history of supporting each other in times of need. Following a serious oil spill off Morocco’s coast in 1989 by an Iranian tanker, Saudi Arabia sent Morocco $50 million for the cleanup. When ocean winds and currents unexpectedly pushed the spilled oil offshore and out of harm’s way, the money was used to create Al Akhawayn University, which quickly became the country’s most prestigious institution of higher learning. Morocco famously sent 1,200 troops to defend Saudi Arabia in 1991 following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait despite strong populist headwinds in Morocco. GCC countries made a series of strong gestures during and after Morocco’s large Arab Spring protests, leading to the 2013 establishment of a $5 billion development fund. Morocco joined Saudi Arabia’s military action in Yemen in March 2015, and Moroccan soldiers stayed for nearly four years. When Morocco cut ties with Iran in 2018, it cited Iran’s 2011 interference in Bahrain as one of the reasons.

These gestures of solidarity have accompanied a deepening of economic and business ties. The first Morocco-GCC summit was held in 2016. And, in March, Morocco and the GCC established a joint action plan for 2030. The fifth Moroccan-GCC Investment Forum was held in early November. Increased GCC investment has been and will be critical in helping Morocco weather the current storm.

The King’s Response and a “Victory” for Youth

Mohammed VI responded to the protests in his October 10 address to the new session of Parliament. He called for job creation, improved services, and a reduction in regional inequities and directly criticized the Parliament for inefficiency, but he also – indirectly – criticized protesters for questioning “flagship” projects. These include the construction and refurbishing of seven stadiums for the World Cup, which he argued were no less important to national development and pride than other local infrastructure projects. For example, the new stadium in Casablanca is planned to be the largest in the world, with a capacity of 115,000 spectators. However, the most prominent slogan of Morocco’s protests was “Stadiums are there, but where are the hospitals?” Another was: “At least the FIFA stadium will have a first aid kit! Our hospitals don’t.”

The Moroccan government introduced both economic and political reforms following the protests. On the economic side, it announced a 16% increase in health and education spending amounting to $15 billion. These reforms are slated to create 27,000 jobs in those sectors, build new university hospitals, renovate 90 other hospitals, and expand teacher training and preschool education. On the political side, Morocco introduced bills to increase youth participation in politics, including the easing of candidate eligibility requirements and subsidies of up to 75% for young candidates’ electoral campaigns. “Gen Z 212” responded somewhat tepidly that “these measures must be accompanied by firm measures against corruption and conflicts of interest.”

Then something extraordinary happened: Morocco upset a heavily favored Argentinian team at the 2025 FIFA U-20 World Cup, the youth soccer World Cup, in Chile. Morocco defeated Spain, Brazil, South Korea, the United States, and perennial top seed France to get to the final. Argentina was the only undefeated team and had won the trophy six previous times. On October 19, the young Moroccans beat the offensively and defensively capable Argentinian team 2-0.

Suddenly, many of the same young Moroccans lamenting new stadiums joined the delirium in favor of another huge Moroccan soccer success. Morocco had been the first African or Arab team to reach the Men’s World Cup semifinals in 2022. Its women’s team was reaching new heights as well by unexpectedly qualifying for knockout stages of the 2023 World Cup, the first Arab and North African team to do so. This filled Moroccan youth with pride and is likely to serve to further dampen criticism of soccer stadium construction and refurbishment. But as the monarch and Moroccan youth seem to agree, the country’s political and economic success will depend to a significant degree on greater investment in job creation and services beyond what World Cup success will provide.

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Some Washington pundits view the attack on Qatar as a minor dent in an otherwise sturdy defense platform: It has angered the Gulf states, but they will come around due to few, if any, alternatives. This is a flawed assessment. It downplays the uniqueness of the attack and the determination it will spark in reassessing options. The attack was executed by a U.S. ally in a residential area without warning and targeted a U.S.-endorsed mediation process with Hamas representatives. It is not even remotely similar to the 2010 targeted Israeli assassination of a Hamas operative in Dubai, a covert action that violated sovereignty but did not involve airstrikes in broad daylight resulting in local casualties. This botched Qatar operation has been accompanied by alarming rhetoric. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has shown no remorse, warning Qatar and others on U.S. Embassy grounds in Jerusalem and subsequently in the presence of Secretary of State Marco Rubio that similar such attacks could not be ruled out. The Gulf’s centrality in the Middle East and its significance to the United States warrants specific U.S. guarantees beyond President Donald J. Trump’s assurances of nonrepetition and dinner meetings.

Interdependent Paths?

The Gulf Arab states have been the Trump administration’s preferred regional partner as evidenced by his affinity for forceful leadership and first major trips abroad to the Gulf in both presidential terms. The two sides share a pragmatic approach and recognize the possibilities of Gulf capital and U.S. technologies, among other mutually attractive domains.

Gulf-U.S. relations are at the heart of Trump’s vision for the Middle East: a peaceful, prosperous region further integrated with Israel. Yet this vision will not materialize if Israel sustains its occupation and keeps getting a free pass, violently advancing its aims at the expense of U.S. partners and even U.S. interests at times. A second obstacle is the midlife crisis confronting the current U.S. security umbrella as the relationship based on “oil for security” needs to be redefined. Both sides have been overtly discussing, and occasionally working on, a holistic and multifaceted agreement. However, they have not yet been able to come to a conclusive understanding. Accompanying this is the recurring frustration among the Gulf states over the perceived U.S. unwillingness to defend them, while the United States remains frustrated with the complaints and the Gulf states’ inability to grasp its position. Gulf leaders are aware that the United States does not necessarily respond to one-off attacks unless they are part of a clear cycle or threat – though such attacks appear increasingly more common in the Gulf. But the current U.S. defense posture is not delivering for the Gulf. It is further complicated by a new challenge: how to deter attacks on the Gulf by a U.S. ally. This is on top of changes in the United States and the Gulf during the past decade. An emboldened Gulf and an internally fractured, preoccupied United States makes a clearly defined defense treaty more urgent, starting bilaterally and then extending collectively to the Gulf Cooperation Council membership. Saudi Arabia and the United States have been pursuing one, but it remains on hold. Further, the most recent defense relations update with Bahrain in 2023, the Comprehensive Security Integration and Prosperity Agreement, falls short of Gulf expectations as would the rumored U.S. “enhanced” defense agreement with Qatar after Israel’s attack.

Gulf security has long relied on foreign superpowers. The United States has been the Gulf states’ main security partner, characterized by military bases and weapons procurement as well as training and interoperability. The relationship has delivered in the past, but its utility is under question if turning the Gulf into a conflict zone goes unaddressed. These attacks were few – until now. The last bastion of stability in the Middle East, the Gulf cannot afford these incidents to be the new normal. The often-underreported Gulf-U.S. security success stories will eventually be dwarfed by unaddressed security threats.

If these two elements – Israel’s conduct in the region and U.S. defense parameters – remain open questions, it will risk the stability of the region, the transformations underway in the Gulf, and the trillions of dollars in committed investments in the United States. The Gulf states will have to prioritize their security. They will not have enough bandwidth or even the excitement to pursue the envisaged projects with the United States. The United States cannot refuse to acknowledge the red lines that Israel has crossed in the past two years. Nor should it stay idle when its interests and Gulf partners are under attack.

The Gulf: One or Many?

Feeding the conviction that this was another one-off attack that will not garner a serious U.S. reaction is the notion of Gulf unity. Several partners of Gulf states, including the United States, readily dismiss Gulf unity. They find it performative, comes in waves, and serves passing interests at best. There are elements of this, but holding it as a rigid descriptor of Gulf affairs misses historical trends and the ongoing reconciliation momentum on display since the 2021 Al-Ula Summit. It also misses fast changing dynamics underway that reinforce the efficacy of unity: a weakened Iran and an emboldened Israel. The Gulf Arab states have always come together when major crises befall them. The Iran-Iraq War, occupation of Kuwait, and invasion of Iraq are a few examples. A U.S. ally attacking a Gulf capital, regardless of the reason, qualifies as another strong unifier.

Converging Gulf views and actions have been on display in recent months too. Look no further than coordinated actions in postconflict spaces such as Lebanon and Syria and relations with Iran. Tactical differences may exist (Sudan and the degree of normalization with Israel for example), but there is a shared general direction especially when it comes to regime preservation and pan-Gulf security. The Gulf rift from 2017-21 was the exception, not the norm.

For example, a delegation from the United Arab Emirates, an Abraham Accords signatory, kicked off its Gulf tour to align Gulf views toward normalization with Israel before turning to the ramifications of the Qatar attack (the Emirati visit to Saudi Arabia was followed by Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman). Top Emirati officials have warned Israel against annexing occupied Palestinian lands, and Abu Dhabi summoned the deputy Israeli ambassador to protest the Qatar attack. The UAE is part of a gathering Gulf consensus against Israel.

If Gulf leaders want to be taken more seriously by the United States, concrete and coordinated actions are necessary. The Gulf needs to move beyond optics (condemnations and communiques) and the performative (visits and summits) to specific innovative, escalatory actions that influence outcomes and yield tangible results from its partners and adversaries.

What Can the Gulf Do?

Gulf leaders are realists. Their dependence on U.S. security cooperation is no secret. Setting aside the question of trusting the United States or not, they recognize that no powerful alternative exists in the interim. Meanwhile, Israel has succeeded in rapidly elevating itself as the most immediate challenge to Gulf security. Early versions of these risks were already hinted at in the GCC’s first vision for regional security, issued in 2024. The precedent of an Israeli attack and the threat of a repeat underscore the urgency of GCC states coming fully to grips with the vulnerabilities and threats that currently face them. That is why remaining idle with no impactful response to Israeli aggression is not an option for the Gulf. The Gulf states need to efficiently promote their views and devise a set of actions that shields them from future attacks.

Diversifying partners, localizing defense, and establishing an indigenous regional security architecture are the next best options to the current dependence on the United States. But these measures, even with the modest progress of previous efforts, will take a decade at least to bear fruit, if pursued wholeheartedly. The Gulf’s changing threat perception can generate outcomes that diverge from U.S. security imperatives. When a U.S. ally becomes the source of a major threat to the Gulf, it means more regional defense cooperation with parties the Gulf Arab states have traditionally viewed with suspicion, such as Turkey and possibly even Iran, or with trusted partners, such as Pakistan. These defense ties are less developed than with the United States, but what use is a military superpower if it does not provide basic security needs and thwart repeated attacks? Regarding evolving Gulf attitudes toward Iran, a lax U.S. response to the Israeli attack could ultimately push the Gulf Arab states closer to Iran, an astonishing potential turn of events and one that indicates how powerfully Israel’s reckless action has upended long settled strategic thinking in the Gulf. This can mean continued quiet communication and de-escalatory efforts with Iran, turning a blind eye to maximum pressure enforcement, and enabling Iranian regime survival to act in effect as a counterweight to Israel, avoiding the latter’s imposition of a regional order. Such a trend, which would represent strengthening current Gulf rapprochement dynamics with Iran, could push Abraham Accords signatories toward cooling relations with Israel, at best, and further systemize Gulf efforts toward actualizing a Palestinian state as a precursor to any further normalization.

Despite the challenges the Gulf states confront in addressing threats to their security, they have more immediate options to respond to Israel’s attack. If such a response is smartly planned and coordinated, the tools at their disposal can send a clear signal that the Gulf is to be reckoned with. Such action can also help fend off future attacks or at least raise the stakes for potential attackers.

Gulf sovereign wealth funds are the region’s most underutilized deterrent although marshaling this tool for deterrent effect will require acknowledging the independent calculation of national interests each state brings to the deliberations. If the many Gulf sovereign wealth funds were to consider a joint, specific divestment plan that starts with Israeli-affiliated entities, including specific triggers, it could have powerful effect. Similar action aimed at the U.S. entities at a later stage would also likely have a galvanizing effect. Any financial moves that could have an impact on U.S. interests should be gradual and well-communicated in advance to accentuate impact and minimize fallout, and they should be accompanied with specific asks that meet Gulf defense needs and regional interests, such as delivering a Palestinian state – a goal that the United States does not disagree with. Consideration should be given to making Gulf investments in the United States conditional on enabling local industrial and defense development to secure civilian nuclear programs and access to technology and materials, like the recent U.S. artificial intelligence and chip deals with the UAE and Saudi Arabia.

Diplomatic pressure and global coalition building like the Saudi-led “Global Alliance for the Implementation of the Two State Solution” is another model to follow. Despite their low risk tolerance and capability disparity with Israel, Gulf states need to underscore – and have their powerful friends underscore – the right of states under international law to defend themselves when attacked. The United Nations charter enshrines that right. Gulf countries could choose to exercise that right, as well, with a demonstrated, orchestrated defensive response.

Continued diversification and signing major defense deals with other countries should also be geared toward securing more U.S. concessions. This process is already underway. A joint, strategic approach is already one of the early responses to the Qatar attack, including the Saudi-Pakistani mutual defense pact that had been in the works but was notably signed eight days after the attack. Putting together an adaptive, integrated suite of options promises better returns than a wait-and-see attitude, a hesitant response, or exclusive recourse to a behind-the-scenes approach. Absent an assertive approach, the Gulf states would be inviting another attack. Other Gulf capitals could be next.

New Gulf-U.S. Understandings

This is a different attack. The United States should take note of the Gulf’s rapidly shifting calculus. The attack on Qatar will accelerate a process already underway – weaning off of dependence on the United States – and likely provide for a more unified response across the Gulf. But eliciting a firm U.S. response that addresses Gulf security concerns and admonishes Israel would reinvigorate the relationship and demonstrate the Gulf’s value to the United States. That could translate into a well-defined collective defense pact with the Gulf states.

The United States is facing a depleting reservoir of credibility in the Middle East. Consistency is key to addressing that depletion and so is treating the Gulf states as equal partners in a multifaceted relationship starting with security.

The Gulf states need to forcefully demonstrate their rejection of the evolving regional status quo. Turning a blind eye to Israel’s open season on the region is not an option; Gulf states need to take action and activate messaging that effectively quarantines this attack as a deeply mistaken one off and absolutely not the start of an alarming new trend.

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“Heatwave,” Bahrain pavilion, 2025 Venice Biennale of Architecture (Photo by Ishaq Madan, courtesy of Bahrain Authority for Culture and Antiquities)

Bahrain’s pavilion is part of a broader shift in how Gulf Arab states are leveraging architecture to address – or at least narrate – pressing environmental and social questions. Framed as an urgent yet poetic response to extreme heat, “Heatwave” advances a vocabulary of modular platforms, raised canopies, and passive cooling strategies rooted in traditional Bahraini architecture. But beyond its technical sophistication and articulate design, the pavilion’s political and ethical stakes demand closer interrogation – particularly in comparison with its regional counterparts from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, and Oman.

Curated by Andrea Faraguna and commissioned by Khalifa bin Ahmed al- Khalifa, “Heatwave” proposes an architectural language attuned to the experience of heat as an embodied condition, especially among those who have to inhabit outdoor spaces – namely laborers and low-income workers. Drawing inspiration from wind towers, shaded courtyards, and local material systems, the pavilion positions itself as a climate-responsive prototype and a platform for rethinking “thermal commons” – namely shared spaces, resources, practices, and knowledge related to thermal comfort within a community, in short shared civic infrastructure. The structure is at once minimal and affective – a reminder of how modernism once promised social equity through spatial design. But to what extent can such an elegant gesture intervene in systems that produce environmental and social precarity in the first place?

“Heatwave,” Bahrain pavilion, 2025 Venice Biennale of Architecture (Photo by Ishaq Madan, courtesy of Bahrain Authority for Culture and Antiquities)

“Heatwave” is among the few Gulf pavilions that embody realities of extreme heat and the lived experiences of vulnerable workers. Yet some danger may lie in precisely this framing – where the sometimes lethal intensity of climate is abstracted into a universal design problem. For decades, like other Gulf countries, Bahrain has relied on South Asian migrant laborers to build and maintain its urban infrastructure. Many of these laborers work outdoors in summer, often with little protection or oversight. However, Bahrain’s official policy prohibits outdoor work in direct sunlight from midday to late afternoon during the hottest months – from June 15 to September 15, between 12 pm and 4 pm. The policy applies primarily to traditional field laborers, carries substantial fines and criminal penalties for violations, and is enforced through active inspections. But, according to numerous Bahraini media reports, the policy is limited in scope and does not account for real-time heat conditions – prompting calls for broader coverage and climate-responsive measures. Considering this context, “Heatwave” risks appearing as a symbolic balm – an aesthetic resolution to a much deeper structural issue.

Other Gulf national pavilions engage with similarly urgent themes. Saudi Arabia’s “The Um Slaim School,” curated by Beatrice Leanza and presented by Syn Architects, focuses on the study of traditional Najdi vernacular forms. The exhibition space is a “living archive” that celebrates tradition and community learning. Despite its ambition, the Saudi pavilion leans heavily on representation rather than spatial engagement, raising questions about whether architecture can function as a form of pedagogy without actual construction. Moreover, its reliance on antiquated notions of heritage and history does not offer a solution to the concerns posed by the biennale’s theme – instead, it is nostalgic and romanticized. In contrast to Bahrain’s tactile prototype, Saudi Arabia offers a discursive platform – valuable in itself but less grounded in the material reality of urban transformation.

The UAE’s “Pressure Cooker,” curated by Azza Aboualam, centers on food security and greenhouse design in arid contexts. It showcases modular “kit-of-parts” structures for localized agriculture and offers an alternative narrative to the resource-extractive history of Gulf development. Its architectural “cookbook” format is inventive, but its speculative nature – like many research-led exhibitions – is difficult to assess without implementation. Unlike “Heatwave,” which confronts heat as a spatial and civic problem, “Pressure Cooker” frames food production as a systems question, somewhat detached from questions of equity and access.

Qatar’s debut pavilion, “Beyti Beytak” (“My House Is Your House”), plays with hospitality as an architectural and cultural trope. With installations ranging from Yasmeen Lari’s bamboo “Community Centre” to archival explorations of Middle East and North African architecture, Qatar’s pavilion functions more as cultural diplomacy than architectural critique. While its ambition to represent multiple geographies and generations is admirable, its use of hospitality – serving dates and coffee, invoking the mashrabiya (wooden screen windows) – occasionally seems performative. Unlike Bahrain’s “Heatwave,” which is modest in scale but radical in implication, Qatar’s offering is expansive and curated to impress – a mirror of its wider cultural strategies in Doha and beyond.

Kuwait’s “Kaynuna” (“Being”), meanwhile, provides the most introspective reflection on modernization. Led by Abdulaziz al-Mazeedi and a team of young designers, the pavilion critiques the demolition-driven ethos of Kuwait’s urban policies. It proposes alternative frameworks that bridge memory, identity, and material sustainability. Among all the Gulf pavilions, “Kaynuna” comes closest to Bahrain’s pavilion in its willingness to confront the erasures of state-led development. Yet where Bahrain responds with architectural form, Kuwait uses speculative drawings and conceptual installations.

“Traces” is Oman’s Venice Biennale of Architecture debut. It focuses on the sablah, a traditional gathering space. The pavilion’s material choices – woven palm, modular seating, and pottery-inspired structures – articulate a vision of architecture as continuity rather than rupture. While modest compared to the other Gulf contributions, it is also the most grounded. In comparison to “Heatwave,” “Traces” offers a quieter meditation on climate, community, and temporality.

“Heatwave,” Bahrain pavilion, 2025 Venice Biennale of Architecture (Photo by Ishaq Madan, courtesy of Bahrain Authority for Culture and Antiquities)

Bahrain’s “Heatwave” has distinguished itself not only by winning the Golden Lion for Best National Pavilion but by grounding environmental design in spatial and political urgency. Its invocation of the “thermal commons” is an important intervention in architectural discourse, particularly at a time when climate response is often reduced to technical solutions that do not directly address social concerns. But its real legacy will depend on what happens after Venice. Will its modular design be replicated in schoolyards, labor sites, and bus stations in Manama? Or will it become yet another speculative gesture consigned to the archives of biennale architecture? To avoid that fate, Bahrain must move beyond the aesthetics of care and confront the deeper structures that perpetuate thermal inequality. Architecture, after all, is not just about shelter or cooling – it is about who gets to inhabit space with dignity. In that regard, “Heatwave” is not an answer but a provocation. And perhaps that is precisely why it matters.

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Modern, Skill-Intensive, and Export-Oriented Services

While manufacturing still has an important role to play, emerging economies, including in the Gulf Cooperation Council states, can benefit from adding skill-intensive and export-oriented services as part of their development strategies. Driven by digital transformation and shifting consumer preferences, services have high growth potential. This is particularly the case for information and communication technology, transportation and logistics, finance and insurance, and remote services, such as telemedicine. Services grew from an estimated 65.3% of global gross domestic product in 2023 to 66.2% in 2024, owing to an increase in skill-intensive activities.

Services that used to be classified as nontradables (i.e., with no foreign trade potential) are becoming increasingly export oriented as digital technologies make services more storable, codifiable, and transferable. Recent International Monetary Fund estimates show that median labor productivity relative to manufacturing in the Asia-Pacific region is higher in wholesale and retail trade, more than double in business services, and nearly four times in finance.

Services are increasingly accompanying the exportation of goods, as companies work to bundle manufactured exports with complementary services, such as engineering or maintenance, a trend driven primarily by foreign-owned manufacturers. According to the IMF, since 2000, the GCC’s trade in goods and services grew at an average real rate of 7.5%, almost twice that of real GDP growth of 4.8%, and much higher than the global average of 3.8%.

Services in the Gulf Economies 

The Gulf Arab states’ well-developed infrastructure, geographic location, and growing urban centers position them to capitalize on high-value services, such as high-end travel and tourism, finance, transportation and logistics, information technology, and artificial intelligence. Saudi Vision 2030 emphasizes diversification strategies that include such activities, and Dubai has already emerged as a global service hub.

Differences in shares of three “productive services” – commerce, restaurants, and hotels; transportation, communication, and entrepots; and financial services – in percentage of non-oil GDP in the GCC states show where there is growth potential for lagging countries. In commerce, restaurants, and hotels, Bahrain and Kuwait have roughly half the shares of Saudi Arabia and Oman and just a bit more than one-third of the United Arab Emirates. The key to improve here is to promote tourism with more investment in facilities and infrastructure, increased promotion campaigns, and easy entry requirements. The GCC unified tourist visa, which requires tourists to acquire only a single visa to visit all six GCC states, is an important step in this direction.

For transportation, communication, and entrepots, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia can catch up by developing more deep-sea container terminals and logistics facilities. For financial services, where Bahrain dominates, Gulf neighbors can focus on establishing an effective regulatory environment, strong infrastructure, and a pool of highly skilled and experienced professionals in niches such as banking and insurance, wealth management, and commodities trading. This is in addition to Islamic finance, which aligns with national job creation strategies by directly linking financial services to the real economy through asset-backed investments and profit-sharing arrangements, thereby supporting enterprise development and job creation.

Source: The 2024 Arab Unified Economic Report

Boosting “Good Jobs” in Services

Economist Dani Rodrik defines “good jobs” as those that provide “a middle-class living standard, adequate benefits, reasonable levels of personal autonomy, economic security, and career ladders.” The OECD, through its job quality index, compiles data on earnings, labor market security, and the quality of the working environment, in efforts to help countries assess job quality to identify areas for growth.

In the GCC context, the emphasis is on increasing employment among national populations. National employment programs try to fill quotas, particularly in the private sector. For example, the UAE’s Emiratization initiative requires companies with 50 employees or more to increase the number of Emiratis in skilled positions by 2% per year. These programs, however, are often inefficient because less qualified employees can end up being hired or promoted for the sole purpose of filling the quotas.

A better alternative is to adopt a strategy to develop modern, skill-intensive, and export-oriented services, especially in sectors that have already demonstrated notable growth potential, such as transportation and logistics in Dubai and financial services in Bahrain. Meanwhile, training needs to focus on jobs in high demand. Gulf Talent, an employment agency, regularly posts job openings by sector in the UAE. This data can be used in conjunction with results from good jobs surveys to develop a national good jobs strategy.

Source: Gulf Talent

In practice, instead of trying to pick winners, i.e., services that are expected to provide good jobs (something that is difficult to do as proved by decades of industrial policy in developed and emerging economies alike), GCC governments would find greater success in establishing specialized free zones in services that provide fast business setups, state of the art infrastructure, innovative funding opportunities for startups, exemptions from customs and corporate taxes, and easy access to global markets. In this context, subsidies can support new and innovative projects that are expected to provide strong demonstration effects to other investors. Otherwise, the choice of investment niches should be left to investors who will assume the risks of failure.

Newly announced projects, such as the establishment by the United States of an AI data center in Abu Dhabi and President Donald J. Trump’s AI deals in Saudi Arabia, are initial steps, but more should be done, especially in education.

Putting the Pieces Together

As the GCC countries transition to post hydrocarbon economies, they should offer their youth good opportunities in the private sector, particularly “good jobs” in export-oriented services. This can complement where Gulf states have made inroads in manufacturing, especially high value-added and export-oriented high-tech and heavy industries, such as petrochemicals, where the Gulf states have a competitive advantage.

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